

participation of Muslim youngsters within the established political parties. Consider that of 8,424 candidates in the 2002 national election there were only 123 *beurs* or blacks, most of them within the ambit of small sectarian parties on the extreme left. Here, in combination of course with combating socioeconomic exclusion, lies the frontier of more successful Muslim integration in the future.

### Conclusion

In the European imbroglio surrounding Muslim integration, the fundamental distinction between cultural and socioeconomic integration tends to be ignored. With respect to cultural integration, the accommodation of Islam has made huge strides across European societies, irrespective of divergent nationhood and church-state legacies. By contrast, the unresolved problem is the persistent socioeconomic marginalization of the children and grandchildren of Muslim immigrants. This marginalization has no religious roots—it meets Muslims not qua Muslims but qua immigrants. But it has often found a religious expression in that global Islam provides an idiom of protest and identity for excluded Muslim ethnics.

To the degree that religion is causally involved in the production of marginality, it is less as the cause of discrimination than as a factor in cultural withdrawal. The notion Islamophobia, invented in mid-1990s Britain, has obscured the real causes of Muslim disadvantage, which have little to do with a behavioral or institutional animus against Islam and everything to do with the demographic profile of this minority (see Joppke forthcoming). On the contrary, when we consider how much the confrontation with Islam has historically shaped the Christian identity of Europe, we should be surprised at how flexible its laws and institutions have proved to be in accommodating the former “enemy” in cultural and religious terms.

Assertive Muslim identities, for which the headscarf, above all, stands today, unfortunately contributed to deflecting attention away from the crucial socioeconomic problems to more peripheral cultural and religious issues, for which a solid constitutional and statutory framework exists. By the same token, a firm stance on cultural integration, as in the French anti-headscarf law, may well be a prerequisite for fighting socioeconomic marginalization more effectively. It is wrong to argue that the French headscarf ban was a “delusional ‘fix’ given the much larger set of social problems that needed to be addressed,” as Joan Scott argues (2007, 115). Instead, in a kind of lexical ordering, French lawmakers first brought Muslims into the national fold by asking them—like all French citizens—to abstract from their origin features in public space. Once this was done and the Frenchness of French Muslims was assured, the struggle against discrimination (*lutte contre la discrimination*) could start in earnest, with a robust push toward Anglo-Saxon-style ethnic counting and positive discrimination under current President Sarkozy. Once the headscarf chapter was closed, diversity, that is, the idea that the key positions in society and polity should mirror the racial and ethnic composition of society, took hold in France much as it has throughout Europe, and this is the French and European Muslims’ best hope for the future.

## CHAPTER NINE

# A Multicultural Paradise?

## The Cultural Factor in Dutch Integration Policy

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Western European countries heatedly debate the issue of how much and what kind of cultural differentiation is to be allowed in the public domain. Many have witnessed the rise of right-wing populist parties that see migrants as a threat to social cohesion and national identity (Van Kersbergen and Krouwel 2003; Michael Minkenberg, chap. 10 in this volume). Whether the integration policy in the past has stressed accommodating immigrants’ cultural or religious identities, as in the Netherlands and Great Britain, or cultural monism or uniformity, as in Germany and France, the culture debate continues to rage widely (e.g., Brubaker 2001; Favell 2001; Benhabib 2002; Commission on Multi-Ethnic Britain 2000; Joppke 2004).

Much of the debate focuses on Muslim minorities, who form the majority of the migrant population in Western Europe. The building of mosques, the call to prayer, the use of religious symbols such as the headscarf, gender inequality, anti-integration pronouncements by ultra-orthodox imams, and Islam-inspired political extremism are all popular subjects in the media (e.g., Christian Joppke, chap. 8 in this volume; Verhaar and Saharso 2004; Uitermark, Rossi, and Van Houtum 2005). Citizens from the majority population are increasingly coming to fear Islam (European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia 2002; Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Hello 2002).

This certainly applies in the Netherlands, where the Islamophobic Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) party took second place in the 2002 elections, despite the murder of its leader, Pim Fortuyn. “These events did not fit the Netherlands’s global image... as a wealthy, tolerant, and perhaps excessively liberal society” (Van Der Veer 2006, 212). This chapter examines the retreat from multiculturalism in the Netherlands, one of its supposed standard-bearers in Europe. According to Christian Joppke (2004; chap. 8 in this volume), the Dutch abandoned their pluralistic policy for two reasons. First, the whole approach of allowing designated minority groups to emancipate themselves within their own parallel institutions allegedly fueled segregation and separation from mainstream society. Second, the Dutch pluralist integration policy did

not remedy the most pressing problems among immigrants and their offspring—unemployment and economic marginalization—and may even have worsened them. In Joppke's view, "under the shadow of official multiculturalism, an 'ethnic underclass' had been allowed to emerge" (2004, 248). Other scholars agree that Dutch multiculturalist integration policy has had pernicious effects on the cultural and economic integration of migrants (Koopmans and Statham 2000; Koopmans et al. 2005; Ireland 2004; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007).

The Dutch debate on "the multicultural drama"<sup>1</sup> led, in 2002, to the establishment of a parliamentary committee of inquiry. This committee requested that the authors of this chapter evaluate the objectives and results of the Dutch integration policy between 1970 and 2002 (Rijkshroeff, Duyvendak, and Pels 2004; Rijkshroeff et al. 2005). Our study leads us to conclude that Dutch integration policy did not, in fact, fail, nor was it all about pluralism. We acknowledge that migrants still face many serious and persistent problems; however, they nevertheless seem to have been fairly successful in economic terms, as evaluated by the standards set by Dutch policymakers. The sociocultural results are more mixed, however, as are the cultural policies of the Dutch government.

This leaves us with a puzzle: If integration policies did not produce negative outcomes, why has the pluralism debate been so heated in the Netherlands? What has really motivated the repudiation of multiculturalism and the demand that immigrants become, in Gans's terms, "like non-immigrants culturally and socially" (2007, 154)? Despite the characterization of the Dutch majority population and Dutch integration policies as pluralist and tolerant, we believe that the Dutch cultural mainstream in fact is strongly monoculturalist and intolerant of pluralism. In other words, it is our claim that the Dutch progressive liberal cultural consensus actually contributes more to the current intolerance of cultural and social differences than the alleged failures of Dutch integration policies.

### Our Evaluation of Dutch Integration Policy

Our study of Dutch integration policy began with several key questions: What were the actual policy objectives? How coherently and consistently were they pursued? To what extent were they achieved? We began by mapping out all the objectives stated in the relevant recommendations, memoranda, and Dutch parliamentary debates and linking them with the specific policy measures adopted to advance them. Analyzing these data enabled us to draw some conclusions about the coherence and consistency of the Dutch integration policy in the period under study.

With regard to actual policy outcomes, we used two approaches. First, we summarized prior evaluations of the effectiveness of the policy measures adopted. Second, we examined the relevant empirical data on immigrant outcomes using the various systems established since the mid-1980s for monitoring the socioeconomic position of the Dutch integration policy target groups (see Guiraudon, Phalet, and ter Wal 2005). These two sources of information enabled us to assess the success or failure of the Dutch integration policy and its constituent parts.<sup>2</sup>

### Phases of Dutch Integration Policy

Large-scale immigration to Holland began with the recruitment of guest workers during the 1950s and 1960s and migration from former Dutch colonies, particularly Indonesia, in that same period. The migration of former colonials was not particularly problematic because many had been part of the Dutch civil service; they had Dutch citizenship, spoke the language, and understood the culture. It was assumed at that time, however, that most migrant workers would stay in the Netherlands only temporarily and that they would return to their country of origin once they had fulfilled their economic goals.

The 1970s saw the start of the follow-up migration of partners, children, and other family members of the original guest workers. Nevertheless, it was still assumed that these people's stay would only be relatively short. At this point, integration policy focused on maintaining group cohesion with only peripheral attention to integration into Dutch society. Policy in the 1970s focused on managing labor migration, encouraging the guest workers to return to their country of origin, and regulating family and marriage migration.

The assumptions about the temporary nature of the migrants' stay were gradually abandoned in the 1980s. This was the era of the minorities policy. Migrants with a low social position were deemed to be the target groups of the new minorities policy. As expressed in the slogan "integration while maintaining one's identity," this policy focused both on combating social deprivation (particularly in education, the labor market, and housing) by strengthening the legal position of migrants and opposing their unequal treatment and on creating spaces for preserving "one's own" culture, religion, and language.

The 1990s saw the arrival of integration policy, inspired above all by the persistent educational deprivation of the children of migrants compared with their counterparts in the majority population, together with an increased demand for more highly educated labor and the concomitant higher unemployment levels among poorly educated migrants. The integration policy sought to foster increased educational attainment and labor market participation. The emphasis shifted to the socioeconomic integration of the individual. Attention to collective emancipation through cultural distinctiveness faded into the background.

Finally, after the mid-1990s, citizenship policy became a predominant motif. It emphasized the rights and duties of the individual citizen. The government abandoned the institutionalization of ethnic diversity as a policy objective. What did remain was attention to improving the accessibility of mainstream facilities, developing the social and cultural capital of migrants to further their socioeconomic participation, and stimulating interethnic contact.

### Socioeconomic Outcomes

Although developed in phases, government policy showed considerable consistency in seeking to improve the socioeconomic position of migrants and ethnic minorities in the core institutions of Dutch society: education, the labor market (work and

income), and housing. An important question is whether, after taking relevant background characteristics into account, members of ethnic minorities are now at the same position as the Dutch majority. This is called the proportionality objective (Van der Laan and Veenman 2004, 15). Moreover, we want to know if a minority group middle class is developing.

### Education

Ethnic minority pupils start primary education at a disadvantage. On completing their elementary school, Turkish, Moroccan, and Antillean children are still behind their native counterparts in the Dutch language and, to a lesser extent, math. Surinamese pupils perform better than the other minority groups, but they too lag behind Dutch majority pupils. Studies show, however, that minority group pupils are gradually performing better at school over the last two decades, resulting in a reduction of their deficit relative to majority pupils (Dagevos, Gijsberts, and Van Praag 2003; Gijsberts and Herweijer 2007). These studies show that in secondary education immigrants Surinamese and Antillean pupils are almost as likely to reach higher school levels as pupils from the Dutch majority, whereas Turkish and Moroccan pupils are more likely to reach lower secondary school levels than pupils from the majority population.

Wendy Van der Laan and Justus Veenman (2004) analyzed the educational positions of the four large minority groups on the basis of the 2002 survey of Social Position and Use of Facilities by Members of Ethnic Minorities (SPVA). They find that, although these ethnic minority groups lagged behind the Dutch majority, the differences diminished greatly after controlling for social background. After they had adjusted for such factors, the entire Surinamese population and Antilleans/Arubans between ages 15 and 65 achieved parity. Although significant differences remain for the other two groups, they have been making progress as well. Furthermore, if we look only at second-generation youngsters—born and raised in the Netherlands and therefore socialized in the Dutch educational system—they generally perform more equitably. More recent data clearly corroborate these trends (Turkenburg and Gijsberts 2007).

It is surprising that the gap between disadvantaged ethnic minority pupils and children from the Dutch majority has narrowed in recent years, whereas the gap between disadvantaged native Dutch children and the majority has widened. Turkish and Moroccan pupils who started in year 4 (grade 2) in 1994 and 1996 made much more progress in both language and arithmetic than disadvantaged pupils from the majority population (Meijnen 2003; Gijsberts and Herweijer 2007). Wim Meijnen concludes, “it is not the foreign origin that is the most important reason why many ethnic minority children lag behind but, their socio-economic background, in this case their parents’ education” (2003, 14).

Although the average educational level of minority pupils has increased over the past decades, only up to half of them leave the educational system with at least the minimum level of qualifications required by the labor market,<sup>3</sup> compared to 77 percent of the majority pupils. Again, however, the performance of second-generation minority pupils tells a more successful tale—between 46 (Turkish pupils) and 78 percent

(Antillean pupils) of the second-generation youth leave school sufficiently qualified for the labor market (Turkenburg and Gijsberts 2007). With respect to those who are in school now, the picture becomes even more positive. “This group of the second generation performs remarkably well. More than forty percent of them are in higher education” (De Valk and Crul 2007, 63).

### Labor Market and Income

Generally speaking, Dutch minorities have long had a poor position in the labor market (Penninx 1988; Veenman 1994, 1999). We can look at how they have been faring in terms of unemployment and the types of jobs held by the working-age population using data from the 2002 SPVA survey (Van der Laan and Veenman 2004).

Overall, the picture of unemployment is predominantly positive from the standpoint of achieving background-adjusted proportionality with the majority Dutch population. Not only have young people from the second generation gained an equal position compared with their native counterparts who have the same background characteristics, but the total population of 15- to 65-year-olds have also done so. Although it remains true that the immigrant population generally has higher unemployment levels than the native Dutch population, this can be traced back to their less favorable background characteristics in most cases. Generally speaking, proportionality has been achieved.

The total population of people of immigrant origin between the ages of 15 and 65 has not achieved equality with the Dutch population in the types of jobs held. In 2002, the percentage with a middle or higher occupational level ranged from 13 (Turks) and 15 percent (Moroccans) to 32 percent (Surinamese and Antilleans), against 49 percent (native Dutch). Nevertheless, thanks also to the increasing flow of ethnic minority members into higher occupational and scientific education, we do observe a fast rise of the middle class. The proportion of 15- to 65-year-olds reaching middle or higher job levels doubled in 2002 compared to 1991 (Dagevos and Gijsberts 2005). In addition, we observe proportionality as far as the average job level is concerned among second generation young people from ethnic minorities—which is mainly due to improvements in educational attainment and language proficiency (Euwals 2007). The most recent yearly trend report on the integration of Dutch minorities confirms the gradual improvement of their position on the labor market. The proportion of working members of ethnic minorities is higher now than it was ten years ago and the unemployment rate has decreased. “A substantially higher percentage of second than first generation Turks and Moroccans in the age group 25 to 35 years of age have paid work” (Heering and ter Bekke 2007, 79). Although minorities, on average, still lag behind the native Dutch labor force, they unmistakably have fared better over the years. Caution regarding their future prospects is necessary, however, because their labor market position appears to be relatively vulnerable to conjunctural fluctuations (Dagevos 2007).

The net hourly wages of minority groups have not achieved proportionality. To the contrary, the situation has deteriorated, mainly since 1998. These unfavorable findings apply to both the total population between 15 and 65 years of age and the 15- to 30-year-olds belonging to the second generation (Van der Laan and Veenman

2004). Bearing in mind the positive developments surrounding job levels, this is a surprising finding; even when migrants have the same or similar characteristics (including the same job level); they receive lower net hourly wages than indigenous residents. This might be because migrants work in different industries than their indigenous counterparts with the same characteristics.

On the brighter side, young migrants between the ages of 15 and 30 do show proportional rates of benefit dependency. This implies that they are much less likely to claim unemployment benefit (WW), invalidity benefit (WAO), or social assistance benefit (ABW) than usually assumed. Apart from the Surinamese, the total population of 15- to 65-year-olds has not, however, achieved parity on benefit dependency in spite of favorable developments over the past years (Dagevos 2007).

### Housing

Our review reveals that the housing situation of migrants (Veldboer and Duyvendak 2004) has improved considerably since their arrival in the Netherlands. Compared with thirty years ago, the quality of accommodations has clearly improved and immigrants are particularly well integrated in public-sector rental housing (Amse and Faessen 2000), which is of quite high standard in the Netherlands.

Nevertheless, immigrants have not achieved proportionality in the housing market. Deprivation tends to apply in particular to Turkish and Moroccan people. Compared with the indigenous population, the Surinamese, and the Antilleans, the upward housing mobility of Turkish and Moroccan people has been slow. One reason has been their sluggish income growth, but their (young) age structure also has played a role. Over the past decade, however, the housing quality for people of Turkish and Moroccan descent has increased at a relatively high pace (Kullberg 2007). "The second generation occupied somewhat more often single-family dwellings than the first. Especially the Turkish second generation showed more often owner-occupancy than the first [generation]" (Van Praag and Schoorl 2007, 42). Although it is not clear how the entire second generation (15- to 30-year-olds) will experience the housing market in the future, these facts leave room for some optimism.

These findings lead us to conclude that mobility patterns may differ highly between and within immigrant groups but that these groups are, on the whole, coming closer to achieving social equality. Because educational success offers the key to further integration (Odé 2002), the positive results in this area offer hope for the future, even though attaining an identical educational level still does not guarantee equal job opportunities for members of ethnic minorities compared with the Dutch majority.

Labor market discrimination appears to be the main obstacle to progress. Opportunities for better jobs and higher incomes enable people to find better housing and break away from housing segregation (i.e., white and black neighborhoods) (Rijkschroeff, Duyvendak, and Pels 2004). The persistently low income of many ethnic minorities does deter them from moving to more favorable districts; however, we do not find that large groups of permanent drop-outs have been left behind in the disadvantaged neighborhoods.

Most of the data show that immigrants or their children have reached a status that is proportional to that of natives after adjusting for socioeconomic background. But can we detect tendencies that the differences in socioeconomic background themselves

are disappearing? Are migrants becoming more equal to the native-born Dutch in nominal terms as well? Is a middle class developing? Recent data suggest that this indeed is the case (Dagevos and Gijsberts 2005, 2007). The most recent report on second-generation immigrants draws the following conclusion regarding the development of a middle class among people with an immigrant background:

The TIES [The Integration of the European Second Generation survey] findings on this are quite optimistic. About a third of the second generation is either studying in higher education, or has already finished higher education. They will be the future elite of their communities. They can be found in high level jobs, are owner of their own business or are active as representative of immigrant and religious organizations. Those who entered the labor market already make good salaries.... The children of these parents will grow up in financially steady middle class families and have good prospects for the future. (Crul, Groenewold, and Heering 2007, 139–140)

These data do not allow us to draw unequivocal conclusions about the extent to which public policies have contributed to the socioeconomic achievements of the immigrant-origin populations. Some of the successes may have resulted from factors other than policy. It is also hard to demonstrate causal relationships between policies and outcomes. Nevertheless, we think some credit should be given to the fact that integration policies started out with the goal of socioeconomic parity, held this goal over the long term, and sought to achieve it on a consistent basis. Our report led the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry (2004) to conclude that the facts did not corroborate the popular belief that socioeconomic integration had failed. On the contrary, many migrants were either fully or partially integrated, as the committee concluded.

### Sociocultural Integration Policy

Policies that focused on the sociocultural position of immigrants were characterized by far more variety than many accounts suggest. The Netherlands had no specific policy regarding this particular issue in the 1970s, the central tenet being that guest workers should maintain their identity with a view to their eventual return home. In the early 1980s, policy tended to concentrate on helping ethnic groups maintain their cohesion. In addition, emancipation within an immigrant's own circle was considered to be conducive to strengthening the societal position of minorities. This ideal of group empowerment as a tool for emancipation built strongly on the legacy of the pillarization<sup>4</sup> that characterized Dutch social structure well into the 1960s (Richard Alba and Nancy Foner, chap. 18 in this volume). This policy emphasis, however, has already faded into the background by the late 1980s as the objective of fully individual socioeconomic integration and participation gradually took center stage.

As a result, central government policy toward sociocultural integration manifested little consistency. It evolved from focusing on achieving group emancipation through the retention of group culture to an approach that accentuated individual integration. More recently, policy has insisted that migrants adjust to "Dutch" norms and values in order to avert the impending danger of insufficient social cohesion.

These changes in policy emphasis make it difficult to assess the extent to which Dutch integration policies have achieved their sociocultural objectives. The many changes and recent toughening of the sociocultural objectives indicate disagreement about what policy should actually try to achieve, a disagreement that continues today. Whereas many of the Dutch majority population currently support the idea of migrants' adopting "Dutch" norms and values, migrants aspire to cultural development that they themselves define (Phalet, Van Lotringen, and Entzinger 2000).

Given the many signs of socioeconomic progress among immigrants and their children, it is difficult to understand why Dutch majority elites came to believe that tolerance for cultural differences among immigrant minorities had somehow produced bad results instead. Moreover, a review of sociocultural policy shows that Dutch integration policy has not been characterized for long periods of time by a commitment to pluralism. Finally, even if it had, it is hard to understand how or why that might obstruct the socioeconomic progress of immigrants. Thus, the interpretation offered by Joppke (2004; chap. 8 in this volume) and Ruud Koopmans and colleagues (2000c, 2005) seems to be ripe for revision.

Although Koopmans and colleagues label the Dutch situation as culturally pluralist, or even as being increasingly pluralist (2005, 73; see also Minkenberg, chap. 10 in this volume), this seems an exaggeration of what government policies were actually promoting. As Koopmans and his colleagues acknowledge themselves, tolerance for the *religious* practices of immigrants had little to do with national integration policies. They observe:

To an important extent, the extension of multicultural rights to minorities in the Netherlands is based on the heritage of pillarization...and was meant to accommodate cultural conflicts between native religious groups. Muslims and other minorities have made use of this available institutional framework to claim their own schools, broadcasting rights, and other cultural provisions. (Koopmans et al. 2005, 71)

Thus, the development of specific cultural provisions for migrants was due to the general Dutch institutional framework.<sup>5</sup> Insofar as this provided a basis for creating migrant religious and cultural institutions, it had nothing whatsoever to do with pluralist integration policies (Rath et al. 1999; Duyvendak et al. 2004). Instead of favoring the development of a new (Islamic) religious pillar, most politicians were decidedly reluctant to support such a development. As one of the most secularized countries in the world, the Netherlands showed little inclination to accommodate new religious institutions. In fact, from the 1970s onwards, local governments tried to prohibit immigrants from claiming their rights as Dutch citizens to set up Muslim schools (Feirabend and Rath 1996).

Should we take tolerance for the emergence of religious self-organization among immigrants as a sign that Dutch integration policies actively promoted pluralism? The answer again must be in the negative. Islamic organizations did not receive support from Dutch integration policies, nor even from the pillarized institutional framework. In part, this unwillingness to support such activities reflected the diminishing importance of religious organizations in a depillarizing country and the continued importance of the separation of church and state. Yet policymakers were also

convinced that religious organizations were ill equipped to help immigrants form a bridge to the larger society. Religious organizations were assumed, after all, to keep people in isolation. Even though such organizations did help some people acquire social capital (Fennema et al. 2000), according to the dominant view (Sunier 2000; Tariq Modood, chap. 15 in this volume) they mainly served as a tool for keeping an eye on one's own supporters.

To sum up, the dominant idea in the scholarly literature and public opinion (Kramer 2006)—that multicultural policies somehow caused the integration of migrants to be "a total failure"—is empirically wrong. The cultural integration policies of the Netherlands were less pluralist than is often assumed and, more important, even though serious problems remain, the socioeconomic integration of migrants has been far less negative than is often claimed. Still, the Dutch are desperately in need of a better understanding of the deep crisis in the multiethnic Netherlands. We think the explanation can be found in the exact opposite direction than the one in which authors such as Joppke and Koopmans are looking.

### Intolerance of Pluralism in the Dutch Mainstream

Matters of culture are so prominent today not because the Dutch adopted culturally pluriform policies but precisely because the Netherlands has rapidly become more culturally homogeneous—as far as the majority population is concerned. Whereas majority opinion is divided on gender, family, and sexuality in many other countries, including the United States, the entire political spectrum of the Dutch majority population supports progressive values on these matters. After a period of intense cultural polarization during the "long sixties," the majority has developed remarkably uniform, progressive ideals according to the Eurobarometer, European Social Survey, European Values Study, International Social Survey Program, and the Continuous Tracking Survey (as recapitulated in, e.g., Uitterhoeve 2000; Duyvendak 2004; Halman, Luijckx, and van Zundert 2005).

More than anywhere else in Europe, the Dutch majority population believes that divorce is acceptable and homosexuality nothing out of the ordinary. It also disagrees most with the propositions that "women have to have children to be happy," that "a child should respect its parents," and that "we would be better off were we to return to a traditional way of life." Finally, the Netherlands has less of a value gap on these questions between more and less highly educated people and is now one of the three least culturally polarized European countries (Achterberg 2006, 55). To the extent that any native Dutch do hold conservative positions, they are not strongly politically articulated.

It appears that the Dutch demand that migrants share these values reflects a strong consensus within the majority population. In this respect, the Netherlands is similar to Denmark. This progressive consensus evidently requires policy to enforce the acculturation of those who are assumed to fall outside of it. A liberal country need not esteem diversity (Wikan 2002).

Thus, Dutch society appears to be losing its ability to cope with cultural differences. As Ian Buruma has observed, "Tolerance, then, has its limits even for Dutch

progressives. It is easy to be tolerant of those who are much like ourselves... It is much harder to extend the same principle to the strangers in our midst, who find our ways as disturbing as we do theirs" (2006, 128).

The growing consensus around progressive values has created a bigger value gap between the native majority and Muslim migrants than in countries with less progressive majority cultures. As Peter Van der Veer puts it, "For the Dutch, Muslims stand for theft of enjoyment. Their strict sexual morals remind the Dutch too much of what they have so recently left behind.... In a society where consumption and especially the public performance of sexual identity have become so important, the strict clothing habits of observant Muslims are an eyesore" (2006, 119–20).

## Conclusion

How has the progressive monoculture of the Dutch majority affected integration opportunities for minorities? Even though survey results (Dagevos et al. 2003; Dagevos, Schellingerhout, and Vervoort 2007) show increasing support for so-called western values among Dutch migrants, the value gap between Muslim groups and the majority population is nevertheless greater than in other countries. Froukje Demant (2005) shows, for instance, that the majority-immigrant distance in value orientations is lower in Germany than in the Netherlands on such dimensions as community spirit, (equality in) gender roles, and sexuality.

Evidently, culture does matter. Cultural differences can make the immigrant integration process more problematic even as acculturation and assimilation have a complex relationship to social mobility (see Gans 2007). Our review suggests that the supposed esteem of Dutch integration policy for cultural or religious differences has had little impact on the socioeconomic achievement of the minority groups. It is the cultural homogeneity of the Dutch mainstream, not its acceptance of cultural diversity, that helps us to understand the sociopolitical crisis in the Netherlands. Of course, the Dutch majority population may be rightly proud of the unique nature of its progressive cultural consensus. But the paradox of recent years is that the majority has deployed it to exclude Islamic migrants (Harchaoui and Huinders 2003) instead of encouraging them to emancipate themselves further—something that many women and girls are already doing (Pels and De Gruijter 2006). If the majority population of the Netherlands does not become more reflective about these matters, instead of being a paradise of multiculturalism, the Netherlands may become an unsettled society of monoculturalists.

What broader implications could the current gap between liberal secular westerners and more conservative minorities have? One question is whether the conservatism of the relative newcomers will affect progressive Dutch morale. Will women's emancipation slow down and homosexuals be forced back into the closet? It is hardly to be expected that a rather small minority will have such an enduring impact on mainstream culture (e.g., Phaet and Andriessen 2003).

What we see happen, however, in the Netherlands as elsewhere, is a defensive and contorted reaction to ethno-cultural diversity, threats to democracy by violent extremism, and globalization (Brubaker 2001; Joppke 2004). The Dutch idealize the

past days of supposed unity and uniformity (although, in fact, the Dutch are nowadays much more uniform in their opinions and attitudes than in the pillarized past). The recent efforts to include a national cultural canon within the school curriculum and to found a museum of national history, as well as the installing of a Dutch cabinet in which Christian parties are heavily represented, are all exemplary of this nostalgic trend. It is very questionable, however, whether this politics of nostalgia offers any answers to today's problems, let alone to those of the future.

Perhaps the most worrying development is that the claim to superiority of the native Dutch culture has quite effectively silenced migrants' voices in the debate, except for those former Muslims who depict Islam and its followers as being backward. Cultural paternalism, however, is not exactly the best approach to finding common ground.