Chapter 1

National Cleavage Structures

In this chapter we will analyze the way that traditional political cleavage structures facilitate or constrain the action space of new social movements. As already suggested in the Introduction, the new social movements tend to articulate a political conflict that is based on a *new cultural and social cleavage* in society. Not only in this case, but quite generally, political conflicts are ultimately rooted in structural and cultural cleavages. In other words, they have their origin in broad societal transformations that oppose social groups for structural and cultural reasons. However, "structure" and "culture" do not impinge directly on politics. Social and cultural dividing lines — societal cleavages — only result in political cleavages if they are politicized. As Bartolini and Mair (1990: 216) observe, political cleavages cannot be reduced simply to the outgrowths of social stratification; rather, social distinctions become political cleavages when they are organized as such.[1] If the social-structural basis of a political conflict emerges from social change, the conflict itself results from the coupling of these processes of social change with those of democratization, politicization, and mobilization. Thus, Bartolini and Mair continue, it is only through the historical processes of mobilization, politicization, and democratization that any specific political cleavage acquires its distinctive normative profile and organizational network (ibid.: 217). In short, political cleavages develop initially on the basis of a social stratification that sets the structural conditions for group identity, and only later do they become fully political, particularly with the development of mass democracies. Or, in other words, social change determines structural and cultural potentials for political mobilization that remain latent as long as they are not politicized. In order for such potentials to become politicized, they have to develop, on the one hand, a collective identity, a sense of solidarity, and political consciousness,[2]

and, on the other hand, an organizational infrastructure (Kriesi 1985: 30ff.; Klandermans 1988). The organizational infrastructure includes not only formal organizations, but also informal personal networks that allow for the micromobilization processes to take place that have been found to be so important in the mobilization for collective action.

Traditional societal cleavages constitute the basis of the political cleavage structure even today. Although Western European societies have undergone far-reaching social and cultural transformations, the impact of traditional societal cleavages on the political cleavage structure has proven to be very resistant to social change. Thus, according to the well-known "freezing hypothesis" of Lipset and Rokkan (1967), the political configuration in the party systems of the Western European countries of the late sixties still reflected the cleavage structures that had existed at the end of the First World War. If, in the meantime, the impact of the traditional cleavage structure on the voting behavior of Western European electorates seems to have considerably diminished in most countries (Franklin et al. 1992), the sediments of past political mobilization are still with us.

Given that the political mobilization by new social movements articulates a new societal cleavage, it seems obvious that the continuing strength of old cleavages, which is reflected in the national political conflict structure, has an impact on the possibility for the new cleavage to emerge. While the structural underpinnings of the new cleavage are present in all Western European countries, the relative strength of the old cleavages may be expected to restrict the possibilities of the mobilization on the basis of the new cleavage. The construction of new identities is only possible when old identities fade and lose their capacity to help people to interpret the world. Distinct existing identities provide, in other words, a shield against the framing attempts of rising collective actors. Moreover, the articulation of a new cleavage presupposes the mobilization of resources that may not be available if political mobilization on the basis of traditional cleavages is absorbing a great deal of the time, energy, and money of the relatively small part of the population that engages in political action. Organizations engaged in traditional political conflicts may even actively prevent potential supporters of new social movements from contributing to their mobilization. According to this line of reasoning, there exists a zero-sum relationship between the strength of traditional political cleavages and the possibility of new social movements to articulate a new societal cleavage.

Karl-Werner Brand (1985: 322f.) has already suggested that the mobilization of "new social movements" depends on the mobilization potential of traditional political conflicts. He maintained that there exists an inverse relationship between the mobilization potential of the traditional class conflict and the mobilization opportunities of new social movements. According to his hypothesis, the pacification of traditional class conflict by way of the expansion of the welfare state and by the institutionalization of the conflict over the distribution of the national product created "space" for the articulation of new conflicts. He did not propose the same substitutive relationship between the continued mobilization potential of other traditional conflicts and the mobilization of new social movements. He seemed to assume that, under certain conditions, these other traditional cleavages might serve as a catalyst for the mobilization of the new social movements rather than as a constraining factor.

The Mobilization Potential of a Political Cleavage

In order to get a clearer idea of the possible relationships between the traditional political cleavages and the new ones articulated by the new social movements, let us briefly discuss the concept of the *"mobilization potential" of a political cleavage.* The term "mobilization potential" was first introduced by Klandermans and Oegema (1987), who referred to the "potential of people in a society who could theoretically be mobilized by a social movement." Applied to a political cleavage, the term can be defined in an analogous way as the potential of people in the social groups involved in a political cleavage that could theoretically be mobilized by a social movement. In order to characterize the mobilization potentials of various cleavages in a more precise way, we propose to distinguish between two dimensions that we conceptualize by applying some ideas of Bartolini and Mair (1990). First, the mobilization potentials of political cleavages vary according to the degree to which the cleavages constitute social groups that are, at the same time, clearly segmented from each other and internally highly integrated. This dimension corresponds to what Bartolini and Mair call the *degree of closure* of the social relationship represented by the cleavage. Accordingly, a cleavage is structured by processes that restrict mobility in a number of ways (ibid.: 224): "through marriage, educational institutions, the urban and spatial setting of the population, social customs, religious practices and so on. And, as mass politics develops, these original forms of closure are extended to new kinds of behaviours, such as organizational membership and voting, which may then reinforce the original basis of the cleavage through an active defense of the community." Social homogeneity and cultural distinctiveness, on the

Table 1.1. Typology for the mobilization potential of traditional cleavages

Closure of the cleavage	Salience of the cleavage	
	Pacified	Not pacified
Closed	Latent potential	"Exclusively" mobilized potential
Open	Available potential for new mobilization	"Inclusively" mobilized potential

groups involved are not actively mobilized on the basis of the traditional cleavage, they will not be available for the mobilization by new social movements, given the closure of the traditional groups.

To the extent that the traditional elites lose their hold over their respective client groups—that is, to the extent that the closure of these groups weakens and they are opening up—their members may become available for the mobilization by new social movements. The acceleration of the process of "depillarization" of traditional Dutch society since the mid-sixties has, for example, increased the availability of Dutch religious groups for the mobilization by new social movements. If the traditional cleavage is open and pacified—our second type—the members of the groups involved become potentially available for the mobilization by new social movements. In such a situation, the extraparliamentary mobilization in terms of the traditional cleavage has ceased to be of any significance and the members of the groups involved become free for the mobilization in terms of new cleavages.

Third, if the traditional cleavage is closed and not yet pacified, the social groups involved tend to be highly politicized and mobilized in terms of the traditional conflict. The closure of the social groups involved in such a nonpacified traditional conflict proves to be particularly instrumental for their mobilization. Given a high degree of closure, the traditional political organizations, which typically mobilize "from above," can count on a preexisting consensus among their members and on elaborate recruitment networks among their respective social groups. In such a situation, the mobilization potential of the cleavage is highly visible, manifest, and activated, but—and this is the important point in our context—it is activated *exclusively* in terms of the traditional conflict. In other words, the social groups involved are not available for the mobilization by new social movements articulating new types of cleavages. Given the high degree of politicization in traditional terms, it is rather unlikely that the groups involved will open up to newcomers on the political scene.

Finally, if the traditional cleavage lacks closure, but is still highly conflictual and still gives rise to intense political mobilization, the situation is more

complicated. The high degree of conflictuality implies a high degree of political consciousness among the members of the social groups involved, as well as a high degree of visibility of the symbols and ideologies linked to the traditional conflict. In this case, the lack of of closure is above all an organizational one. It implies, first, a greater amount of competition between the political organizations that mobilize their traditional client groups. Under these circumstances, some of the organizations associated with the traditional cleavage may try to outflank their competitors in the organizational field representing traditional social groups by trying to be different, that is, by appealing to new issues and new types of clients not catered to by their competitors (Duyvendak 1992: 115). If this is the case, the issues raised by new social movements may be interpreted in terms of the old identities and conflicts. The lack of organizational closure also implies the possibility of "mobilization from below" in the form of revolts against the organizational leadership or of direct challenges of the adversaries that bypass the organizational top. Such "mobilization from below" may be influenced by the interpretations of competitors from outside the traditional organizational field. In other words, lack of closure under conditions of high conflictuality gives rise to a great amount of competition not only within the traditional organizational field but also between traditional organizations and newcomers on the political scene. In this competitive space, the political organizations associated with the traditional cleavage are likely to make every attempt to mobilize their traditional potentials in terms of the traditional conflict and to impose the terms of this conflict on all the newly emerging conflicts in movement politics; that is, they will try to absorb new issues and new collective actors into the traditional conflict. This is why we propose to speak in this case of an "*inclusively*" mobilized traditional potential.

The extent to which traditional cleavages are "inclusively" mobilized also depends on the *proximity* of the traditional conflict in question to the concerns articulated by new social movements. The greater the proximity of the two conflicts, the greater the likelihood of competition between the collective actors that articulate the traditional conflict and new social movements. Proximate causes give rise to competition for scarce resources and conflicts of interpretation and strategy. However, proximity has ambivalent implications. It not only leads to competition, but it also implies the possibility of mutual support, facilitation—in short, alliances. We shall discuss alliances in chapter 3. For the time being, we wish to underline the first aspect of proximity, which suggests that, paradoxically, a traditional cleavage that is closely related to the cleavages articulated by new social movements may reduce the

available mobilization potential for new social movements to a greater extent than a traditional cleavage that has nothing to do with the issues and concerns articulated by new social movements. The paradoxical character of proximity has already been pointed out by Simmel (1968: 205), who reminded us of the fact that the close relationship among kin tends to give rise to more profound antagonisms than we find among strangers.

The Mobilization Potential of Traditional Cleavages in the Four Countries

We can now turn to more specific questions concerning the mobilization potential of the traditional cleavages in each one of the four countries under study and the implications for the mobilization of new social movements. Following the lead of Rokkan (1970), we may distinguish between four traditional cleavages, which have been generally very important in the past: the center-periphery, religious, and urban-rural cleavages as well as the cleavage between the working class and the bourgeoisie. It will, of course, not be possible to study the strength of these cleavages in detail, but we shall nevertheless try to indicate the general makeup of each one of them in the four countries. Let us start with the conflict between the *center* and the *periphery*. This cleavage has traditionally given rise to regionalist or nationalist movements that have mobilized against the builders of the centralized nation-states. The defense of the periphery is typically linked to a specific territorial identity. In this respect, two elements play an especially important role—language and religion. Very often, language constitutes the crucial resource (Rokkan and Urwin 1983: 131). Religious and linguistic minorities in the periphery are particularly likely to mobilize if their territory is at the same time economically discriminated against. If a distinct regional identity is in any case conducive to mobilization, it is clearly reinforced by an unfavorable economic situation (Rennwald 1992: 171). We assume that the persistence of this conflict is closely related to the state structure and that it is much more salient in centralized states than in federalist ones. A federalist state may contribute to a certain degree of closure on the part of peripheral groups. But, by allowing the devolution of political power to the peripheral minorities, it goes a long way toward institutionalizing the conflict between the center and the periphery.

Of our four countries, France is the one where we would expect the most salient center-periphery cleavage. It is not only the most centralized, but it also has several ethnic and linguistic peripheries—in the Alsace, the Basque country, Brittany, Corsica, and Occitania—which are directly confronted with the discriminatory practices of the central state. On the other hand, we have the two federalist countries—Switzerland and Germany. Their federalism is, however, not of the same kind. Swiss federalism is what Lijphart (1984: 179) calls the "incongruent" type, whereas German federalism is "congruent"[3]: "Congruent federations are composed of territorial units with a social and cultural character that is similar in each of the units and in the federation as a whole. In a perfectly congruent federal system, the component units are 'miniature reflections of the important aspects of the whole federal system'. Conversely, incongruent federations have units with social and cultural compositions that are different from each other and from the country as a whole." Whereas congruent systems such as the German one are unlikely to produce strong territorial identities, and are, therefore, typically associated with open center-periphery cleavages, incongruent systems may preserve strong collective identities of a territorial kind, which implies the continued existence of rather closed groups defined in terms of the center-periphery cleavage, even if the federalism is likely to pacify the segmented groups.[4] In this case, the cleavage is not giving rise to large-scale mobilizations, but it is still present in the sense that it shapes loyalties and political consciousness; it influences the way political issues are conceived, and is liable to shut out from public attention issues that are entirely unrelated to it. In Switzerland, there is one more element to be considered: if its federalism allows center-periphery conflicts to be reduced, it may still be possible for a center-periphery conflict to develop within one of the member states of the confederation. This is especially likely if there are ethnic, linguistic, or religious minorities that are politically discriminated against by the majority within a member state. There is one Swiss region where these conditions have prevailed: the region of the Jura in the canton of Bern constituted both a linguistic (French-speaking) and a religious (Catholic) minority in a canton dominated by Swiss-German-speaking Protestants. The center-periphery cleavage has become particularly salient within this region throughout the postwar period, but especially since the late sixties (Rennwald 1994). The Netherlands, finally, is difficult to situate with respect to this cleavage. It is true that the Netherlands has a unitary state that is almost as centralized as the French, and there are also cultural minorities concentrated in specific regions of the country: the Frisians in the north and the Catholics in the south. However, the Frisians have never been a discriminated-against minority, and the Catholic south has been integrated into the pillarized system, which has served to considerably reduce the salience of the center-periphery

cleavage at the same time as it weakened the religious one. In other words, we would not expect much mobilization along these lines in the Netherlands.

The *religious* cleavage takes different forms in predominantly Catholic countries, in Protestant countries, and in countries that are religiously mixed. Among our four countries, France is the only one that is predominantly Catholic, while the other three are all religiously mixed. In France, the religious cleavage refers to the conflict between the church and the secularized state, between practicing Catholics and those who are not affiliated with the church at all. This cleavage marks one of the constants of French politics, where the church has been associated with the political right since the ancien régime. The conflict has not definitely been pacified, but lingers on and erupts typically with respect to educational questions, which have been at its core since the nineteenth century. It has not given rise to stable patterns of political integration. There is, for example, no equivalent to a major Christian Democratic party in France that could integrate the practicing Catholics under one organizational roof. Similarly, the secularized part of French society is not organized in one clearly identifiable party. Although not pacified on the level of political representation, the mobilization potential of this cleavage is weakened by the fact that it crosscuts the predominant class cleavage.

In contrast, in the religiously mixed countries, the religious cleavage has traditionally opposed Catholics and Protestants. In all three of them, the Catholics have organized in defense against the dominant Protestants, who were the decisive builders of the nation-state. In all three, however, the religious cleavage was largely pacified by the mid-seventies. In Switzerland, federalism has allowed the Catholics to preserve their political power in the regions where they dominate. In the other regions, the creation of an organizational infrastructure reminiscent of the Dutch pillarized structures (Altermatt 1991; Righart 1986) has served to defend their interests. In several steps, the Catholics have then been integrated into national politics and the federal administration, which have carefully observed religious proportional representation for decades. The Dutch situation has traditionally been somewhat more complicated in that the Netherlands has known two types of religious cleavages—one between Protestants and Catholics, and a second one within the Protestant church, where orthodox dissenters broke off from the mainstream in the nineteenth century. Just as in Switzerland, however, the cleavage was pacified in several steps at the beginning of our century. Moreover, a process of massive "depillarization" took place in the late sixties, which implied that the various groups lost much of their distinctiveness, even if the organizational

infrastructure of the pillars continues to exist. In the political arena, the parties of the various pillars have joined forces by creating one Christian Democratic party representing Catholics and mainstream and orthodox Protestants. The continued existence of pillarized organizations maintains some degree of closure of the system, but the pacification of the cleavage assures that the potential for mobilization in extrainstitutional channels remains largely latent.

In Germany, the traditional defensiveness of the Catholic minority, which still lived with the memory of Bismarck's Kulturkampf against the Catholic "state in the state," gave way to a much more open attitude after the Second World War. First of all, after the partitioning of the country, the Catholics no longer constituted a minority but approached 50 percent of the population. Second, their party was no longer a minority party but became the major party of the center-right, which was based on a double compromise (Smith 1986): even if the Catholics were the decisive element in the party, it represented an alliance of Catholics and Protestants. Moreover, it also became a party that cut across social classes and mobilized from all quarters of society. In other words, by its "catchall" character it not only weakened the mobilizing capacity of the old religious cleavage, but also that of the class cleavage to which we shall return shortly.

If the *urban-rural* cleavage, as Rokkan maintains, dominated the politics of the nineteenth century, it has generally lost much of its virulence in the course of the twentieth century. The main reason for the weakening of the mobilizing capacity of the urban-rural cleavage is that, by the end of this century, farmers have become a rather small, politically highly integrated minority in Western European countries. Although they have become a minority in the population even of France, farmers have maintained an important political position in all the countries under study. This is certainly related to the excellent political organization of the farming community and to the crucial electoral role played by the farmers in all these countries. Their firm integration into national politics has everywhere contributed to the pacification of the urban-rural cleavage. But, given their organizational infrastructure and their distinct identities, the farmers have everywhere retained a high mobilizing capacity. Due to the institutionalization of the cleavage, this capacity has remained latent for most of the period covered by our study. More recently, however, the political clout of the farmers has been declining in the context of the process of European economic integration. As a result, the farming population has been remobilizing, following an "exclusive" pattern. This remobilization has been especially strong in France.

The *class* cleavage—that is, the cleavage between the working class and the bourgeoisie—is the last and, from the point of view of the mobilization of new social movements, the most important of the traditional cleavages. The class cleavage is most closely related to the new cleavage articulated by the new social movements. In part at least, the organizations of the traditional and the new left, and those of the new social movements, address themselves to the same constituencies. Previous research has amply documented the close affinity between the constituencies of the parties of the left, on the one hand, and those of the new social movements, on the other (see, for example, Kriesi 1993a; Müller-Rommel 1984, 1985, 1990; Watts 1987). The details of the relationship between the left and the new social movements will occupy us in several of the following chapters. In the present context, the question concerning us more specifically refers to the extent of the comparative strength of the mobilizing capacity of the class cleavage in the four countries under study.

The mobilizing capacity of this cleavage depends, first of all, on the transformation of the class structure. As a result of the growing role of the service sector in the economy of Western European countries, the traditional working class is generally losing ground in the active labor force of these countries. This means that the traditional base of the labor movement is increasingly narrowing, which, in turn, implies that the mobilizing capacity of this cleavage, at least in its traditional form, is weakened. In addition, the increasing standard of living and the establishment of the welfare state equally weaken the cleavage in its traditional form in that they reduce the distinctiveness of working-class culture and working-class identities. As a consequence of the opening up of the class cleavage, its impact on the voting behavior of the Western European electorates has declined over the last twenty-five years. If the timing and the speed of this process is country-specific, Franklin et al. (1992) argue that it is taking place in a generalized way all over Western Europe.

The way the organizations of the labor movement have dealt with this process differs significantly between our four countries. In France, in particular, the opening up of the class cleavage has not implied its pacification.[5] In fact, this cleavage has continued to be highly conflictual and salient in French politics. In other words, the case of the class cleavage in France provides us with a particularly eloquent illustration of the pattern of "inclusive mobilization." A crucial factor explaining the continued salience of this cleavage is, as we shall argue in more detail, the split of the French left into a Communist and a Socialist or social-democratic branch. As a result of the repressive tradition

of the French authorities with regard to the labor movement (Gallie 1983), and as a consequence of their record in the Resistance during World War II, the French Communists emerged as the major party on the left in the postwar period. Given the dominant position of the Communists on the French left, the political discourse in France continued to be cast in terms of class, and images of class struggle were continually reinforced until at least the early eighties. The French Socialists had no other choice but to compete with the Communists for the leading position on the left, and they had to do so on the latter's terms. The high mobilization potential of the class cleavage is also a result of the polarization between the left and the right, which in turn has been reinforced by the electoral system of the Fifth Republic (Duyvendak 1992).

The competition between the Communists and the Socialists in France extended to the union system, which again contributed to the mobilization potential of the class cleavage. A divided left prevents the unions from getting integrated into stable policy networks and from abandoning traditional notions of class conflict (Golden 1986). Moreover, as has been pointed out by Hibbs (1978: 169), the particular economic interventionism of the French state, which is oriented to the strengthening of market forces, prevents the pacification of industrial relations and contributes to the politicization of the strike. In the French situation, where the state is an important actor in the system of industrial relations, the strike is frequently used as a form of political action to exert pressure on the government. However, the French unions are organizationally weak. In fact, in terms of organizational density and structuration, the French union system is the weakest in Western Europe (Visser 1987; Rosanvallon 1988). The weakness of their organizational base implies that the mobilization tends to come from below and is likely to escape the control of the unions.

The French situation with respect to the class cleavage contrasts quite sharply with what obtains in the other three countries. In all three, the class cleavage has been largely pacified and depoliticized. By adopting the Bad Godesberg Program in 1959, the German SPD not only shed the remaining Marxist elements but also accepted the integration of West Germany into NATO. Following the lead of its successful competitor, it became a "catchall" party, or at least a "people's party" (Smith 1989). This shift in orientation was remarkably successful: by 1972, the SPD had become the largest party with 46 percent of the vote. Similarly, industrial relations were largely pacified in the Federal Republic. The German union system was completely restructured by the Allies after the war. It now follows the principle of industrial

unionism. The new, comprehensive organizational structures as well as a number of restrictions in the realm of strike legislation, which the unions had to accept, facilitated the integration of the unions into the German policy networks. Although higher than in France, the organizational density of the German unions does not come close to the density rates of Scandinavian or even British unions. However, their comprehensive organizational structure reinforces their position. A highly encompassing, corporatist union system such as the German one is still a class organization "in the sense that it promotes and protects interests of workers that may be tempted by the advantages of pursuing particularistic interests" (Przeworski and Sprague 1986: 75). Moreover, such a union system tends to exert pressure on the Social Democrats to give priority to the traditional labor class concerns. But such a union system is also conducive to the institutionalization of industrial relations. Thus the German unions are highly integrated into institutionalized patterns of codetermination and political concertation (Schmidt 1987). Given its pacified character and the widespread lack of class identities reflected by relatively low union densities, the mobilization potential of the German class cleavage is rather limited. The overall conclusion is that the German situation with respect to the class cleavage is quite ideal for the mobilization of new social movements.

If, compared to France, the class cleavage has become rather inconspicuous in Germany, it is even weaker in Switzerland and the Netherlands. In these two consociational countries, the Social Democrats have been part of coalition governments throughout large parts of the postwar period. Moreover, their union systems have been integrated into corporatist policy networks. The union systems in both countries have been fragmented along religious lines, which has served to dilute images of class from the start of their development. The Socialist unions have never been able to represent the whole working class. Finally, the organizational density of the unions in both countries has been rather low throughout the postwar period, and the Dutch unions in particular have suffered important losses since the early eighties. Pacified, organizationally fragmented, and without distinct collective class identities, the union systems in both countries do not in any sense contribute to the mobilization potential of the class cleavage.

In order to corroborate these sketches of the mobilization capacities of the traditional cleavage structures in the four countries under study, we would like to present some data on the *electoral volatility* provided by Bartolini and Mair (1990) in their study on the closure and competition in Western European party systems.[6] Electoral volatility does not directly address our notion of

Table. 1.2. Electoral volatility in the four countries: 1945–89

	Total volatility (TV)		Class-specific volatility (CV)		% class-specific volatility (CV/TV)	
Country	1945–65	1967–89	1945–65	1967–89	1945–65	1967–89
Switzerland	3.1	6.5	1.3	2.3	40.1	34.7
Netherlands	5.2	10.1	2.4	2.5	46.3	28.2
Germany	12.4	5.7	3.8	2.5	30.4	41.6
France	16.3	10.4	2.4	5.0	17.8	44.1

Source: Bartolini and Mair 1990

the "mobilization potential," but it provides us with an indicator of both the degree of closure and the salience of traditional cleavages in a given society. Table 1.2 presents the relevant figures for the postwar period, which we have divided into two intervals of about equal length—1945–65 and 1967–89. These intervals roughly correspond to the periods before and after the new social movements burst onto the political scene of the countries under study.

First, consider the *total volatility,* which is an indicator of the overall closure of the cleavage structure. During the first period, total volatility was much lower in the two smaller countries that have traditionally been known for their highly segmented—that is, closed—societies and their integrative politics. The high degree of volatility in the larger countries during this period is, however, not only a result of their more open cleavage structures but also a consequence of the restructuration of their party systems due to institutional changes. Thus the German party system was entirely reconstructed under Allied supervision after the defeat in World War II. In France, which had the highest total volatility in this period, the party system changed profoundly as a result of the transition from the Fourth to the Fifth Republic in the late fifties. During the second period, we note a certain convergence with respect to the total volatilities in the four countries, as a result of the opening up of the traditional cleavages in the smaller countries—the famous "depillarization" of the Netherlands, the weakening of the all-party coalition in Switzerland—and of the increasing institutionalization of the traditional cleavages and of the party systems in the larger countries.

Next, consider the *class-specific volatility.*[7] The most conspicuous aspect of this second comparison is the increase of the class-specific volatility in France from one period to the other. While, overall, the French system became less competitive, its class cleavage became more open for competition. In other words, the class cleavage became more salient in France. This is reflected in the last two columns of the table, which give the respective

shares of the total volatility that can be attributed to the class cleavage in each country. If we add to this result the comparatively strong competition within the two blocks of the left and the right, which is included in the still rather high total volatility, we get a confirmation of the continued political salience of the various traditional cleavages in France.

The smaller countries provide a stark contrast to the French case. In Switzerland and the Netherlands, the redoubling in total volatility is not accompanied by a corresponding increase in class-specific volatility. As a result, the share of class-specific volatility decreases. In other words, the salience of the class cleavage in the context of electoral competition is reduced. It is quite likely that, in these two countries, the increase in the overall volatility is generally linked to an opening up of the traditional cleavages, as well as to the electoral repercussions of the mobilization of the new social movements. Finally, with respect to Germany, we would like to underline that its class-specific volatility is no longer higher than that in the two smaller countries, which reflects, in our view, the considerable pacification of the German class cleavage in the postwar period.

Although this test is far from rigorous, the data provided by Bartolini and Mair confirm the general sense of our previous discussion of the mobilization potential of the traditional cleavages in the four countries, independently of the actual mobilization capacity of the various cleavages in the arena of movement politics. Table 1.3 briefly summarizes this discussion. It points out quite clearly the specificity of the French case, in comparison with the other three countries. Given the largely nonpacified character of the French traditional cleavages, we expect that the "space" for the mobilization of the new social movements was particularly restricted in France, and that, therefore, the mobilization of the French new social movements has been weaker than that of the new social movements in the other three countries. Moreover, given our assessment that the French class-specific potentials in particular have been "inclusively" mobilized up to and including most of the period under study, we expect that the new social movements in France had to meet with particularly stiff competition from the organizations from the left. The only instance of another relatively salient traditional cleavage concerns the center-periphery cleavage in Switzerland. This implies that among the other three countries, the Swiss new social movements were experiencing somewhat greater competition for mobilizing space than the German and the Dutch ones. In other words, if anything, the Swiss new social movements should turn out to be somewhat weaker, in comparative terms, than the German and the Dutch ones.

Table 1.3. The mobilization potential of the traditional cleavages in the four countries

Cleavages	France	Germany	Netherlands	Switzerland
Center-periphery	Exclusive	Available	Available	(Exclusive)
Religious	(Inclusive)	Available	Latent	Available
Rural-urban	(Exclusive)	Latent	Latent	Latent
Class	Inclusive	Available	Available	Available

Note: If a given pattern is present, but less pronounced, it is put in parentheses.

Some Tentative Empirical Results

Our newspaper data allow us to test this hypothesis in a first, rather tentative way. More detailed discussions of the relationship between traditional cleavages and the mobilization of new social movements will follow in subsequent chapters. For the time being, we have two rough indicators at our disposal for the analysis of this relationship. First, we shall consider the overall *distribution of unconventional events* over the different movements. As is discussed in more detail in the Appendix, "unconventional" events cover all actions of a demonstrative, confrontational, or violent type. Not included under this heading are conventional actions of a juridical (various kinds of lawsuits), political (lobbying, letter writing to politicians, participation in consultation procedures, etc.), or media-directed (leafleting, press conferences, public tribunals, etc.) nature, as well as direct-democratic events. The distribution of unconventional events is shown in table 1.4.

This table gives a rather detailed description of the distribution in question, but let us concentrate for the moment on the total share of events accounted for by the different new social movements, on the one hand, and the corresponding share accounted for by other mobilization processes, on the other. As a comparison of these shares across countries shows, our expectations about the impact of the strength of traditional cleavages on the mobilization of the new cleavage are largely confirmed. In France, where the traditional conflicts continue to be rather strong, the new social movements' share of the total number of events is much more limited (36.1 percent) than in the other three countries. The four traditional cleavages we discussed earlier account for almost 40 percent of the unconventional events in France, whereas their share varies between only 10.1 percent in Germany and 17.7 percent in Switzerland. The mobilization on these four cleavages is indicated by lines 14 to 18 in table 1.4, which refer to regionalist movements (center-periphery), education (religious), farmers (urban-rural), and to the labor movement and other left mobilizations (class cleavage). The remaining events

Table 1.4. Distribution of unconventional events by movement (1975–89)

	France	Germany	Netherlands	Switzerland
1. Nuclear weapons	.4	11.6	11.8	.7
2. Other peace movement	4.0	7.1	5.1	5.3
3. Nuclear energy	12.8	12.8	5.1	7.2
4. Ecology movement	4.4	11.3	8.0	10.6
5. Antiracism	4.8	8.7	4.5	.8
6. Other solidarity movement	4.4	6.3	13.2	15.2
7. Squatters' movement	.3	6.7	10.4	7.9
8. Other countercultural	2.7	6.7	3.7	10.5
9. Homosexual movement	.8	.3	2.0	.7
10. Women's movement	1.5	1.7	1.6	2.1
Total NSMs	**36.1**	**73.2**	**65.4**	**61.0**
11. Student movement	4.8	1.5	2.2	.2
12. Civil rights movement	1.5	1.3	.6	2.7
13. Foreigners	2.5	4.2	7.1	8.5
14. Regionalist movement	16.6	.1	.0	10.6
15. Education	4.0	1.5	1.0	.2
16. Farmers	6.6	.3	1.3	.8
17. Labor movement	10.1	4.3	9.2	3.7
18. Other left	2.0	3.9	2.4	2.4
19. Countermobilization	.9	1.3	3.0	.9
20. Right-wing extremism	3.3	3.8	.7	.6
21. Other right mobilization	2.6	1.9	1.0	2.0
22. Other mobilization	8.8	2.7	6.2	6.6
Total not-NSMs	**63.9**	**26.8**	**34.6**	**39.0**
All mobilization	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
N (number of events)	(2,132)	(2,343)	(1,319)	(1,215)

Note: The squatters' movement includes actions for autonomous youth centers, mainly to be found in Switzerland. The category "other countercultural" includes actions by groups like the Autonomen or terrorist organizations that are not directed at the goals of any of the other NSMs. "Countermobilization" refers to all actions directed against the new social movements listed in the table. Examples are demonstrations against abortion or in favor of nuclear energy. The category "civil rights" includes actions against repression and state control to the extent that they are not part of the campaigns of the other movements. The category "foreigners" refers to actions by residents of foreign origin, against both the regime in their country of origin and their treatment in the country of residence. The figures for the labor movement do not include strikes (see Appendix, the section titled "Why Monday Issues?"), but they do include any other actions that may take place around strikes (for instance, factory occupations or demonstrations).

were produced by mobilization processes that are not readily attributable to either the new social movements or movements associated with the four traditional cleavages.

According to this indicator, new social movements take the largest share of the overall mobilization in Germany. In Switzerland, the relative share of unconventional events attributable to new social movements is limited, as

expected, by the moderate strength of the center-periphery cleavage. More detailed analyses show that, in this case, it is indeed the conflict in the Jura region that was responsible for the rather conspicuous presence of regionalist mobilizations (10.6 percent of the events as compared to 16.6 percent in France). The Jura conflict in the canton of Bern was of considerable importance throughout the postwar period. After many years of intermittent mobilization, it started to escalate in the late sixties and peaked in the course of the seventies. In 1979, the conflict was partially solved with the creation of a new canton, the canton of Jura (Rennwald 1994). The solution was only partial, however, because the new canton did not cover the whole territory claimed by the regionalist movement, which continued to mobilize throughout the eighties. In the Netherlands, the number of events produced by the labor movement is somewhat higher than we would have expected on the basis of the previous discussion (9.2 percent of events as compared to 10.1 percent in France). A more detailed analysis will have to show what accounts for this comparatively strong unconventional mobilization of the Dutch labor movement.

Our first indicator only takes into account one aspect of the magnitude of collective action—its frequency. Other aspects include its duration, its size (number of participants per event), and the intensity of the involvement required (Tilly 1978: 96). We propose a second indicator that takes into account the *size* of the events. We shall exclude from the calculations based on this indicator all demonstrative events that require only a minimal level of involvement; in other words, we exclude petitions and political festivals.[8] Table 1.5 presents the volume of participation in the various movements of the four countries. If we concentrate again, for the time being, on the relative weight of the mobilization of the new social movements, our expectations are once more confirmed. In France, the mobilizing capacity of the new social movements again turns out to be much weaker than that of the traditional movements, whereas exactly the contrary obtains in the other three countries. In fact, the weakness of the French new social movements turns out to be even more serious, if we evaluate them on the basis of this second indicator. These movements account for only 24.5 percent of the participation in unconventional events, compared to 64.7 percent in Switzerland, 72.0 percent in the Netherlands, and almost 80 percent in Germany. However, not all new social movements are equally constrained by the mobilization potential of the traditional cleavages in France. Thus, the mobilization for peace issues that do not concern nuclear weapons and the mobilization against racism reach a

Table 1.5. Volume of participation in unconventional events by movement (1975–89), in 1,000s per million inhabitants

	France	Germany	Netherlands	Switzerland
1. Nuclear weapons	0	92	89	10
2. Other peace movement	14	19	3	15
3. Nuclear energy	9	26	15	24
4. Ecology movement	2	11	5	16
5. Antiracism	10	7	4	1
6. Other solidarity movement	5	6	15	18
7. Squatters' movement	0	3	4	9
8. Other countercultural	0	3	1	5
9. Homosexual movement	1	0	4	0
10. Women's movement	2	1	3	3
Total NSMs	**43**	**168**	**143**	**101**
11. Student movement	23	4	7	0
12. Civil rights movement	0	2	0	3
13. Foreigners	1	2	3	8
14. Regionalist movement	4	0	0	11
15. Education	62	2	2	0
16. Farmers	3	2	1	1
17. Labor movement	33	19	19	15
18. Other left	1	3	14	4
19. Countermobilization	4	1	2	4
20. Right-wing extremism	1	0	0	0
21. Other right mobilization	1	7	2	4
22. Other mobilization	5	1	4	5
Total not-NSMs	**135**	**43**	**55**	**55**
All mobilization	**178**	**211**	**198**	**156**
N	(2,076)	(2,229)	(1,264)	(1,027)
23. Strikes	225	37	23	2
Total	**403**	**248**	**221**	**158**

Note: Sum of the number of participants in all unconventional actions per million residents (Germany 61.6 million; France 53.3; Netherlands 14.1; Switzerland 6.4; the figures for France are for 1979, and for the rest, 1980. Missing values have been replaced by the national median of the number of participants for a given type of event (e.g., a demonstration). Figures have been rounded to thousands, figures below 500 are given as 0. Petitions and festivals are excluded (see text). Strikes were not included in the newspaper sample (see Appendix). They are based on International Labor Organization (ILO) figures.

volume comparable to that of the other countries. As we shall argue in chapter 3, these mobilizations profited from the support of allies on the left.

With respect to the traditional cleavages, our second indicator shows that if the center-periphery cleavage gave rise to a particularly large number of events in France, it did not mobilize very many people. Instead, the religious cleavage (i.e., educational issues) and the class cleavage (i.e., the labor movement) were particularly mobilizing in France during the period under consideration.

If we add all *strikes* that took place in this period to the set of unconventional events we collected in our newspaper analyses (see line 23 in table 1.5), the relative mobilization potential of the French new social movements is further reduced. They now account for no more than roughly one-tenth (10.7 percent) of the total mobilization, compared to roughly two-thirds of the total mobilization in each of the other three countries. Adding strikes reveals the enormous strength of the class cleavage in France, which, on the basis of this indicator, accounts for no less than two-thirds of the people mobilized by unconventional events. Some readers may consider it inappropriate to classify strikes among unconventional events.[9] We believe, however, that it is justified to regard them as unconventional for the period and the countries we are dealing with here. On the one hand, one should not forget that for pacified union movements such as the Dutch, German, and Swiss movements, strikes are quite unconventional ways of pursuing their workers' interests. In Switzerland, for example, collective agreements between employers' associations and unions typically do not allow the workers to strike. On the other hand, as we have just seen, strikes are, indeed, quite frequent in France. But, as Schain (1980: 201) has pointed out, the style of the strike in France is often rather close to what we understand as a political demonstration: it takes the form of mass meetings, marches, and frequent attempts to mobilize the support of the broader public. Indeed, the style of the strike is to politicize, rather than to isolate, industrial conflict. We believe, therefore, that strikes are best categorized among demonstrative actions in all of our countries. But even if strikes are treated as less unconventional than we claim them to be, this result confirms the crucial importance the pacification of the traditional class cleavage has for the mobilization potential of the new social movements.

Finally, if we also take into account the *petitions and political festivals*, which we have excluded from the calculations presented in table 1.5, the overall results do not change very much: the mobilization potential of the French new social movements remains quite marginal, whereas these movements are still shown to be predominant in all the other three countries. If we add these two action forms, which require very little involvement, the new social movements turn out to be somewhat less prominent in Switzerland, because political festivals belong above all to the action repertory of the regionalist movement and its countermovement in the Jura, which have mobilized large numbers of people for the festivals of the "people of the Jura." Table 1.6 pre-

Table 1.6. Summary of relative strength of the new social movements in the four countries (percentages)

	France	Germany	Netherlands	Switzerland
1. Relative number of unconventional events (table 1.4)	36.1	73.2	65.4	61.0
2. Relative size of mobilization capacity (table 1.5)	24.2	79.6	72.0	64.7
3. Relative size of mobilization capacity (as 2, but including strikes)	10.7	67.7	64.7	63.9
4. Relative size of mobilization capacity (as 3, but including petitions/festivals)	17.3	69.9	69.1	58.8

sents a summary of the different measures of the relative strength of the new social movements in the four countries.

The figures in table 1.5 also allow us to compare the *absolute* size of the mobilization capacity of new social movements and traditional mobilizations between the four countries. These figures are directly comparable, since they measure the number of people that have been mobilized per one million inhabitants. Excluding festivals, petitions, and strikes, we note that the new social movements in Switzerland have a mobilizing capacity roughly two and one-half times as important as that of their French counterparts, that the corresponding Dutch capacity is roughly three times and the German capacity roughly four times as large. On the other hand, strikes alone have had a greater mobilizing capacity in France than all the new social movements taken together in each one of the other three countries. If we exclude strikes from consideration, the four traditional cleavages have proved to be as mobilizing in France as the new social movements in Switzerland, but not quite as mobilizing as these movements have been in the Netherlands and in Germany.

The figures in table 1.5 also allow us to compare the overall level of mobilization in the four countries. This overall level is strongly dependent on the forms of action that we include in the analysis, as the differences between the totals including and those excluding strikes indicate. While it is true that the country-specific characteristics of the action repertoire are not wholly independent of a country's cleavage structure—the prominent place of political festivals in the Swiss regionalist movement is a case in point—action repertoires do not so much depend on the cleavage structure of a country as on its political opportunity structure. This is the subject of the next chapter, which shall also consider variations in the overall levels of mobilization between the four countries.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have presented some concepts for the discussion of the relationship between the mobilization potential of traditional cleavages and the corresponding capacity of the new social movements to articulate new issues. We have found support for the idea that there exists a zero-sum relationship between the two. The French case has been particularly revealing in this respect. Our hypothesis that salient traditional cleavages can be quite constraining for the mobilization of new social movements has been confirmed by the French case. By contrast, where traditional cleavages are no longer closed and have been pacified, the new social movements seem, indeed, to find more "space" to mobilize. The availability of the social groups belonging to the constituency of the old and the new left—which are defined by the class cleavage—has turned out to be crucial in this respect, because these groups are most likely to form a constituency of the new social movements, too. The availability of some other groups, which are defined in terms of the three remaining traditional cleavages—farmers, orthodox Protestants or Catholics, ethnic minorities, or regional groups—is likely to be less significant for the mobilization potential of the new social movements, since these groups typically do not share their concerns in the first place. However, to the extent that these other three traditional cleavages are not pacified, they still dominate the political agenda in movement politics, absorb public attention, and provide master frames for the interpretation of political mobilization in general. Accordingly, we have found that, contrary to what Brand (1985) had expected, all nonpacified traditional cleavages impose important constraints on the mobilization potential of new social movements, even if they do not directly involve social groups that belong to their main constituencies.