


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From Revolution to Involution: The Disappearance of the Gay Movement in France

Jan Willem Duyvendak

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SUMMARY. This essay sketches the development of the modern French gay movement in relation to its political context, in particular to the French Socialist Party. The author argues that its curvilinear development—the movement started very modestly in the 1950s, spread within small, radical left-wing circles in the late 1960s and early 1970s, peaked around 1980, and declined rapidly in the course of the 1980s—can be explained by the ups and downs in political repression on the one hand and political support and success on the other.

Those men and women who do not reproduce but are always more numerous. . . .

Georges Pompidou

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The homosexual movement may be considered a subcultural movement par excellence. As we shall see, an instrumental, activist wing developed within this movement in France during the late 1970s and first half of the 1980s, but the subcultural side has remained preponderant. The homosexual subculture, the gay and lesbian "scene," has figured as the indispensable substrate of activism largely because identity production has been one of the movement's main goals. To the extent that a positive gay or lesbian identity is formed in subcultural settings, shared sexual preference has provided an incentive for individuals to mobilize and organize collectively.

In this essay, I will mainly be concerned with the gay male side of the French homosexual movement. Whereas mixed (lesbian and gay male) organizations dominate the stage in some countries (for instance in the Netherlands), homosociality has been and remains the norm in France. It is, of course, an interesting question why non-mixed organizations dominate in France. Apart from broader cultural aspects (e.g., polarized relations between the sexes in general), a more specific answer may be possible. To the extent that a homosexual movement has a more instrumental orientation, i.e., focuses mainly on representing interests, a mixed organization may develop provided that discrimination against lesbians is seen primarily as a form of homosexual and not of women's oppression. In a subculture-oriented organization, on the other hand, homosociality will prevail because men and women exclude each other in their homosexual desires. Since, as we will see, the period of instrumental-oriented interest representation in France was rather short-lived, non-mixed, pleasure-oriented organizations have predominated.

Gay movements need to strike a balance between desires and interests: when desire prevails, a pure subculture may result;¹ but when interest advocacy comes to predominate and the link with the subculture is loosened, the movement may dwindle to insignificance, since identity production will no longer take place and the main incentive for most people to participate will disappear in the process.²

A subcultural movement that aims solely at the collective good for its participants-and, in this case, produces it through activities-does not suffer from free-riders. This is true, however, only in the

short term: although direct participation is an indispensable prerequisite for sharing in any collective benefits at the start of the emancipation process, “parasitic” behavior may arise as an option later on, when a collective identity has been produced and the position of gay men and lesbian women is starting to improve. This is particularly true as subcultures become increasingly professionalized (in this instance, commercialized) and people can share a collective identity outside the movement purely on the basis of pleasure.

In this essay I seek to show that the development of the gay movement depends strongly on its political context. Subcultural movements are generally less influenced by politics than are instrumental movements, since the latter are wholly dependent on interaction with the authorities to reach their goals. Yet the history of the gay movement in France shows that, even for its subcultural wing, the power of politics has been overwhelming. As we shall see, this means that in the polarized, left/right political situation specific to France, *left-wing* parties have played a decisive role in the development of the gay movement.

PROLOGUE

It is difficult to fix the precise date when the French gay movement came into being. Surveying the period after World War II, we can detect (as in Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland) a very cautious beginning with the publication of a journal, *Futur* (1952-55). This remained almost unknown to the outside world, however, since publicity for it was forbidden by the state. Homosexuality was simply not regarded as a public political category—in contrast to its place in French cultural life, in which it was a source of inspiration.³ Contacts between gays and the authorities during these years were quite one-sided: any interaction was consistently initiated by the authorities, with repressive intentions and tactics.

This desolate situation improved slightly in 1954, when the journal *Arcadie* was launched. Some authors regard this event as the starting point of the modern gay movement,⁴ while others, who would define a movement as essentially outward-directed and change-oriented,⁵ refuse to ascribe the status of a full-fledged movement to either the journal or to the Literary and Scientific Club

of the Romance Countries (Club littéraire et scientifique des pays latines, or CLESPALA), the apolitical social club that was affiliated with it.⁶ The *Arcadie* circle was nonetheless important, since all subsequent organizations had to relate to this highly autocratic institution. André Baudry was its leader from start to finish, and he dictated its (a)political line.⁷ A self-help organization (“*Arcadie* permits homosexuals to meet each other, to come out of their solitude”), *Arcadie* stressed the equality of hetero- and homosexuals: “the homosexual is also a social human being.”⁸ In its slowly developing contacts with the outside world, *Arcadie* followed a so-called key-figure policy, with designated spokesmen.⁹ Under the prevailing conditions of repression, public activities were absolutely impossible. But even when the political climate became a bit less wintry following the May events of 1968, *Arcadie* clung to its strategy of advising homophiles to behave as normally as possible in order to improve the status of homosexuals.¹⁰

The highly confrontational style of the Revolutionary Pederastic Action Committee (Comité d’Action Pédérastique Révolutionnaire) which emerged at the Sorbonne in May 1968 and, more importantly, of the Revolutionary Homosexual Action Front (Front Homosexuel d’Action Révolutionnaire, or FHAR) from 1971 on ran directly contrary to *Arcadie*’s approach. These new formations stressed not only the political character of homosexuality and its repression but also its revolutionary potential. In contrast to *Arcadie*, they considered “*la différence*” a positive quality. “Abnormal” sexuality was no longer to be hidden, but instead exhibited in public. “Our asshole is revolutionary,” proclaimed FHAR spokesman Guy Hocquenghem. The public display of homosexuality on the streets, disrupting the May 1st demonstration of the Communist Union (Confédération Générale du Travail, or CGT), was the start of the gay movement as a “new social movement,” although—like other such movements—it remained colored by conventional Marxist ideology and rhetoric in its early days: “In a world based on sexual repression and on that repulsive filthiness—labor, all those who do not reproduce and who make love solely for pleasure rather than to produce a reserve army of factory workers have no alternative other than to be smashed or to revolt.”¹¹

This development signalled a split within the French movement

between the radical “*pédés*” and the homophile *Arcadie* circle; by contrast, the main homosexual organization in the Netherlands, the COC, proved capable of incorporating such oppositional tendencies.¹² The new French organizations of the 1970s were more radical than their counterparts in other countries, due not only to the climate which was still rather repressive, but to interorganizational relations as well. The new organizations strongly opposed the “dignified and virile clandestineness” of the old guard. “While *Arcadie* broadly rejected effeminate, inverts, queers, transvestites, and transsexuals, FHAR on the other hand brought together a rich variety of conducts and behaviors.”¹³

In addition, this movement made it clear that autonomous organizing by new social movements was virtually impossible in France. Although the prominent left parties, the Socialist Party (Parti socialiste, or PS) and French Communist Party (Parti communiste français, or PCF), ignored homosexuality during the first half of the 1970s, smaller leftist and especially Trotskyite groups such as the League of Revolutionary Communists (Ligue communiste révolutionnaire, or LCR) integrated gay demands to the extent that they were conceptualized in class terms. In fact, the gay movement in France became politicized rather early on because of the overall climate of repression and *Arcadie*’s absolutely apolitical character:

Thanks to FHAR, homosexuality erupted within politics; in this country where social struggles have traditionally been fierce, where the division between the left and the right is quite pronounced, where the spectrum of political parties is very broad, the homosexual movement will be entangled in a web of political divergences which probably runs counter to the essential nature of the homosexual condition.¹⁴

FHAR sought to balance the promotion of pleasure with a policy of advancing gay interests by organizing events which combined the qualities of a party and a political meeting. Its journals *Le Fléau Social* (Social Plague) and *L’Antinorm* were likewise interesting mixtures of anarchistic chaos and Trotskyite order. But as new organizations came into being, they increasingly tended toward a one-sidedly political agenda, a development encouraged by the con-

tinuing police repression of pleasure-oriented institutions of all kinds (e.g., bars, journals, saunas, etc.). This repression was, however, less harsh than in earlier times, giving the organizations some “space” to express themselves. It was exactly this combination of some repression and a certain opportunity which fueled the starting liberation movement.

After FHAR faded away in 1973, the Homosexual Liberation Group (Groupe de Libération Homosexuelle, or GLH) came to the fore and a factional struggle developed among its members: some favored a political line in the new tradition of “anti-normalcy,”¹⁵ while others called for greater pragmatism. This demonstrated that if a subcultural movement becomes more externally oriented, it has two options: to choose either a countercultural profile, challenging authorities with highly confrontational tactics, or an instrumental profile, dealing with politics in the manner of the environmental or peace movements. If the climate is not too repressive, countercultural organizations often tend in the long run to deradicalize and adopt a more instrumental attitude.

This is exactly what happened with the winner of the struggle within the GLH. Of all tendencies, GLH-Politics and Everyday Life (GLH-Politique et Quotidien, or PQ) survived and even succeeded in building a network of local organizations. Besides organizing a great number of activities with other new social movements (concerned with such issues as abortion rights and the risks of nuclear energy), PQ also mobilized the first massive demonstrations in the streets of Paris and put forward openly gay candidates in local and national elections. In its political discourse, PQ struck a balance between new and old leftist points of view, which reflected its repudiation of the Communist Party of France (PCF). The PCF was still opposed to gay liberation, even when it was couched in class terms.¹⁶ Nevertheless, the gay movement garnered support from the more moderate left parties such as the PS during the second half of the 1970s, and this success tempered the radical discourse of the movement: the total politicization of homosexuality (countercultural orientation) was replaced with a more reform-oriented tack (instrumental orientation).

DIALOGUE

It is state power that has primarily preoccupied the gay and lesbian movements of the 1980s.

Barry D. Adam¹⁷

At the end of the 1970s, an umbrella organization was established comprising sixteen gay and lesbian groups, excluding *Arcadie*. This Emergency Committee against the Repression of Homosexuals (Comité d'Urgence Anti-Répression Homosexuelle, or CUARH) openly supported the candidacy of François Mitterrand in the 1981 presidential election. On the one hand, this showed a certain moderation in the political outlook of many gay activists; on the other hand, it clearly indicated that the movement was still highly politicized. In the specific context of France, this implied that the CUARH was still dependent on the left, and particularly on the Socialist Party (PS). Whereas in other countries it was also liberal parties—such as the Free Democrats (FDP) in Germany and both the VVD and D'66 in the Netherlands—that showed a degree of interest in gay issues (to the extent that they were formulated in terms of equal rights), in France only the PS opened itself to the gay and lesbian movement in the late 1970s.

Apart from this umbrella organization, some other new organizations emerged that provided structure and publicity for the subculture. While lesbians and gay men cooperated in advancing their common interests in the CUARH, only gay men were behind the founding of the most important new journal *Gai Pied*. Although the instrumentally and more subculturally oriented wings of the movement maintained some connections in the early 1980s, these disappeared afterwards due to the success of the instrumental side. What brought this about?

Between the two rounds of the presidential elections, François Mitterrand promised to put an end to all “discrimination on grounds of the nature of morals.” For the first time the issue of homosexuality became a political question that fig-

ured in the political platforms of presidential candidates in the same way as the death penalty or education. This “eruption at the summit,” widely covered by the media, transformed the social standing of homosexuality: it signalled recognition by governmental authorities who were willing to discuss with homosexual organizations. All this was facilitated by a homosexual movement which increasingly renounced its leftist and radical discourse in favor of precise requests.¹⁸

The prospect of success offered by PS backing powerfully reinforced the instrumental wing of the gay movement. This process was accelerated by the founding of gay groups within or closely linked to political parties, such as Homosexuality and Socialism (*Homosexualité et Socialisme*) and Gays for Liberty (*Gais pour la Liberté*), both PS-oriented, as well as the right-wing Movement of Liberal Gays (*Mouvement des Gais Libéraux*).

On the other hand, the climate of reform which came to prevail was not particularly conducive to mass mobilization. The French gay movement proved capable of the strongest mobilization in Europe in the late 1970s and early 1980s (with two 1981 demonstrations drawing about 10,000 people), but subsequent decline was even more dramatic. From this time on, the hard core of the movement concentrated on parliamentary politics, and successfully so:

Between 1981 and 1986, the government and the parliamentarians put an end to discrimination directed against homosexuals and even went so far as to start setting forth protective measures in several legal and regulative decisions. In December 1981, [Minister of Justice] Robert Badinter declared: “It is time that France recognize what it owes to the homosexuals as to all other citizens.”¹⁹

Since the government of a “strong,” centralized state has the capacity not only to make decisions but to implement them as well, the CUARH quickly scored substantive and procedural successes.

This breakthrough, coming at the very moment that both an instrumental orientation was absolutely dominant within the movement and a commercial subculture was beginning to flourish, brought about a rapid decline of the gay movement. Notable politi-

cal advances without facilitation—in this case, subsidization—of any organization by the government necessarily brought an end to the instrumental wing of the gay movement. This wing had already become isolated, insofar as the gay community was increasingly inclined to prioritize pleasure. This was possible because the left-wing government itself was now protecting homosexual interests by dismantling all the legal barriers that had heretofore prevented the gay subculture from developing. CUARH membership declined after 1982, and provincial groups disappeared. While its journal *Homophonies* survived until 1986, it faced growing competition from other magazines aimed exclusively at either lesbians or gay men. And because these magazines were non-mixed, they were better able to strike a balance between pleasure and political issues.

Good relations between the CUARH and incumbent politicians were the main reason for the disappearance of *Arcadie* in 1982, which had increasingly found itself isolated and hopelessly outdated. *Arcadie*'s obsolete character was vividly revealed in June 1981, one month after Mitterrand's election, when it protested against the closing of the police bureau which had specialized in the surveillance of gays. *Arcadie* complained bitterly about the loss of the good contacts it had developed with some key figures within this (repressive!) agency:

Arcadie did not understand that the homosexual movement had to build upon a non-discriminatory attitude on the part of all policemen; and even if that required a major commitment of time and frequent consultations with the movement, it was preferable to the prison, however golden it may have been, that this kind of police surveillance stood for.²⁰

The *Arcadie* circle also ceased to function as a meeting place at this time, because the commercial scene was booming and people were no longer forced to meet behind closed doors.

It is interesting to note that the commercial scene also became too competitive for the “*lieux associatifs*” (community centers) which, with subsidies from the Ministry of Culture,²¹ had developed during the first half of the 1980s but faded away during the second half of the decade. This period also witnessed the demise of the rather intellectual journal *Masques*,²² which was neither commercial nor

political in a partisan sense. The success of the CUARH's "equal rights" program not only outstripped the anti-normality discourse so eloquently formulated by FHAR and its successors,²³ but all collective sexual identities, either normal or abnormal, as the staff of *Masques* finally concluded: "Even more fundamentally, the future of homosexual men and women resides in the disappearance of the very concept of homosexuality, which ipso facto brings with it the end of heterosexuality and thus all sexual normality."²⁴ It is important to note that this Foucauldian "deconstruction" of sexual identity could only take place in a setting in which gay men and lesbians were experiencing less discrimination. The relativization of identities presupposes relative freedom.

Apart from commercialization, the pure subculture was characterized by territorial concentration, especially in Paris, and a strong emphasis on sex: pleasure became an even stronger binding element than it had been heretofore, and all kinds of sexual substyles came into being as restrictions eased. Although this newly acquired sexual freedom was still displayed to the outside world at the outset, it turned out some years later that the drive to show just how "gay" gay life can be no longer generated sufficient incentive for mobilization. This can be illustrated by the decline of the Gay Pride March. As stated, the number of participants had sunk from 10,000 at the start of the 1980s to 2-3,000 by the second half of the decade. The character of the march underwent both a quantitative and qualitative change: whereas political demands were expressed during the early years, the element of fun became more important as time went by. In 1985, the most prominent gay entrepreneur of those days, David Girard, wrote in an open letter to *Gai Pied*:

Everyone to the demo! What is certain is that we are not coming to the demo in the same spirit as the people of the CUARH. They want to parade to denounce the anti-homosexual racism? That is their right. But you will permit me to think that putting up a banner and parading underneath it while saying 'No to anti-homosexual racism!' will change absolutely nothing and will not even attract sympathy. That's depressing. That's gray. We, we will come to have a party. And what we defend is the right to party. It is certainly more communicative (and communicating), more exciting for the participants,

and therefore more impressive and remarkable for the on-lookers and the media.²⁵

The same development from an outer-directed, largely political orientation towards a subcultural one can be traced in the pages of *Gai Pied*.²⁶ This magazine was founded in 1979 by former members of the GLH-PQ who had discovered the impact of media use by the gay movement. From its beginnings, however, there was tension between political purity and sexual pleasure, resulting in several shake-ups within the editorial board. The expansion of the subculture and the growing number of people who considered themselves openly homosexual nevertheless provided a basis for a profitable project. A price had to be paid, however: the magazine dealt increasingly with issues related to pleasure, as its readership was no longer very interested in politics.²⁷

It was in this environment of a very weak instrumental movement wing and an increasingly sex-oriented, inner-directed subculture that HIV started to circulate.

THE AIDS CRISIS

While the influence of AIDS upon the gay movement is difficult to gauge, it should not be underestimated—especially in France, which has the largest number of HIV-infected homosexuals and highest percentage of AIDS patients of any European country.²⁸ Although prevention measures have not been any less effective here than in comparable Western European countries,²⁹ the lack of a strong French movement in the years between 1983 and 1986 hindered the treatment of patients, the establishment of support networks, lobbying activities, and so on. During the second half of the 1980s, however, a network of groups did develop, within which AIDES was the single most important organization.³⁰ Although it did not want to be considered part of the gay community, AIDES was clearly linked to several more or less political gay organizations. Contacts between AIDS organizations and the government have come about only recently with state recognition of the seriousness of the crisis. Apart from the general lack of interest shown by the government during the first years of the epidemic, one of the

main reasons for the isolation of the AIDS/gay organizations was the weakness of the gay movement's instrumental wing: the government was not confronted with a strong organization capable of speaking on behalf of the gay community as a whole.

Together with this lack of an adequate reaction from all the parties concerned, the enormous number of infected homosexuals and registered AIDS patients has resulted in a new kind of radical militancy in ACT-UP groups, which seek confrontation with the authorities in order to stress the systemic failure in containing the epidemic. Although the AIDS crisis has broadly had the effect of both increasing awareness about homosexuality in official politics³¹ and (re)politicizing the gay community,³² this latter effect caught French gays by surprise. Their agenda had been devoid of politics during the 1980s, and its sudden reappearance revealed their inability—inherent in this pleasure-oriented community—to deal politically with a crisis related to their sexual behavior.

EPILOGUE

Apart from the rise of many kinds of AIDS-related organizations (varying from support networks to safe-sex groups), we can discern a double reaction to the AIDS crisis within the gay community. On the one hand, many pleasure-oriented (but not sexual-oriented) organizations have come to the fore, such as sport clubs (“*randos*”; Gay Games), choral groups, radio programs, bars, and restaurants; on the other hand, political activism has undergone a form of revival in the Gay Pride March, the opening of a community center, and a more outward orientation on the part of, for instance, *Gai Pied*.

In addition, AIDS organizations have finally begun to receive some financial support, and taken together all these developments have contributed to a small revival of the movement—despite the deaths and illness of many of its members. The generation of 1970s militants has been particularly hard hit, and since the swinging start of the 1980s did not bring about the the socialization of a younger generation of militants, the mobilization level of the community was significantly reduced.

This political reactivation—or at least political vigilance—has gained extra impetus from national political changes. The era of

reform ended once Chirac's cabinet came to power in 1986. *Gai Pied*'s existence was particularly threatened, as the right-wing Minister of the Interior Pasqua was of the opinion that it and other homosexual journals posed "a danger to youth by reason of their licentious and pornographic character."³³ *Gai Pied* was forced to (re)act in a very interesting way, since it could no longer rely on instrumental gay organizations that had disappeared. By now the most important organization within the gay community, *Gai Pied* was forced to look for support outside the movement.³⁴ It launched a publicity campaign stressing fundamental civil rights, such as freedom of the press, and succeeded in gaining support from other organizations within the new social movements (SOS Racisme, Ligue de Droits de l'Homme) as well as many important intellectuals. Divided, the government finally halted the campaign.

Gai Pied nevertheless folded in 1992, a demise due not to the politics of the authorities, but to the politics of its publisher who responded to a continuing decline in sales. This turn of events should be understood in relation to the journal's repoliticization. While its readership remained interested primarily in sex and to a lesser degree in political and social coverage, the editorial staff felt it urgent to devote full attention to the interests of gay men and, increasingly, of lesbians as well. This time the readers did not follow the switch in the journal's policy, and *Gai Pied*, a commercial enterprise, was forced to cease publishing.

The AIDS crisis and the threat of the right-wing government in 1986-88 stirred the gay movement after its long sleep. Direct crackdowns and the generally more repressive situation forced homosexuals to organize and mobilize. In the political context specific to France, this did not mean simply attention to politics in general, but to party politicization. Since 1986, the number of gays positioning themselves to the left on the political spectrum has increased. Because the PS was considered the one party that really protected minorities and individual liberties, "*la vote rose*" took on a double meaning: the gay ("pink") vote for France's moderate left-wing ("red") party. Political polarization remained so strong and support for gay rights within the right-wing parties so weak that the right-wing Movement of Liberal Gays disappeared from the political arena after "its" government menaced *Gai Pied*.

In contrast to other European countries, France stills lacks an umbrella organization representing common gay interests in a unified fashion, in particular since *Gai Pied* disappeared.³⁵ The situation is perhaps even more difficult because the feeling of belonging to a community, of having common interests and identities, is rather underdeveloped in France.³⁶ Of course, this may change under the influence of a new political situation. But as long as the majority of gays identifies with the PS and a PS president is in power, the demobilization of the movement will not be easily overcome.

AUTHOR NOTE

Jan Willem Duyvendak was born in the Netherlands in 1959, studied sociology and philosophy in Groningen and Paris, and completed his doctorate in political science at the Universiteit van Amsterdam in 1992. He currently teaches in the Department of Political Science of the Universiteit van Amsterdam. He is the author of *Le Poids du politique. Nouveaux mouvements sociaux en France* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1994). He has also coauthored one book on new social movements in the Netherlands and another on the issue of the "normalization of homosexuality" in the Netherlands in the 1980s.

This essay is based on a chapter of the author's dissertation dealing with new social movements in France: J.W. Duyvendak, *The Power of Politics* (Boulders, CO: Westview, 1995).

NOTES

1. If outsiders consider the mere existence of this subculture provocative and start to "interact" with homosexuals whose intent is not to provoke any reaction by their behavior, this pure subculture may, however, develop into a movement.

2. Naturally, the production of a gay identity is not the most important factor motivating all members of the movement to participate. However, even the hard core for whom interests predominate has a subcultural identity as well. Their strong conviction that "this work has to be done" may be considered a form of "interest identity."

3. Famous authors and other artists (Proust, Gide, Jouhandeau, Cocteau, Genet, Foucault, Colette, Fernandez, Tournier, Guibert) could deal with issues related to homosexuality relatively openly. This openness, however, has little bearing on the broader hostile public attitude toward homosexuality. Those who one-sidedly stress this cultural tradition are overlooking the fact that these extraordinary people have rather exceptional points of view not generally shared by society at large. Although writers and artists may have contributed support to the emancipation movement as a

whole, most of them did not become actively involved in it. Because they enjoyed artistic freedom, they were not directly confronted with discrimination and related problems; as a consequence, the category of “gay writers” has not developed in France along the lines of, for instance, the USA.

4. See Gérard Bach-Ignasse, *Homosexualités: expression/répression* (Paris: Le Sycomore, 1982); idem, *Homosexualité: la reconnaissance?* (Paris: Espace Nuit, 1988); Jean Cavailles, Pierre Dutey, and Gérard Bach-Ignasse, *Rapport gai: enquête sur les modes de vie homosexuels en France* (Paris: Persona, 1984).

5. See, for instance, Jacques Girard, *Le mouvement homosexuel en France 1945-1980* (Paris: Syros, 1981).

6. Under repressive circumstances, homosexual organizations in all countries favor names with a high protection value, suggesting that the organization deals either with literature (e.g., the Shakespeare Club in the Netherlands) or science (e.g., the Scientific-Humanitarian Committees in Germany and Holland prior to World War II).

7. “Arcadie seeks to be apolitical: it does not believe that improvements in the fate of homosexuals should automatically be linked to the victory of any party or of any economic doctrine.” This platform was repeated in every issue of the journal.

8. *Arcadie*, no. 273 (September 1977): 14.

9. It has been pointed out that a key-figure policy developed in the Netherlands because of the division of Dutch society into so-called “pillars”; see Rob Tielman, *Homoseksualiteit in Nederland* (Meppel: Boom, 1982), p. 163. Using this approach, representatives of the Dutch national organization COC entered into discussions with the leaders of other pillars. France illustrates, however, that the key-figure model was also used in other countries; this model seems to develop in all repressive but non-dictatorial societies. The effectiveness of this approach in the Netherlands may be attributable to the fact that not just homosexuals but other groups as well were pillarized.

10. *Le Regard des autres* (Paris: Arcadie, 1979).

11. Pamphlet cited in Hervé Hamon and Patrick Rotman, *Génération. Les années de poudre* (Paris: Seuil, 1988), p. 329.

12. Tielman, p. 165, and Hans Warmerdam and Pieter Koenders, *Cultuur en Ontspanning; het COC 1945-1966* (Utrecht: Interfacultaire werkgroep homostudies/NVIH-COC, 1987), p. 341.

13. Girard, p. 91.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 116.

15. The booklet *Rapport contre la normalité* (Paris: Champ Libre, 1971) was, for instance, published by the FHAR.

16. Juquin, who in those days was spokesman for the PCF, formulated the party’s position in the first half of the 1970s as follows: “I did not know that homosexuality, glorified in the leftist movement, has an especially radical position. . . . The cover of homosexuality or drugs never had anything to do with the workers’ movement. Each of them actually represented the opposite of the workers’ movement” (cited in Girard, pp. 96-97). By 1977, the PCF position had become some-

what more liberal: "We must revise the law, not because homosexuality in itself would have either a liberating or revolutionary value (that would seem absurd to me), but because homosexuals have as much right to live in peace as all the other citizens of our country" (ibid., p. 138).

17. Barry D. Adam, *The Rise of a Lesbian and Gay Movement* (Boston: Twayne, 1987), p. 121.

18. Report of the Socialist Party's Commission on Gay Issues preparing the party's 1988 election platform, p. 1. Mimeographed copy in the archive of the author.

19. Ibid., pp. 1-2.

20. Bach-Ignasse, p. 71. That the closing of this department was not a guarantee against police homophobia was illustrated in 1990, when a policeman, who was backed by his colleagues, harassed (and murdered) Father Doucé, one of the leaders of the French gay movement.

21. Whereas the left-wing government subsidized gay organizations oriented toward pleasure, more interest-oriented organizations, which desperately needed support for their survival, did not get much money. This shows that this government placed scant value on the intermediary organizations of civil society: only such inward-oriented organizations as the "*Fédération des Lieux Associatifs Gais*," based on participation and not on representation, were in fact subsidized.

22. See in particular three *Masques* publications: *Homosexualités 1971-1981* (no. 9/10), *Années 80: Mythe ou libération* (no. 25/26), and *Homosexualité & Politique* (Spring 1986).

23. Jan Willem Duyvendak, "De uitdaging van de homoseksuele subcultuur. De normen van de marginaliteit, de marges van de normaliteit," in *Over normaal gesproken: hedendaagse homopolitiek*, ed. Irene Costera Meijer, Jan Willem Duyvendak, and Marty P. N. van Kerkhof (Amsterdam: Schorer-imprint, 1991).

24. *Homosexualité & Politique*, p. 31.

25. *Gai Pied*, no. 174 (June 1985), p. 61.

26. On the development of *Gai Pied* from 1979 to 1989, see Jan Willem Duyvendak and Mattias Duyves, "Gai Pied After Ten Years: A Commercial Success, A Moral Bankruptcy," *Journal of Homosexuality*, 25(1/2) (1993).

27. Data from *Gai Pied*'s annual readers poll, conducted in cooperation with Michael Pollak, showed that in 1983, 25% of the readers considered *Gai Pied* too political, 30% would have liked to see more erotic or pornographic pictures, and 36% wanted more "pictures" in general. These heretofore unpublished figures, based on a survey in *Gai Pied*, nos. 80/81/82 (June 30-September 1, 1983), were provided by Michael Pollak. The 1986 results indicated that the readers thought too much attention was still given to politics—even though the journal's political coverage had already diminished considerably. See Michael Pollak, "Ce que veulent les gais," *Gai Pied*, no. 257 (February 14, 1987): 25-27.

28. This section is mainly based on Michael Pollak, *Les Homosexuels et le SIDA* (Paris: A. M. Métailié, 1989); Emmanuel Hirsch, *AIDES, solidaires* (Paris: Cerf, 1991); Michael Pollak, Rommel Mendès-Leite, and Jacques Van Dem Borghe, *Homosexualités et SIDA* (Lille: Cahiers Gai-Kitsch-Camp, 1992); Jan Willem Duyvendak and Ruud Koopmans, "Résister au SIDA: destin et influence

du mouvement homosexuel,” *ibid.*, pp. 195-224; reports about AIDS organizations; and discussions with the late Michael Pollak and with Rommel Mendès-Leite. See also Frank Arnal, *Résister ou disparaître? Les homosexuels face au sida. La prévention de 1982 à 1992* (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1993).

29. Duyvendak and Koopmans, “Résister au SIDA: destin et influence du mouvement homosexuel.” Data shows that HIV prevention among homosexuals has been (almost) as effective in France as in other countries, which implies that the weakness of the gay movement was compensated for by the infrastructures of bars, restaurants, newspapers, etc. Countries such as Italy, Greece, and Spain that lacked a functional equivalent of this nature were at a disadvantage.

30. On the development of AIDES, see Hirsch.

31. See, e.g., Janine Mossuz-Lavau, *Les lois de l’amour: Les politiques de la sexualité en France de 1950 à nos jours* (Paris: Payot, 1991).

32. Dennis Altman, “Legitimation through Disaster: AIDS and the Gay Movement,” in *AIDS, the Burdens of History*, ed. Elizabeth Fee and Daniel M. Fox (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), and John D’Emilio and Estelle B. Freedman, *Intimate Matters: History of Sexuality in America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1990).

33. *Gai Pied*, no. 264. Information about the action campaign against the ban can be found in *ibid.*, nos. 264, 265, 266, all of March 1987.

34. The distance between *Gai Pied*’s journalists (often former militants) and the last old-style militants, who organized the campaign of support, was evidenced in the reporting about this mobilization in *Gai Pied*. The latter wrote: “The contrast between impotent anger and powerful mobilization stirred up by *Gai Pied* in those last days was indeed compelling. . . . Though the demonstration pleased the old militants, they once again displayed their inability to mobilize the people. GPH won because it understands the media age.” Marco Lemaire, “Censure,” *Gai Pied*, no. 264 (April 9, 1987): 9-10; here, p. 10.

35. I am not dealing here with an important part of the gay movement that is rather unrelated to politics: the Christian organizations, such as “David & Jonathan.” These organizations are nonetheless important, not only for individual help, but also for the continuity of the movement. Although these organizations are virtually invisible to the outside world, their decentralized infrastructure is impressive and their activities—with regard to AIDS, for instance—are important. These organizations are based on a kind of double-identity: homosexual identities are produced within the context of a shared “external” identity as members of a religious community, providing considerable stability to these organizations. After other organizations had disappeared during the 1980s due to the quick successes at the start of Mitterrand’s first period, David & Jonathan even became one of the most important groups within the field of homosexual organizations. Due to its denominational character, however, it will never function as an umbrella organization.

36. In 1985, the *Gai Pied*/Pollak survey showed that forty-five percent of the readership did not consider itself as belonging to a “special social group.”