1 An Institutional Approach to Framing Muslims in Europe

John R. Bowen, Christophe Bertossi, Jan Willem Duyvendak, and Mona Lena Krook

Across Western Europe, public discourse has been suffused by claims about Muslims and Islam. These claims are mainly negative. Across a wide political spectrum, public figures denounce Islam for its retrograde values. Some claim that Islam is incompatible with the values of Europe and European states, that Muslims are irremediably foreign because they will not or cannot abandon pre-Enlightenment ideas. Framing Islam as a set of values intrinsically incompatible with Europe implies that Muslims must choose between abandoning their religion and remaining outside the boundaries of the true European citizenry.

This representation was at the heart, for instance, of the 2004 ban on wearing the Islamic veil in public schools in France. As Joan Scott (2007: 8) argues, “Outlawing the veil ... was an attempt to enact a particular version of reality, one which insisted on assimilation as the only way for Muslims to become French.” The notion that Islamic moralities and “modern” Europeanness are mutually exclusive has also played a key role in Dutch debates. The highly influential late right-wing populist Pim Fortuyn argued that Islam was a backward religion. Unlike Islam, Fortuyn argued, Judaism and Christianity had been transformed by “the Enlightenment,” during which the essential “Western” values such as individual responsibility, the separation of church and state, and the equality of men and women—among others—had developed. Fortuyn described Islam as a backward culture and a threat to his personal way of life: “I refuse to start all over again with the emancipation of women and gays.”

Thus the notion of “Muslim citizens” appears as an oxymoron: their presence as citizens would challenge the essential values constitutive of European civilization. We read, nearly every day, stories about Islamic challenges to gender equality, in the form of headscarves in schools or refusals to allow male doctors to examine female patients, or about Muslims weakening civic life either by introducing religion into the public sphere or the opposite, by isolating themselves in religious enclaves.²

The response has been varied, and often desperate. Western European states have tried to define national identities as reservoirs of values for citizenship: Dutch values, French laïcité, Danish identity, Britishness, or Italian national culture. By doing so they have transformed what had been values of liberal citizenship into values of cultural distinctiveness. To a great and perhaps increasing extent, these nationalist cultural claims are confused with claims about the principles that guide how a particular Western European country works. Some French social scientists use laïcité to explain particular laws and policies, writing as if the term had a stable, agreed-on meaning. Others, writing about the Netherlands, argue that “multiculturalism” was once the Dutch national model, and their arguments converge with populist and nationalist uses made of “multiculturalism” in Dutch public debates. Disputes about the future of “British multiculturalism” are structured along similar lines. In these and other instances, it becomes difficult to pry apart national ideologies from analytical models.³ More often than not, both political and analytical discourses on citizenship share a common concern about the so-called multicultural crisis of European immigration societies and the role played by Islam and Muslims in this crisis. They both identify national idioms of citizenship as the framework of reference at once to assess, explain, and resolve the crisis.⁴

Of course, cross-national differences are real and important. We argue, however, that to understand these variations we must take into account two important sets of dynamics. One is the relative autonomy of what takes place in different institutional settings. Each of these locations—for example, the army, the school, or the court—has its own repertoires of “practical schemas” for action, namely complexes of ideas, norms, values, and emotions that are not reducible to a national model or ideology. As such, similar trends can be observed across national borders. At the same time, however, national ideologies do have strong effects of shaping patterns of reasoning and practices. Rather than assuming these effects prior to the analysis, it is essential that such influences be traced and demonstrated, underscoring how they interact with specific institutional logics.

STUDYING INSTITUTIONS

In line with these insights, this book examines both institutional properties and national ideologies, emphasizing one or the other in different analytic moments, in order to accentuate the dual character, national and institutional, of the mechanisms and processes shaping perceptions and boundaries regarding Muslims in Europe. The authors collectively look at schools, courts, hospitals, the military, electoral politics, the labor market, and civic education courses. We analyze representations and policy framings across strategically chosen countries and across institutional locations in order to compare the shaping effects of these particular institutions on the one hand and of national ideologies on the other. Whether institutions provide more or less accommodation to Muslims or, on the contrary, impose negative framings on them cannot be explained by a national ideology about immigrant integration, citizenship, and religious diversity. What we propose here is precisely an analytical framework that emphasizes the different and complex dimensions of this question.

In so doing, we take as our object the relationship of European states to those residents and citizens sometimes viewed as Muslims, and we analyze that relationship through the workings of certain key public institutions, from courts and the military to schools and hospitals. It is through participating in the social life of these institutions that most residents and citizens encounter “the state”: as a regulator of citizenship, a provider of services, or a source of employment. It is in these varied and relatively autonomous social contexts that boundaries are created or reaffirmed in ways that have the sanction of the state behind them. It is also in these institutional settings that employees interact both with “clients” (like job seekers, students, litigants) and with the broader political and public settings of state offices, elected officials, and representatives of the media. It is also with regard to these settings that the most
visible conflicts have emerged about Muslims and Islam in today’s Europe: on clothing in schools and hospitals, ethnic representation in the army or on electoral lists, and challenges from “sharia councils” to the legal system.5

These examples should make clear that we do not wish to suggest, either by our title or in our approach, that “the state” and “Muslims” form two homogeneous blocs, facing each other. “Muslims” is used here in the sense of “sociological Muslims” – that is, people whose background and traditions form part of the long history of Muslim civilization, regardless of whether they worship regularly or what they believe. It is very important not to ascribe a uniformity of religious observance to Muslims, but most of them consider themselves to be Muslims, and they are seen as such by others around them. For that reason, we retain “Muslim” as a socially relevant characteristic applying to a broad category of residents and citizens of Europe. But it does not mean that all Muslims always highlight that dimension of their identity in their everyday lives (see Bowen 2010: 11).

Nor do we intend that “citizens” be read in an inordinately literal sense, in terms of the precise requirements for nationality. In this period of increasingly complex and multiple senses of citizenship (Soyasal 1994), residents of Europe may be on diverse pathways to permanent status, and, increasingly, they are measured in terms of their potential fitness for citizenship.6 This “interpellation” of Muslims, their call to present themselves in suitable form for integration, is constitutive both of national imaginaries (can Islam fit into visions of Norway, or France?) and of specific institutions’ relationships with Muslims, as Muslims are imagined as components of the army or targeted by citizenship courses and tests. Even those who are recent immigrants, as Sargent and Erikson show in their study of hospitals (Chapter 2) in this volume, are called and measured in this way.

Precisely how specific actors draw on their repertoires of ideas and emotions concerning others – defined in terms of ethnicity, religion, color, origin, or in other ways – is what we wish to uncover, not what we assume. As Glick Schiller, Çağlar, and Gulbrandsen (2006: 613) put it, we are interested in documenting “institutional processes through which ethnic categories and identities are constructed and naturalized.” The term “Muslims” is only a starting point, and then it needs to be unpacked and contextualized. For example, although the French media looks for stories about troubles originating from “Islam” and

5 In a few places, as in Chapter 9 by Britte Siam, we also consider the contrasts between private and public institutions (in that case, regarding resolutions of employment discrimination cases).

6 Of course this sense of pathways was endemic to colonial strategies of promotion and status-granting; for an acute recent analysis, among many, see Davidson (2012). In the sentence that follows, we owe the observation on interpellation to James Beckford.

“Muslims” in public hospitals, hospital workers more often draw on schemas concerning the behavior of “Africans,” reserving the religious framework for situations when they are faced with specific requests for religious exemptions. German workers in some hospitals are more likely to categorize patients as “Tuks” than as “Muslims” (see Sargent and Erikson, this volume; Bertossi and Bowen [Chapter 5], this volume). Along slightly different lines in Sweden, the concept of immigrant replaced the term “foreigner,” reflecting a shift in how the state theorized citizens from other countries (and their children).

How does this approach fit into the literatures in politics and sociology on institutions? The institutions studied in this volume shape social life within a broader field of power, but their relative autonomy means that they cannot be defined by their roles in distributing power, as is often done in political science for the class of institutions – usually formal political arrangements – on which they focus (see, for example, Moe 2005). A public school, for example, can be located in a broad field of power and accountability, in which ministries, syndicates, and local funding authorities play their role. However, what we take to be the institutional dimensions of a school – ideas and practices about curricula, diversity, responsibility, pedagogy, discipline, play, proper ways of speaking – are not mainly concerned with distributing power, but rather with teaching, producing a certain type of citizenry, and other functions. As Sunier shows in Chapter 4, these features of schools are shaped by shorter- or longer-term historical pathways regarding the place of schools in society.

In this respect, we find ourselves agreeing with those in political science who emphasize the shaping power of institutions, but differing from them in the explanatory role assigned to power and resources, because our objects differ. Whereas those scholars ask how national political institutions interact to produce public policy, and therefore focus their studies on the shifting balance of power relations between legislatures, organized interest groups, the electorate, and the judiciary, we look at institutions charged with a wide variety of tasks that include educating, healing, fighting, and judging and examine them only insofar as they structure perceptions and boundaries concerning Muslims and Islam.7 In some cases, such as elections and the judiciary, our objects overlap, but our focus remains quite different. The chapter by Krook (Chapter 8), for example, explores not the effects of electoral systems per se, but rather the dynamics of electoral competition and how it shapes the initiatives taken by

7 On institutionalist approaches to politics, see Hall and Taylor (1996); Knight (1994); Mahoney and Thelen (2006); March and Olsen (1989); Schmidt (2008); and Steinmo et al. (1992). The chapter by Mona Lena Krook in this volume comes closest to an institutionalist approach in politics, but also with an attention to cultural schemas that moves her analysis toward cultural sociology.
political actors to incorporate particular marginalized groups as candidates. Our questions concern the practical schemas employed by institutional actors – for example, how judges or teachers perceive, justify, and treat others. In this sense, these schemas, rather than policies, constitute our outcomes.

In our approach we might seem closer to institutional analyses in sociology, which employ a broader sense of institutions than those prominent in political science, and turn attention to the importance of culturally specific practical schemas. Although economic organizations constitute a central domain for this approach, sociologists also examine schools, professional associations, cultural institutions, and so on. Here again, our questions differ from those that animate most of this work. Because the sociological approaches arose within the study of formal organizations (and in reaction to the assumption that rationality and efficiency explained how these organizations worked), the outcomes of much of this work are explanations of how organizations look and why they function the way they do. One major line of inquiry, for example, concerns how the organizational forms of institutions are reproduced across time and space: why schools, or firms, resemble each other across different countries. We ask different questions; our outputs are not institutional forms, but rather the schemas and boundaries particular to treatment of Muslims and Islam within those institutions.

Our approaches do, however, converge with those adopted by sociologists who seek to combine macro and micro approaches. An important line of sociological inquiry has focused on the flow of everyday social life, and we join with those approaches in looking at everyday ways of classifying soldiers, patients, students, and other actors. Others in sociology have sought to capture the rules and practices underlying an entire domain, whether schools, law courts, or churches. We converge with their concerns, not to explain the forms taken by a school or a hospital, but rather to show how those rules and practices shape the formation of schemas concerning Muslims and Islam. However, because we also ask about the role of institutions in shaping national-level cultural phenomena of racism, Islamophobia, multiculturalist tolerance, and so forth, we pay attention to links between institutional specificities and national discourses. For example, we ask how public intellectuals and journalists have treated particular events in schools, neighborhoods, electoral campaigns, or hospitals as instances of something purportedly nationwide, namely a supposed general threat posed by Islam to social life.

THE ROLE OF NATIONAL IMAGINARIES

The aforementioned relationship between national ideologies or imaginaries, on the one hand, and the social lives of particular institutions, on the other, becomes a key object for our study. We wish to question more centrally the ways in which institutions shape a sense of cultural citizenship, precisely because we wish to move beyond a perspective that sees in national cultures of citizenship and integration the central building blocks of comparative analysis: France as an open and universalist culture versus the “multicultural” cultures of Britain and the Netherlands, so claimed because they organize immigrant inclusion and religious diversity along the idea of “group-based rights” and collective identities, versus Germany’s relatively “closed” approach, and so on.

We opt not to follow this approach for two major reasons, perhaps best seen in terms of space and time. First, any approach that seeks to define a single national model tends to flatten out the highly complex set of institutions and public actors within any one country, such that they are seen as simply implementing a consensual model: French people execute laïcité, Dutch people previously applied multiculturalism but now have seen the light, Germans follow the model of public corporations, Norwegians emphasize social equality, and so forth. In stressing the existence of cross-national differences, this approach may at times provide a useful starting point, but it cannot take account of the highly contested nature of these concepts within each country. For example, in Britain there are powerful voices raised in favor of allowing communities to resolve problems according to their religious values, and equally powerful voices raised against community isolation. Both sets of voices gained strength in the years after the July 2005 bombings. Neither defines a British national model of how to treat religious or ethnic diversity. In Norway there are powerful movements against racism and also powerful movements attacking Muslims as culturally inscrutable – both gaining strength after the 2011 massacre committed by Anders Behring Breivik. The former type of movements draws on Norway’s commitments to human rights, whereas the latter type – seen as well in Denmark – views Muslims as posing a threat to widely accepted commitments to gender equality. Neither defines a “Norwegian model” – such a phrase could usefully refer only to a particular form of welfare state nourished by its oilfields.

3 Breivik himself, however, viewed gender equality as part of the problem of decline of Norwegian society, for which he blamed the Norwegian Labour Party.
Nor can a top-down approach capture the degree to which actors in specific institutions employ specific working models. As Bertossi shows in Chapter 4, the French army does not perceive Muslim recruits as simple citizen-soldiers, as the ideology of republican integration and laïcité would predict, but as instrumentally useful because they can appear as Muslims or as Africans to others in French society. As Siim shows for her Scandinavian cases in Chapter 9, it is the specific judicial competences of bodies in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, and not a national ideology, that best explains outcomes of cases involving women wearing Islamic scarves. Instead of assuming the existence of an unequivocal and stable constellation of meanings in a national context, this institutional complexity must be brought back into the analysis. What we must explain is the capacity of a national imaginary to maintain a moral balance between the given country’s most valued principles (e.g., color-blindness, universalism, and laïcité in France and other principles elsewhere) and the social and institutional realities of competing values and adaptive responses. This uncertainty and these contradictions are part of the factory of cultural citizenship in a country.

The second limitation of national model approaches has to do with time: that they telescope the social, political, and legal history of each country into one or more crucial dates or events, which then are given a pan-historical meaning. For example, rather than tracing the shifting political agendas that gave rise to conflicting French laws and policies on religion during the early twentieth century (as in Baudrout 2004), many French public figures and even some social scientists claim that over the past century, France has followed a single model of laïcité, and that this model was implemented by the law of 1905 on separation of churches and state. This claim ignores the long-term practices of regulating religion in France and rests on a law that does not use the term “laïcité,” was not accepted by the Catholic Church, and was in part superseded by subsequent legislation. It cannot account for the continued highly active support the French state gives to religious institutions, nor can it account for the radically different schemas followed by national actors at different points over the past two centuries. In such ex post reconstructions of institutional national histories, national cultures are seen as stable and all-encompassing.

To summarize, national model approaches may usefully point to important cross-national contrasts, and in this regard we, too, invoke them in this volume as part of an initial level of analysis. In doing so we must take care to distinguish between two quite distinct analytical approaches based on cross-national contrasts. We join in spirit with other authors who seek to base such contrasts on the analysis of specific institutions or policy debates, be it citizenship policy (Brubaker 1992), juridical traditions and legal debates (Joppke and Torpey 2013), or historical patterns of church-state relationships (Fetzer and Soper 2004). We distinguish this approach from one that takes a national ideology as itself providing a useful analytical model. French approaches to religious governance are indeed based on a very long-term Gallican Church model of supporting and regulating recognized religions, more recently inflected by the twentieth-century legal apparatus often (and incorrectly) glossed as “separation.” These approaches can be usefully distinguished at this cross-national level from German forms of decentralized corporatism and from the British tradition of privileging religious communities as bases for education and morality. However, saying this should not then lead us to take the ideological (and “essentially contested”) concepts of laïcité, leitkultur, or multiculturalism as if they could explain or analyze these cross-national distinctions.

We argue that even the most nonideological analyses of cross-national contrasts cannot adequately account for the practical schemas that shape how particular Swedish, German, or Italian actors, working in specific institutions, perceive and discuss Muslims and Islam. The studies in this volume, by examining in greater depth the dynamics at work in particular institutional settings, allow us to ask how certain elements of national ideologies articulate with representations and practices in institutional contexts. Under what conditions do certain actors working in a public hospital or in a court deploy schemas that reflect national imaginations? Under what different conditions do these or other actors instead highlight norms and practices linked more directly to the type of institution concerned? If we would see in the former case an instance of top-down shaping by a national ideology, we would need to specify the conditions and mechanisms for such a shaping effect to take hold. If we would see in the latter case an example of the modular argument advanced by John Meyer and his colleagues (Scott and Meyer 1994), namely that types of institutions reproduce their tokens across specific national contexts, we would also need to specify the mechanisms by which those resemblances take on social reality. We note in passing that those practices that tend to be more “accommodative,” in the sense advanced in Québec (Bouchard and Taylor 2008), are found across national contexts in schools, hospitals, and armies, where administrators and frontline workers find themselves facing strong pressures to accomplish tasks linked to the specific function of each such institution.

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* We have in mind work in the comparative study of the integration of immigrants, which seeks to explain national differences in terms of national imaginations, or ideologies, or ways of thinking about citizenship, rather than in terms of legal or political institutions; see, for example, the references in note 3 to this chapter, and also Pavell (1998) and Schain (2009).
CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY

The preceding discussion ought to have made clear that we wish to bring more centrally into our analyses both social imaginaries and the institutions in which actors live and work. When national ideologies have a shaping effect on ideas and practices, they do so in specific contexts of enactment. Take, for example, the matter of Islamic garments worn in schools, in which many ways has been a proxy for debates about tolerable social diversity (see Chapter 3 by Sunier in this volume). The fact that the debate in France concerned students whereas in Britain and Germany it focused on teachers indicates differences in national approaches that do indeed concern national cultures. That the French government decided to ban “ostentatious religious signs” – that is, Muslim headscarves – cannot, however, be understood without looking at lobbying by school heads for the ban. Such lobbying certainly would have been more difficult in Britain, where visible diversity is less likely to be seen as a social issue. Here is where a cross-national contrast provides a starting point. But neither would it be possible without the efforts of certain school heads to frame the issue as one of protecting schoolgirls from unruly Muslim boys, and a high level of receptivity such arguments received among members of the Stasi Commission. It is noteworthy that prior to 1989, there were girls with scarves in schools, but no one was lobbying against them, for reasons explored elsewhere (Bowen 2007a).

At this general level, there is an obvious interplay between a national repertoire on the one hand (the laïcité grammar) and, on the other, a specific belief that the state should protect schools from simple manifestations of religious diversity. At other moments, however, teachers preferred to frame the matter in another way, namely about accommodating in practical fashion the ethnic and religious diversity encountered in the classroom. Similar divergences in practical schemas are found in other settings, such as hospitals and courtrooms (as shown in the contributions by Bertossi and Bowen [Chapter 5], Sargent and Erikson [Chapter 2], and Siim [Chapter 9]).

In the following chapters, we observe interactions, repertoires, symbols, and formal organization within the settings of concrete institutions. But to do that, we must avoid a dual drawback that bringing institutions back to the center stage of comparative sociology of citizenship could cause. The first drawback would be to replace the reified conception of the national with a reified conception of institutional thinking and culture. When we explore how institutions impact boundaries and perceptions, we obviously look for aspects of institutional cultures. However, these cultures are not a single set of dispositions distributed evenly to members of a school, an army, or a law court. For example, if some military sociologists emphasize the role of military socialization in effecting transforming civilians into new and uniform men and women – and thus explain the uniqueness of military people in a large series of attitudes and behaviors (e.g., why and how they divorce, etc.) – others have emphasized the self-selection of those people who decide to enlist and the type of predisposition necessary to opt for a military career.

This question of the institutional habitus concerns all institutions of the state. However, we look at institutions not simply in terms of dispositions but also in terms of contexts of actions. Members of institutions are asked by the state to maintain the normal functioning of these institutions in order to meet their objectives. Members of a school, for example, work to maintain discipline among students as a way to meet the educational objective assigned to the institution by the state, and so do police officers, nurses, judges, and naturalization officers. Members of institutions adapt their repertoires, preferences, and beliefs to the institutional program they believe that they, as institutional actors, must implement in their day-to-day routine.

This is not to understand institutions in a functionalist way, however. The second drawback we want to avoid is to assume that the relative autonomy of institutional dimensions takes the form of an overarching institutional order in which different institutions play their unique role within a single coherent system – a question of particular sensitivity when we address issues of moral and ethnic diversity in modern immigration societies. To respond to this danger, we distinguish our approach from one in institutional sociology that emphasizes the cross-national reproduction of certain specific features of schools, armies, and so forth, and instead draw on another recent current within sociology, one that emphasizes the cultural and moral specificity of structures of justification (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006; Lamont and Thévenot 2001). These latter approaches treat in comparative fashion the moral frontiers in a society, as well as the relationships between those frontiers and institutions. Although their comparative enterprise is pursued in cross-national fashion, these sociologists seek to ground national differences in specific institutional and cultural practices, such as distinct orientations toward and evaluations of “natural environment” (Thévenot, Moody, and Lafaye 2000; Fourcade 2011).

In their North American and French formulations, this approach, perhaps in reaction against an older institutionalism, emphasizes cultural contrasts. For example, in their recent analysis of the interplay between moral visions and institutions of health, Michèle Lamont and Peter Hall (2009) emphasize three dimensions of culture often embodied in institutional forms: symbolic boundaries, status hierarchies, and collective imaginaries. They argue that national cultural understandings of health refract and transform the impact of public policy concerning health, as do Thévenot, Moody, and Lafaye (2000) concerning environment.
We join in that direction of research, but our question is different; it concerns not the cultural distinctiveness of policy outcomes but the ways in which actors draw on specific practical schemas in specific institutional contexts. We are also interested in the impact these institutionally embedded schemas and practices have on the key notions that become projected onto a national canvas and are seized on by politicians and journalists as elements of a national self-understanding regarding religion, ethnicity, and immigration. Our focus is on how, at a more micro level than that of the national canvas, schemas and practices are generated or transformed, and how in certain cases they can have a national impact.

To sum up much of the aforementioned discussion, we situate our approach at the crossroads of two broad orientations in the contemporary social sciences. With those who practice institutionalist approaches in sociology and politics, we share the methodological premise that the social life of institutions is not to be found in organizational rule-books but in patterns of everyday interactions, and in the norms, representations, and practical schemas that inform interactions. With those who have developed comparative sociologies of moral boundaries and social hierarchies, we share the working assumption that norms, representations, and practices are shaped by broadly distributed cultural premises concerning justice, morality, and value. These two approaches are themselves increasingly interpenetrating, as analysts of institutions, for example, emphasize the construction of moral boundaries and the shape of judgments and justifications (Stark 2009).

In our own modest contribution to these literatures, explored in Chapter 11 of this volume, we focus not only on institutions as the source of schemas and practices but on the multiple pressures and motivations within any one institution. Even within a single institution, we do not find a set of global rules, from which we could deduce the practices likely to be observed, say in a school or on a shop floor, but rather a set of relevant practices, specific rules and roles, and grammars of justification (Dewey 1924). As a result, members of different “social locations” within an institution will arrange very differently the interplay between the institutional identities they claim their institution be based on (the school system, the military, the hospital), what they see of their institution’s social function in the national society they argue they play (e.g., national integration), and the place the institution offers for the expression of religious or cultural diversity (which can be consonant with the dominant politics of diversity).

For example, teachers may conceive of a school as neutral with respect to values and identities, but they also must deal with the cultural diversity of the students beyond this neutrality credo. Diversity will not be regulated only according to what principles of laïcité or antidiscrimination mean in the general debate and how it is regulated by the law. It will also be dealt with regard to the existing bivouages in the schoolyard, or the specific values that teachers or school heads seek to defend—their own understandings, strategic interpretations, various core beliefs, and contradictory practice of laïcité or antidiscrimination in general terms (how they see their mission as educators) or in more contingent contexts (the constraints of ordinary life in the class room). In turn, on the basis of how schoolteachers and administrators construct repertoires about the difficulties they may face (or think they face), they can mobilize and shape the public and political debate and make claims about a change in the law. Institutions are not simple receptacles of existing ideas about what they must do, or the passive sponges of national identity principles. They participate in the production of these principles as well.

Consider a second example: the military is seen as an institution that de-emphasizes cultural or ethnic or religious identities; this is how the military is seen as a “total institution” with a total identity (Coffman 1961; Pinto 1975). But it also faces two challenges: to find sufficient manpower and to achieve a proper level of social legitimacy, for example by reflecting the rest of the society and not existing as an insular organization. Minority groups can help the military meet both objectives, by changing the traditional image of the white straight male Christian officer. The institution can be tempted to offer an explicit niche of visibility and expression for diversity through an explicit communication policy and the advertising of recruitment opportunities targeting specific minority groups, or through (for instance) the provision of halal food in the garrisons and the creation of a Muslim chaplaincy. Such outcomes can be the result of the transformation of the institution itself. For example, the shift from conscription to all-volunteer forces may result in similar readjustments of the military policy irrespective of the dominant national model, be it republican or multiculture-friendly. This is something that belongs specifically to the institution. But what is crucial to observe is how members of the institution construct their interpretations of this transformation, and link it to issues that are debated outside the institution (see Bertossi’s contribution to this volume).

In other words, these processes are constructed under the contradictory constraints and facilitations of an institutional structure. But members (say a Muslim noncommissioned officer, nurse, or teacher) and users (the Muslim public who are policed, healed, or taught) are always negotiating what they consider this structure is or should be. That is, institutions shape their own structure of constraints, beliefs, and role assignments, but this structure is always the result of routine interactions among the institutional personnel.
and its "publics" through which constraints, core beliefs, and role assignment are constantly negotiated, rearranged, and reinvented.

As a result, the fact that institutions play a crucial ordering function in societies is one important dimension of how members of institutions define their roles and social identities. To emphasize this important dimension, our definition of institutions outlines the interplay between objective and subjective dimensions. Institutional actors are engaged in a continual interplay between the constraints and facilities offered by institutional structures, on the one hand, and their ideas of what they want their institution to be, on the other (Lagroye and Offerlé 2010: 17). The belief in an overarching institutional order can have as much of a performative effect as have national ideologies.

PRACTICAL SCHEMAS AND INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES

Now we wish to expand on a concept introduced earlier, that of the "practical schemas" used by actors to orient themselves toward their environment, in specific institutional contexts and with respect to specific categories of people. We use this concept to maintain the tension between the individual actor, situated in a particular social location and with a particular set of experiences, and the practical realities of working in a specific institution. We understand schemas as consisting of ideas, evaluations, and ways of speaking that shift in their relative importance or weight as "things happen" in the social world. We see them as practical in that they are deployed without constant reference to theories of why they are important. They are quickly available as guides for living: "marriage ought to look like this or that;" "this is how we do things here;" "religion belongs in the private sphere," "we ought not to disrupt people's lives"; and so forth.

In terms of theories of everyday cognition, schemas are "knowledge structures that represent objects or events and provide default assumptions about their characteristics, relationships, and entailments under conditions of incomplete information" (DiMaggio 1997: 269; see also Fiske and Linville 1980). Schemas process information and guide action (Rumelhart 1980). They contain both relatively fixed ideas and ideas that depend on contextual cues. A schema followed by students in a classroom, for example, would always contain concepts of teachers and examinations and provide "scripts" for answering questions, but these elements would be modified in interaction sequences that are context-sensitive.

DiMaggio (1997) has pointed to the parallel findings of cognitive psychology and sociology concerning the power and attractiveness of typified images and ideas. Schematic organization makes certain ideas particularly accessible to actors (von Hippel et al. 1993) and these are embedded in institutions to the extent that actors take cues from specific contexts as to expected and appropriate ways to act (Meyer and Rowan 1977; see Bruner 1990). If individuals form prototypes of everyday objects as part of carrying out efficient cognition (Rosch 1978), such that typical images of "chair" or "bird" are widely shared within a population, so too, stereotypes organize and even comfort people in situations of uncertainty or unease (Swidler 1986). But these images and ideas are not randomly distributed across societies or characteristic of a "national culture," as we argued earlier; they are shaped by institutions, in what Friedland and Alford (1991: 248–249) call "institutional logics." Here Goffman's (1959) idea of the "interaction order" is relevant, referring to the expectations and tacit forms of knowledge that guide individuals in institutional settings but that are not reducible to the formal rules of an organization.

In the social sciences, cross-cultural comparative research projects have developed what we can recast as schema-oriented approaches to variation. For example, Michèle Lamont (1992, 2000) and her colleagues have highlighted differences in ideas about "worth" across countries, across regions within countries, and across social-class lines. Across these contrasts, differences between individuals can be captured as different weightings of the same bundle of normative qualifiers. All workers value work, for example, but they differ from one place to another in the weightings they give to income, task mastery, and consumption patterns. It is the particular weightings that define that which we often call "the culture."

These comparative sociological studies point to the ways in which schemas are deployed to define one's identity with respect to some other category of people. The diacritic use of schemas about kinds of people draws on the intrinsically negative nature of social schemas. One cannot have a social category schema without distinguishing it from other social categories: one's notions of what upper-class people are like inevitably involve contrasts, positive or negative, with people of other classes (Lamont 1992). In the essays assembled here, actors often employ schemas to construct moral and practical boundaries between themselves and others, distinguished by religion, race, ethnicity, or origin.

An actor's repertoire of such practical schemas may include multiple, sometime conflicting ideas that vary over time in their relative weight—a modification of the approach found in Lamont and Thévenot (2000). For example, a hospital worker may have at her disposal practical schemas about "Muslims," "Africans," "religious people," and "hospital patients," all of which could apply to a particular patient. The worker may draw on one or another of these schemas depending on the cues she receives from the patient, a superior, or a
news report heard on her way to work. She also may invoke them strategically in order to justify her actions to specific publics (her superiors, her coworkers, or her family). In her everyday work life she also will take into account the specific range of permissible actions defined by the institution of the hospital (see Sargent and Erickson [Chapter 2] and Bertossi and Bowen [Chapter 5] this volume).15

Throughout this volume, we argue that actors’ practical schemas develop within institutional contexts, and that institutions present constraints and opportunities that cannot be reduced to a national political culture. Hospital workers must deliver services, schoolteachers must teach, judges must render decisions, each following certain professional and institutional norms, and these norms limit the range of possible actions and justifications. These actors do not simply implement a national model. To some degree, hospital workers or teachers in different countries face similar challenges, and these similarities refract national ideologies through institutional lenses.

Furthermore, different social locations within institutions present actors with quite specific constraints and opportunities. A hospital administrator, for example, with her responsibilities both within the hospital and vis-à-vis other institutions (the press, ministers, university presidents), draws on different schemas in discussing “reasonable accommodations” with religious patients than do first responders and ordinary hospital staff. The same actor might invoke different practical schemas in speaking to different publics. Even in self-consciously secular France, a town councilor repairs the church roof and a nurse works out ways of dealing with patients’ religious demands, but the same individuals might speak very differently in public settings, both invoking ideas of neutral public space and church-state separation.

It is in examining justifications that we return to explicit national models. An institutional analysis allows us to recognize the importance of national models as repertoires for public justification of specific actions. The multiple ideas in France about religion-state relations – keeping public space free of religious signs, allowing private citizens to form religious associations, monitoring religious organizations from the Interior Ministry, providing state funding to religious schools – cannot be summed up in any one idea or phrase (and indeed they often clash with each other), nor do they explain actions, but each has a certain legitimacy that allows it to be mobilized for political (or other) purposes. One finds similar coexistent dissonance among British ideas about the importance of religious values to construct community, a relatively high tolerance for offensive speech, a concern about community cohesion, and an ideology of English (not British) identity.

In our analysis, the more nationally legitimate schemas about diversity are particularly apt to be mobilized in certain locations with institutions by the head of a school or hospital, for example, rather than by frontline workers. Furthermore, national ideologies are themselves produced, transformed, and reinforced within specific institutions, such as political meetings, media, and systems of education. At certain points in our chapters, we emphasize the ways institutions contribute to the broader spread of social representations of Muslims. For example, debates about treatment of children in Norway, about schools in France, and about sharia councils in Britain have shaped broader, national representations of Muslims and Islam in those countries. We can thereby better understand some of the microfoundations of large-scale representations and also changes in those representations.

PLAN OF THE BOOK

In the following chapters we do not analyze all institutions across all countries, but carry out strategic comparisons to show how institutions infect national models: that hospitals, schools, and courts, for example, have their own rules and roles that often are very similar across countries. Focusing on a few cases in depth allows us to show how differently situated actors within an institution find themselves drawing on quite distinct schemas with respect to Muslim colleagues or clients. It also allows us to see whether there exist strong structural similarities across national contexts.

Part I highlights diversities and contradictions within three types of institutions that are defined by their explicit tasks: hospitals, schools, and the military. To varying degrees, tokens of these institutional types also are taken to represent a facet of public life in their country: diversity (or uniformity) and equality (or hierarchy). To analyze institutional life in these settings requires looking at everyday conversations and boundary-setting.

In their study of hospital settings in France and Germany, Carolyn Sargent and Susan L. Erickson document the discrepancies between institutional ideologies and everyday practices. They provide ethnographic material on how hospital personnel represent and discuss patients of African and Turkish origins and chart the ways that the staff define boundaries between French or German people and various kinds of “culturally different” people. Some of these everyday demarcations generalize from specific cases to broad categories of “immigrants” or “Africans,” for example regarding language competence.
Others attribute broad behavioral attributes to these categories of patients, such as excessive fertility, and this schema leads some French midwives, for example, to prescribe contraception without discussing the implications with patients. In these hospitals (and, as we see later, in schools), we find highly organized public institutions whose administrators have strong ideas about identity and history. We would expect, and indeed find, efforts to maintain strong boundaries. However, the authors also show how medical settings serve as sites of contestation, where personnel, patients, and others “deploy and negotiate” practical schemas concerning ethnicity and race, religion, and sexuality; these may combine ideas about punctuality, choice of medicines, emotional tendencies, language competency, and so forth. Their study looks at immigrants because of the particular precariousness of their situation; most of the other papers consider immigrants and residents perceived as Muslims.

Thiil Sunier argues that public schools are in many respects the state’s main cultural agent, but that they also have specific institutional characteristics, including their role as sites for negotiating national contradictions, such as that between cultural universalism and ethnic identities. He introduces the concept of “civil culture,” which refers to the historically particular conventions of how citizens should interact with each other and with the powers that dominate the public sphere, and how they imagine the nation. His study focuses on how, in schools, students’ pupils are supposed to acquire competencies associated with that culture, and how this works out from school to school. He finds that in practice, the school-specific competencies—for example, how to properly formulate a complaint—work better for students not considered to be “foreign”; their complaints are seen in the Dutch school, for example, as suggesting the presence of discrimination, which would contradict the school leadership’s way of presenting Dutch society as tolerant and relatively immune from discrimination. Students in British schools tend to draw on ethnic schemas to frame complaints and to mobilize; such approaches would not be accepted in the German, Dutch, and French schools. Here, national ideologies work in indirect fashion to reduce the effective competencies of minority students and to shape their responses to conflicts.

Christophe Bertossi turns to the military, an institution that, as with the school, is taken to operate on universalistic grounds, especially in France where his study is centered. And yet even in the French military, schemas underlying practices of recruitment and everyday interactions come from specific, conjunctural concerns within the military about the practical values of diversity. To think through how and why to expand minority recruitment, the military looked not to other French institutions but to armies elsewhere, on the assumption that those resemblances were more important that national

ones in providing ideas and models. Ironically, if the military, and especially its Gendarmerie branch, sees practical value in having visible minorities in its ranks, most of those minorities reject this way of thinking about their value. Bertossi’s interview material shows why: non-Muslims continue to treat Muslim recruits, born and raised in France, in terms of anti-Muslim schemas and stereotypes—as drug dealers and unassimilated, owing to their Islamic religion. Muslim recruits thus must negotiate three schemas: color-blind universalism, ethnicity as value, and anti-Islam.

Bertossi and Bowen then compare schools and hospitals in one country, France, in order to underscore a point made earlier in this introduction, namely that within any one institution, the practical schemas actors employ have to do with their social location in the institution and the specific temporal conjuncture where they find themselves. They argue that, in both institutions, directors have a particular exposure to media and to their administrative superiors and that they shape their justifications accordingly, with a particularly heightened attention to national ideologies and political exigencies. Line workers, by contrast, including teachers and medical personnel, face more directly the challenge of negotiating diversity of needs and demands without neglecting the service mission of the school or the hospital. On both levels there is also the temporal dimension: that as the problems change, so do the way that institutional actors conceive of and respond to people they label as “other,” and the way they frame the “problem” to be addressed. They examine the extent to which what happens on institutional grounds can result in the public reformulation of a key political concept, as in the example of debates about schools and laïcité. They also examine how members of institutions produce schemas about Islam and Muslims through their day-to-day routine practices and through the principles of justice that are specific to each institution, concerning what is good and right for teaching or for delivering care.

Part II of the book approaches our object from a different angle, focusing on the relationships between particular institutions and national political and cultural ideologies. In a series of studies, these contributors examine the schemas and norms that shape judicial decisions, policy outputs, and political rhetoric, and the ways in which those outputs in turn shape national imaginaries.

John R. Bowen and Mathias Rohr argue that judges face specific institutional constraints in how they decide a case and how they justify that decision, and that in doing both they draw on practical schemas that reflect both shared features of European legal discourse and country-specific ideas about public moral order and about the desirability of visible cultural and religious differences. They take the example of legal responses to polygamy to show how courts can differently weigh two ideas about law’s function: sending a
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electoral strategizing that she finds the best explanation of variation in political representation. For example, schemas concerning race discrimination have a greater depth and salience in Britain than in Sweden, and thus have facilitated attention to minority political representation. In Sweden, schemas concerning class, gender, and indigenous peoples have stronger cultural roots. In all three countries examined—Sweden, Britain, and France—stereotypes about Muslims underlie, at least to some extent, concerns expressed about race- and immigrant-based groups.

In a comparative study of judicial decisions affecting Muslim women, Bine Siim shows that explaining variation in outcomes requires reference to specific institutional mandates. She takes cases involving women wearing Islamic head scarves in public and in private institutions across Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. These three countries have taken relatively accommodating approaches to veiling in public institutions, in spite of differences in migration and integration policies. Given this cross-national similarity, national models are unable to explain the different outcomes. Making a series of two-way contrasts, Siim argues that justifications for judicial decisions are shaped by the kinds of authority actors possess in each setting, as well as the relative weight given to each of several broader principles in each institution. In each case, a number of practical schemas were available to actors: for example, in Norwegian debates about hijab-wearing police officers, actors could and did invoke the neutrality of the state, religious freedom and nondiscrimination, or political Islam to support or oppose the practice. In this and the other cases, outcomes were shaped by the balance of power among various public actors and the norms and schemas characterizing particular institutional settings.

The chapter by Justus Uitermark, Paul Mepschen, and Jan Willem Duyvendak is of a different sort altogether. They trace the rise in the Netherlands of culturalist—or in their terms, "neoculturalist"—schemas concerning Muslims and Islam. They show how the representations and associations introduced by politicians in the 1990s simultaneously referred to Muslims and to the liberal Dutch elite; this linking gave political potency to the culturalist framing and a progressive cultural tone to the political claims. Their analysis situates these specific schemas about Muslims and Islam in a class-based political struggle among Dutch political leaders. Dutch ideologies stand out within Europe for their intense focus on issues of sexual emancipation, by reimagining Europeans as progressive and tolerant by contrast to Muslims, who are framed as homophobic and sexually backward. Although it is particularly evident in the Netherlands, this framing extends to other countries in Europe as well.
In the concluding chapter of this volume, we return to the specific contribution of the approach proposed here, and to some of its broader empirical findings.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


