Conclusion

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In this volume on European states and "their" Muslims, we have presented a way to understand how actors, situated in particular institutions and at specific times and places, draw on practical schemas regarding others in their midst who are often categorized as "Muslims." We see institutional life as the central space in this story. Looking "downward," we see actors who face varied and shifting demands and who in response reformulate and reweight the schemas that shape their practices—schemas that classify persons, erect boundaries, and inform practices. Looking "upward," we see certain of these actors as empowered to circulate schemas in broader spheres, and thereby inflict national ideological discourses.

Of the chapters assembled in this volume, some focus on how institutional programs articulate with the day-to-day life of actors; others analyze the articulation of key institutional actors with national political ideologies. Bertossi analyzes the schemas and moral boundaries that arise out of everyday social interactions in the French army, for which he relied on extended interviews and observations, as did Sargent and Erikson in their study of French and German hospitals. Both works show how the practical and moral exigencies that define each institution—what armies, or hospitals, generally do—interact in spatially and temporally varying ways with national ideologies. Sunier studies a similar institution, the public school, and gives examples of everyday interactions, but his comparative approach leads him to also analyze how schools respond differently to student diversity and demands across four countries. These chapters focus on everyday life in their respective institutions, as does Bertossi and Bowen's contrastive study of social location and conjunctures across hospitals and schools.

Taken together, these analyses emphasize the internal variation and historical contingency in the practical schemas actors use in each institution. These particular institutions—army, hospital, school—are particularly susceptible to ideological confrontations. On the one hand, they are charged with performing a specific practical and moral duty, which has relatively strong shaping effects on how personnel carry out their tasks of policing, teaching, or healing. On the other hand, for diverse sociohistorical reasons, they are burdened with considerable "representational baggage" in that they are seen as standing for, or saying something about, the nature of public life in each of these countries. The tension thereby produced leads to considerable variation in which schemas are deployed by which actors (and at which historical moments), and also to often intense public debate about whether each institution is internally acting in a morally and socially correct way. Boundary maintenance is of great concern, aimed at ensuring that the purity and the mission of the institution can be maintained.

The second group of chapters links institutional specificities to judicial decisions, policy outputs, or political rhetoric, all elements that shape and are shaped by national political and cultural ideologies. Krook builds a contrastive model to provide explanations of different policy approaches to the political representation of various kinds of groups. Stim accounts for divergent responses across Scandinavian countries to legal challenges about discrimination and religious freedom. Both works show how analyses of cultural contrasts must be combined with analyses of the constraints faced by specific legal or political bodies in order to explain legal and political decisions. Both also illustrate tensions internal to any one country's ideas about political representation, complicating ideas of a national "model." In similar fashion, Bowen and Rohe start from schemas shared by much of Europe concerning international private law and religious freedom; they then show how (1) these schemas are differently weighted in different countries and how (2) particular institutional constraints and national pathways together explain that variation. Michalowski analyzes the internal tensions in citizenship course materials between universalistic principles and Islam-specific targets, a tension redolent of that pointed out by Bertossi for the French army. Uttermark, Mepschen, and Duyvendak link current Dutch framing of Muslims to intense political and electoral struggles against the background of the post-9/110s public expression of progressive cultural values.

The essays in this second category trace diverse pathways along which institutions complicate or disrupt allegedly consistent national ideologies. In particular, universalistic principles encounter specific complicating factors in specific institutional settings: ordo publice exceptions are taken to broadly accepted legal principles by judges, and conflicts emerge between nationalist ideologies and nondiscrimination principles in electoral or judicial spaces. It is in such moments of departure from general principles that we can discern the operation of schemas concerning Muslims.
SEX AND ISLAMIC CULTURE

With all these sources of variation – in countries, institutions, and analytical perspectives – are there major themes? Does each institution just “do its job,” or does each country just “apply its model”? As we assembled the results of these research projects, we found that the practical schemas we studied shared two major elements or themes across institution and country: anxiety over gender and sexuality and, relatedly, worries about Islam as “culturally backward.”

Concerns about gender and sexuality surface consistently as a central theme in these practical schemas. Often the debates give particular emotional urgency to claims that moral boundaries must be maintained. It is striking, for example, that many of the religious practices in question – the wearing of head scarves, social norms regarding marriage and reproduction, and conflicts arising from women’s increased participation in the public arenas of politics and the judiciary – closely map onto issues related to women’s bodies and to the broader social control of women. Such observations have previously been made by scholars exploring tensions between goals of feminism and multiculturalism (Okin 1999; cf. Phillips 2007).

Yet, the case studies in this book go further than existing debates in at least two ways.

First, the cases reveal that such debates take place in a wider array of institutional settings than has been previously recognized. While head scarves, for instance, have been of particular concern in French schools, their use has also raised questions in the labor market and in courtrooms in Denmark and Norway, as Siim describes. Similarly, while a great deal of activist and scholarly attention has focused on the practice of female genital mutilation, Sargent and Erikson indicate that women’s reproductive health more generally has been the subject of contestation between competing logics, as illustrated in their case by patient-doctor interactions. Not only do these cases draw attention to additional arenas of interest, but they also reveal how closely questions of female sexuality tie into dynamics of assimilation and cultural mistrust.

Second, the book underscores how, partly in reaction to such debates, “gender equality” has emerged as a new trope used by those who oppose the further integration of Muslims into European societies. This concern manifests itself in a number of different ways. The citizenship training modules Michalowski analyzes in her contribution to this volume include a specific component on the equality of women and men – implying that Muslims and immigrants more generally need to be “taught” this value, which is assumed not to exist in their own communities. Representations of the threat that veiled judges pose to Danish conceptions of justice play out in a similar manner, the underlying suggestion being that the veil is truly “foreign” to Danish ways of life. Yet, as Kooek shows, the status of Muslim women need not always been viewed negatively: in countries like France and Sweden, the desire to appear modern and inclusive on the part of certain political parties has led to enhanced opportunities for minority female candidates to be nominated and elected.

A related set of tropes can also be seen with respect to sexual orientation. Gay rights are now put forward, even sometimes instrumentalized, in public criticism of Islam and in arguments about the supposed backwardness of European Muslims. This leads to portrayals of gay rights and identity as if they had been the foundation of European culture for centuries, with the suggested contrast that Muslims are, for this reason, fundamental enemies of European culture. Cases involving homophobia among citizens from Muslim communities are highlighted, epitomized as archetypal, and cast within narratives that underwrite the superiority of European secular modernity. Similar to what occurs with gender equality narratives, the making of homosexuality into a weapon to be used against Islam puts gay rights advocates in a difficult bind, placing them on one or the other side of the divide – defending gay rights or defending Muslims – with those they see as holding unsavory views.

An example of these dynamics can be seen in the Netherlands, as detailed by Uitermark, Mepkens, and Duyvendak.

The use of sexuality as an anti-Islam trope is closely connected with the second theme we found across countries and institutions in Western Europe: namely, Islam is increasingly criticized as a religion that carries certain immutable values, that these are attached to the religion (rather than to particular country traditions), and that they are inimical to Western European or nation-specific values. Although some politicians already voiced these critiques of Islam in the 1980s and 1990s, they were part of a larger set of critiques and schemas concerning the problem of integrating immigrants into specific European nation-states. These schemas appeared in specific national forms, such as the notion of Gastarbeiter (guest worker) in Germany, the immigration of non-white Commonwealth members to Britain, or the broader French category of immigrants. By the 2000s, however, we see the emergence of a pan-European set of schemas that bring together earlier, nationally-specific schemas to focus on the question of Islam. If the problems used to be framed in terms of multiple schemas of immigrants, racial minorities, and Muslims, increasingly they have been framed in terms of Islam.

1 Anti-Islam discourse is not necessarily pro-European, as Geert Wilders’s positions in the early 2000s illustrate.
of the country, for example, regarding the relative prevalence of ethnic/geographical versus religious encoding. The schemas concerning "typical Turks" as un-German and alien are further complicated by the dyad of former West Germans and East Germans, as well as the category of Aussiedler (resettler) patient.

In the French hospitals reported on earlier in the book, personnel work from two sets of practical schemas that can exist in tension. One categorizes African patients in terms of myriad features, among them difficulties with French and with keeping appointments, practices of polygamy and specific patterns of male-female interactions, and beliefs in sorcery. These schemas may shape treatment and lead some personnel to speak of Africans' general difficulty integrating into French society. However, these same hospital actors also hold to universalistic normative ideas, especially, in this context, ideas about gender equality and religious neutrality, which emphasize the importance of giving all patients the same information. These second set of ideas may keep personnel from acting on the first set by, for example, developing more effective ways of dealing with difficulties in communication or with differences in idea of illness, as they see their own practices as color-, language-, and religion-blind. Moreover, this type of conflict or interference is more likely to be found among some personnel than others. Midwives may dispense prescriptions for contraception without telling the new mothers, here they are giving more weight to schemas concerning the excessive high fertility of these women in general than to schemas concerning the full disclosure of information.

It is telling to contrast the way in which hospital staff Sargent interviewed denied the relevance of religion for hospital interaction with North or West African women, with the way certain hospital directors were widely reported by French newspapers in 2003-2004 as denouncing the impact of Islam on their ability to do their job. They only did so at a particular moment, probably because they followed the example of earlier public statements by school officials (Bertossi and Bowen, Chapter 5 in this volume). How a particular hospital staff person will frame her or his interactions with a patient from, say, West Africa is thus dependent on social location and conjuncture, and will involve (re)weighting the elements involved in that actor's repertoire of schemas. It is less that actors change attitudes than that they draw on a repertoire that is continually inflected by all that is happening around them.

Cultural approaches to moral boundaries and social hierarchies developed in reaction to what some perceived as overly deterministic theories of social causation. In France, this reaction (in part to the work of Pierre Bourdieu) took the form of an empirical program for studying morality in the form of

the sociology of judgments and justification (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006). Implicitly building on the empirical-normative articulation developed earlier by Michael Walzer (1983), this approach was also pragmatic in that it located morality in the reflections individuals make on their social lives as they live them. Closely related has been the sociology of moral boundary-making (Lamont 1992; Lamont and Fournier 1992), which sought to place Bourdieu's (1984 [1979]) analysis of taste and hierarchy on firmer, and more inductive, comparative grounds.

These approaches start from the notion that ideas and practices are shaped by broadly distributed cultural premises concerning justice, morality, and value (Lamont and Thévenot 2000). This may seem at first to be close to the "explanation from national models" approach that we have critiqued in Chapter 1, but it must be seen in a dialectical relationship with earlier Marxist or functionalist approaches. If functionalist approaches treated institutions as "churches" or "schools," cultural sociology approaches them as forms of social life in which the actors draw on nationally specific schemas concerning justice, morality, order, and so forth. Consonant with this approach, in the study of German and French courts, Bowen and Rohe found judges to draw on similar background notions of the functions of law and to justify their judgments in terms of the techniques of law, but also to exhibit deeply rooted national differences regarding the place of moral judgments and religious diversity in law. A corresponding contrast emerged in Michalowski's analysis of differences between German and French citizenship courses. Cross-national differences emerge from studying cultural forms that emerge from highly specified institutions: national tribunals of a particular composition; instruments designed to limit the attribution of permanent residence permits.

Although in this respect we align ourselves with pragmatic and cultural sociology, we propose that the properties of institutions play a more explicit role in explaining the construction of practical schemas than is clear from much of the work shaped by those approaches. In particular, we suggest making more variegated the national backdrop for cultural analysis, such that the properties of institutions gain their relative autonomy vis-à-vis moral boundaries and social hierarchies. We propose this change precisely because we find actors constructing boundaries, representations, and hierarchies in specific institutional contexts. In our view, an actor is to be studied not only as a member of a certain class and nation, but also as, for example, a nurse in a public hospital with an urban clientele, or the head of a rural school, or a judge on an administrative tribunal. If we extract these actors from their institutional contexts, they can then stand as representatives of their class and nation (and perhaps region), and their statements as directly indicative.
of national-level boundary-making. And yet when seen in their workplaces, their social locations and institutional constraints come to the fore. What the foregoing analysis adds to these cultural approaches is — among other things — a greater attention to institutions as capable of generating and inflecting broad, national ideas. Adding this element ensures that cross-national sociologies of institutions will not collapse back onto “national models” approaches and will not assume that a key set of values are directly internalized by actors.

CHANGE, VARIATION, AND MUSLIMS

We have argued for greater attention to how institutions doubly articulate with actor-specific schemas and with national-level ideologies. We examined how actors see others (and their own institutions) by employing schemas; we looked at change and variation across different tokens of the same institutional type; and we analyzed internal differences into the perceptions and constraints characteristic of distinct social locations in an institution. Actors give differential and shifting weightings to the several ideas and images they hold concerning Muslims as a function of biographical differences, conjunctural shifts, social locations, and other factors. We take these dynamic interfaces as integral to each institution, and thus we assume no particular stable equilibrium.

Recall some of these cases. One might take international private law to be a particularly difficult field for studying variation and change, because jurists strive for cross-national uniformity in order to avoid disrupting the stability of families as they pass across international borders. But Bowen and Rohe found contrasts across countries and changes within one country (France) regarding the status to be accorded Islamic divorces (in Islamic-law countries). They analyzed these differences into differential and shifting weightings of two generally held yet conflicting schemas: one concerned with overlooking general principles of gender equality and the other concerned with maximizing the welfare of particular individuals. Shifts and contrasts in weighting of these schemas are no less to be expected than are uniform and stable results. They

have to do with relative weighting of legal schemas, not with incommensurable differences across national contexts.

Siim offered a similar analysis of Scandinavian court decisions about discrimination and religious freedom. Differences in judgments are attributable to ways in which each tribunal’s mandate privileged some considerations over others. Krook’s account of different outcomes of debates about minority electoral representations linked electoral strategizing to the differential strength of schemas about race discrimination across different countries, leading to greater success in Britain than in Sweden, for example.

In Chapter 1, we used these and other examples to argue against the idea that a national model concerning religion-state relation exists and can explain everyday practical schemas and policy outcomes. These cases also suggest that we invert the frequently assumed priority of stability over change. Variation and change appear not as a problem to require further explanation, but as built into the very idea of institutions. Even in the most “uniformizing” environments, such as French schools, the ways teachers and school heads perceive and practice matters of ethnic and religious diversity will of course be highly sensitive to differences among student populations, parent demands, disruptive events, and the biographic experience of a school head. Our interest is at least as much in variation as in change, because our central questions include that of the relationship between aggregate national ideologies, on the one hand, and the practical schemas drawn on by actors working in specific contexts (and in particular roles within those institutions), on the other. We are thus most interested in tracing effects of intra-institutional specificity on these schemas.

If variation and change in European institutions is the “normal condition, then we do not need to conceive of institutions in terms of equilibrium states, to be guarded against challenges and collective mobilizations.” Here we enter an ongoing debate among rational choice, historical, and sociological institutionalists (Schmidt 2008; Thelen 1999; Hall and Taylor 1996), and side

4 The “anecdotal” literature written in recent years by secondary school teachers is replete with examples of working through tensions between top-down demands for uniformity and school-specific demands to address the specific populations of students, with regard to questions about religion and science, history, and everyday school comportment; see, for example, Britland and Kowacs (2008) and Goyet (2003).

5 To return to the topic of this volume, starting from institutional equilibria as part of “normal” politics implies that institutions are successful when they resist the pressures of their social and political environment. Or, to put it differently, normal functioning means resisting dysfunctional claims (Dubet 2005), including those stemming from collective mobilizations involving Muslims (see Koopmans and Statham 2005; Joppke 2005). We see a danger here in thinking of institutional change as a matter of a cultural (and even moral) crisis of an otherwise seemingly successful institutional order.
with those who insert institutions in broader social processes. Rather than conceiving of institutions as "holding together" a particular pattern of politics, historical institutionalists argue that institutions emerge from features of the broader political and social context (Thelen 1999: 384). This perspective thereby questions the notion of an overarching, consistent, and coherent institutional order. Within the "cognitive turn" stream of institutionalist sociology, this issue emerges with respect to the idea of cultural scripts, which could be seen as a subtype of what we have called practical schemas, but also could be seen as a way of translating norms into cognitive elements (see Dobbin 1994; Heimer 1999). As Stark (2009) observes, one danger is that the older assumptions about an "over-socialized man" are revived in a new garb.

SCHEMAS, TASKS, AND NATIONAL IDEOLOGIES

What, then, can be said at a more general level about "European states and their Muslims" from the perspective we have set out? We have argued that it is through public institutions that citizens experience the state. As public institutions, those we have studied have a particular sensitivity to fields of state power and national ideologies. But they also have specific tasks that define and legitimate them: healing patients, defending the country, and so on. These institutions thus already harbor in their midst the broadest tensions that we have been addressing: between the functional tasks, structures and schemas particular to an institution, and more broadly distributed national structures and schemas regarding issues of diversity, religion, and citizenship. Our critiques of national models and of functionalist analyses can all be reconceived as appeals to seize this tension rather than as settling on one of its terms as an analytical foundation.

In our analyses we have approached this tension from two directions. The first is to ask how practical schemas about Muslims bear on an institution's principle tasks. How do actors perceive the relationship between those tasks and the presence of religious and ethnic diversity? To what extent does this relationship differ across particular instances of an institution, and across countries? We saw this articulation most clearly in the study of the French army, where the military leadership saw recruitment of Muslims as important both for accomplishing practical tasks, such as policing in poor areas, and for representing the army as reflecting all of France. However, we also saw that such a position translated neither into general acceptance of Muslims by other soldiers nor into Muslims' acceptance of their imputed difference. For many soldiers, recruits from North African backgrounds were inferior; for many of those recruits, being seen as "Muslim" ran counter to their own desire for acceptance as fully French. Hospitals presented the inverted case: directors spoke of the neutral and secular hospital, whereas other personnel dealt in practical ways with differing ideas about gender and sexuality (although there, too, often with schemas that denigrated Muslim or African patients).

From this first direction, then, the issue revolves around the relationship between definitions of the institution's main tasks and the diversity of ideas and practices associated with Muslims. It is perhaps in schools where this issue has been given the sharpest scrutiny, and also where we find the greatest degree of cross-national difference, because of the tendency to see in the school the aspirations of the society. But this "reflexivity" itself varies in degree. Reporting on his four-country study, Sunier (Chapter 3 in this volume) says that "the main differences between the four schools with regard to frames of teaching concerned the extent to which the schools consider themselves as a reflection of (civil) society." Even if British schools do not find ethnic diversity to facilitate their tasks of educating students, they do incorporate such diversity into the school's public image of itself and into the way in which the smooth functioning of the school is understood. Problems of discipline, which in the French and German schools were seen as resulting from a breakdown in the vertical social order, were in the British school attributed to the student's "lack of respect for the normative multicultural mosaic." British students understood this moral order, and would "ethnicize" issues in framing them and mobilize on ethnic lines - a practice unacceptable to French, Dutch, or German school directors. The greatest contrast to the British school is found in France, where the mere presence of tokens of Islamic religious affiliation are seen by many teachers and directors as interferring with the accomplishment of the school's mission.

Institutions differ, then, by type and also by country in the way that the everyday experience of religious or ethnic diversity is seen as supporting or endangering the performance of their task. This is also the case for those institutions in our second grouping, where we focused on their policies or justifications. Debates over electoral representation, examined by Krook, turn on the very concept of the requirements of a representative and the divisibility of the electorate. Does religious or ethnic diversity among citizens argue for corresponding diversities among elected representatives? This question is indeed task-based, and the cross-national differences reflect different historical discussions about difference and society, where the British history of debating matters of race contrasts with a Swedish focus on class and gender (and a French tension between universalism and electoral opportunism).

Our second point of departure in analyzing the function-ideology tension within institutions emerges when we ask about the reciprocal relationships
between schemas and practices specific to an institution and schemas that circulate nationally. This question allows us to ask (1) whether some institutions provide material that is then recuperated for cross-institutional discursive production, and (2) whether some institutions are particularly susceptible to shaping by top-down pressures. (Further development of these questions brings in the dimensions of social location and juncture, or space and time, already discussed.)

As we have seen in the chapters, the army, school, and hospital are particularly likely to be inspected to see whether they accurately reflect national values and principles. The degree of this mirror function varies for specific historical reasons: the French school as the site of Church-Republic battles contrasts with the pluralist idea of church-dependent English schools and with somewhat similar Dutch ideas; the decentralized character of German schools probably reduces the potential of such national mirroring. The reasons for each specific configuration lie in past battles and current anxieties. However, these different potentials require mobilization. For example, only in the mid-2000s did certain French national actors call on school heads to complain about the presence of religion in the schools, with a particular policy goal in mind, namely banning the Islamic headscarf. Krook documents the quite diverse reasons that led actors to mobilize around ethnic representation in Sweden, Britain, and France.

Other institutions produce statements that can be justified wholly in terms of institutional reasoning but have a reciprocal relationship with national political and cultural ideologies. Legal reasoning is always justified in purely legal terms, as the application of legal principles, statutes, or jurisprudence. But the schemas judges have available to them are multiple and conflicting: assuring a beneficial outcome, emphasizing national principles, and agreeing with a past decision are among them. The open-ended nature of this assortment of schemas contrasts with a juridical ideology of closed continuity, well documented by Labrousse (2010) for the French State Council. This ideology enables judges to translate broader values or political exigencies into juridical terms, because they can justify decisions ex post facto in the sole terms of the juridical field: as simple applications of the law. We saw this most clearly in the contorted justification given by the French Constitutional Council to the law banning face-covering, where the reasoning had been explicitly rejected by the State Council but allowed the Constitutional Council to provide juridical cover to what had by that time become a political inevitability. It is the specific set of constraints and opportunities afforded to each of these two judicial bodies that explains their divergent reasons. At the same time, however, both bodies had begun to take account of mounting critiques of Islam as harboring values incompatible with the Republic, leading to a series of decisions that associated female dress with radical Islam and “assimilation defects” (Bowen and Rohe, Chapter 6 in this volume).

These judicial decisions created moral boundaries that were now defined in cultural terms rather than in immigration terms. The same boundary schemas emerge in less obvious form in the civic education materials examined by Michalowski; her analysis reveals the implicit assumption that the problem immigrants are Muslims, and the consequent need to highlight behavioral issues they are assumed to have.

Institutions differ, then, by token (one hospital is not identical to another), by functions (hospitals do different tasks than do elections or tribunals), and by the particular national and regional contexts in which they develop and transform. Some have, by their very nature, more to do directly with national debates; others enjoy a greater degree of autonomy. The actors who spend much of their lives working in them have their own private lives and their specific social locations in the institution itself. They draw on the repertoires of ideas, emotions, and memories that we have analyzed as practical schemas: as multiple and often conflicting sources of orientation and justification. Outside events and internal pressures shape and reshape these schemas, sometimes leading one or another idea to carry the day and influence practices. We have looked at this complex world of institutions, national ideologies, and particular actors only as it shed light on how those women and men often seen as Muslims encounter particular faces and facets of the state as they go about their lives, seeking help and legitimacy as new citizens of a fast-changing Europe. These encounters, perceptions and boundaries will continue to have much to do with shaping the new Europe.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


Conclusion