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Running from our shadows: the performative impact of policy diagnoses in Dutch debates on immigrant integration

ROGIER VAN REEKUM AND JAN WILLEM DUYVENDAK

ABSTRACT This article examines the performative politics of claiming policy failure in the integration of immigrants in the Netherlands, often articulated as the failure of ‘the multiculturalist model’. Four consecutive ‘post-discourses’ are distinguished, in which we see the construction of increasingly explicit notions of Dutchness. This idea of the Dutch is as much about the style in which it is articulated as it is about the symbolic resources through which Dutchness is imagined. Examining the national imagination in policy diagnoses helps us to understand why immigrant integration has been so consistently presented as a failure of multiculturalism.

KEYWORDS Dutchness, integration policy, multiculturalism, national models, performativity

Since the beginning of the 2000s, claims in the public and political debate about the ‘failure’ of integration have been heard in most of Europe’s ‘old’ immigration countries.¹ The reasoning here implies that policy-makers assume ‘national models’ for the ‘integration’ of immigrant and minority populations, embedded in clearly defined national identities. Grand principles are claimed to govern the integration process, among them notions of citizenship, separation of the public and private, tolerance and secularism.² As the editors of this volume argue, national models are seen as comprehensive, coherent and stable frameworks through which integration can be discussed and practiced. The approach also suggests a specific concept of path-dependency—inertia—that blinds us to change in concrete policies.

Finally, it implies that different policy spheres are mutually coherent and consistent with the ‘model’ (such as the organization of religious pluralism, the definition of integration policy objectives, citizenship rules and categories labeling the target populations of integration policies).³

However, it is questionable whether the roots of the ‘crisis of integration models’ in countries like the Netherlands and France lie in the respective virtues and failures of their different models. In the Netherlands, an anti-multiculturalist model has been developed in response to the failure of the multiculturalist one. But whereas the Dutch understand this alleged ‘empirical failure’ as the necessary end of their model, in France the model seems to be reinforced with every crisis.

In this article, we deal with the long history of alleged ‘policy failures’ regarding immigrants in the Netherlands, often framed as the failure of the ‘multiculturalist model’.⁴ ‘Under the shadow of official multiculturalism, an “ethnic underclass” had been allowed to emerge’.⁵ Dutch pluralist integration policy is thought to have had a pernicious effect on both the socio-cultural integration of immigrants and their socio-economic integration.⁶

This article does not address the alleged consequences of multicultural policies, nor whether the picture of Dutch multiculturalism is correct. Duyvendak and Scholten have persuasively argued why this is not the case.⁷ Instead, we are interested in the broader question of why and how the notion of ‘failed policies’ has dominated the Dutch debate for the past 30 years, particularly in relation to the burning question of providing space for new forms of diversity in Dutch society.

In the Netherlands, the ‘failed model’ (multiculturalism) works as an ‘anti-model’ that structures the public, political and academic debate, fuelling the

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³ Rogier van Reekum, Christophe Bertossi and Jan Willem Duyvendak, ‘National models of integration and the crisis of multiculturalism: a critical comparative perspective’, introduction to this issue.


attractiveness of oppositional discourses. Taking our cue from work by both Christophe Bertossi and Baukje Prins, we will analyse the performative impact of articulating policy failure and the central role that the notion of a coherent—yet failed—policy model plays in such discourses. In other words, it is not our ambition to analyse the misunderstandings of the alleged Dutch multicultural model, but to look at the performative politics of policy failure. What are the performative effects of the narrative that policies have failed because they were multiculturalist?

Below we focus on the rhetoric with which diagnoses of failure are performed. As we will show, four consecutive ‘post-‘discourses can be distinguished which share one recurrent trope: Dutchness. The many shifts in policies and practices over the past 30 years notwithstanding, the debate consistently imagines an idea of Dutchness that, unlike the policies, becomes more and more explicit over time and is not fundamentally transformed or contested. This idea of the Dutch is as much about the style in which Dutchness is articulated as it is about the symbolic resources through which Dutchness is imagined.

**Post-racism and the ideal of uninhibited relations**

It was only in the late 1970s that the Dutch government began publically to recognize that large numbers of post-war guest workers were not going to return ‘home’. Government policy had long been oriented towards return migration: guest workers were to be carefully selected to match the needs of the labour market and should not be encouraged to stay longer than necessary. But this approach contained all kinds of tensions: employers would rather retain their trained employees, while advocacy groups demanded rights for guest workers, including better housing and family unification. A two-track policy was therefore adopted: a primary focus on

return migration and the ‘integration while maintaining cultural identity’ of guest workers who did end up staying longer. The cultural differences between natives and newcomers were assumed to be so vast that integration into the national fold could only proceed by allowing newcomers to organize themselves in social ‘pillars’—in much the same way that other ‘minority’ groups, for example Catholics and Jews, had done in Dutch history.\textsuperscript{14}

With rising unemployment, a surge of immigration from decolonized Suriname, increasing mobilization around migrant worker’s rights, growing family (re)unification and several violent incidents by radicalized Moluccans, the two-track approach lost its credibility. In 1979, the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) took the initiative and drafted its report on ethnic minorities in which the primary focus on return migration, the organization of society into denominational ‘pillars’ and the maintenance of cultural identity in particular were deemed obsolete.\textsuperscript{15} If guest workers were going to stay in large numbers and become minorities, an entirely new approach was needed, focusing on integration into the national fold and prevention of enduring deprivation among minority groups.\textsuperscript{16} Note that the first coherent government statement on the integration of post-war immigrants, the 1983 white paper \textit{Minderhedennota}, was itself a reaction to this diagnosis of failure by a central, agenda-setting institution, the WRR.\textsuperscript{17}

In the context of the developing minorities policy, the tensions and problems of integrating immigrants and their families quickly became a mainstay of public discussion and, indeed, of heated contention, though it did not significantly effect electoral politics.\textsuperscript{18} The contention followed quite specific scripts and highlighted issues particular to the period. In the early 1980s, for instance, Couwenberg called for a straightforward and civil

\textsuperscript{15} WRR, \textit{Etnische minderheden} (Den Haag: Staatsuitgeverij 1979); Vink, ‘Dutch “multiculturalism” beyond the pillarization myth’.


(zakelijk en zindelijk) discussion of the ‘ethnic minority question’ and emphasized the importance of ‘protecting our own culture’.19 His interlocutors warned him that he thereby legitimized and in fact spurred on latent and manifest racism among the native population. This already hints at the centrality of racism and the importance of getting beyond it in the period immediately following the establishment of the minorities policy framework. As will be seen below, the failure of government attempts to integrate the former guest workers was a central topic in a wide variety of publications in the period up to 1991. Here, we look at three quite different interventions, which nonetheless share motifs that we argue are specific to how government failure was performed and played out in the public debate at that time.

Anet Bleich and Rudi Boon, two journalists writing for the magazine De Groene Amsterdammer, place the local, small-scale, everyday, banal and often clumsy interactions between natives and immigrants at the heart of their opinionated reportage ‘Grote en kleine irritaties in de Amsterdamse Kinkerbuurt’ (‘Large and small irritations in the Amsterdam Kinker quarter’, 1984).20 In their exposé of this working class neighborhood and the day-to-day struggles of its inhabitants, the intricacies and complexities of conviviality take center stage. According to Bleich and Boon, it is there that the failure of integration is ultimately located: ‘This is the Kinker quarter in 1984. With its many remarkable, bizarre, deceitful, awful, inventive, clumsy, endearing, but above all inhibited attempts to live together with inhabitants from other countries’.21 Bleich and Boon focus on the more or less pronounced racism of the white Dutch residents. In their narrative, the complexity of integration is attributed to both the maladjustment of the newcomers and the spiteful, often racist, reactions of the white majority. Efforts to tackle the problem culminate in the spread of counter-productive and pedantic information, which front-line community workers internalize:

An unstoppable stream of factoids in print-work and photo-slides is let loose on them [the community workers] in which the foreigner is presented as either the prisoner of an apparently backward and stagnant culture, or an assistance seeker whom migration has turned into a total fool. When confronted with such a strange specimen of the human species, more than one doctor, social worker or lawyer loses confidence in his own professional competence to interact with people.22

19 Rob van Ginkel, Op zoek naar eigenheid, 268–9. (Unless otherwise stated, all translations from the Dutch are by the authors.)
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
In this account, the attempts to deal with racial and cultural difference and to get beyond racism do not dampen, but instead strengthen, the inhibitions of white community workers. The banalities of daily life are much too specific and complex to be dealt with through formulaic knowledge and bureaucratic policy measures. Because government policy doesn’t attend to the banal character of daily interaction, it is doomed to fail, leaving a chasm between natives and newcomers in its wake.

Although vastly different in intention and explicitly critical of Anet Bleich’s focus on native racism, Herman Vuijsje’s *Vermoorde onschuld* (1986) follows the same motif. Here, too, the obstacles to integration are found in the everyday banalities of interaction between white natives and black others. Vuijsje, a sociologist and publicist, blames the inhibited way in which Dutch tend to approach their coloured compatriots, always careful not to commit the sin of white-on-black racism. The austerity of correct speech makes it impossible to get to know each other. The book begins by stating that ‘In the Netherlands, the road to the ethnic is paved with formal ceremony’. Again, instead of dampening the inhibitions of the Dutch towards racial and cultural others, the attempt to generalize and lay down rules of conduct only makes it harder to realize the goal of an integrated, post-racist society. In Vuijsje’s account, the accusation of native racism further inhibits the receiving population’s ability to interact with newcomers in a forthright, natural, and unencumbered way. The title of his book, ‘Murdered Innocence’, refers to the lost innocence of the Dutch in relation to racial and cultural difference. Vuijsje unmasks anti-racist critiques as being, in fact, racist: ‘The argumentation and the style of the preachers of guilt and punishment are often reminiscent of radical feminism: the “oppressed” can freely accuse the “oppressors”, all stereotypes and generalizations are allowed. When the opposite happens, it is discrimination and racism or sexism’. The victim mentality nurtured by anti-racist activists and those working in the welfare and minority policy ‘industry’ has adverse effects: ‘It was a relief to be at a meeting of an ethnic group where, for once, the main line was not: how pitiful are we and how bad are they, but rather: what can we do about it ourselves?’ If the Dutch do not get over their inhibitions and stop shying away from openly talking about the everyday problems of difference, an easy-going, well-functioning multicultural society will remain out of reach. In this sense, Vuijsje’s book, published by a prominent publisher, was a conscious provocation of what Vuijsje called the ‘Dutch taboo on ethnic difference’.

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24 Ibid., 7.
25 Ibid., 33.
26 Ibid., 34.
The importance of provocation carries over into the final performance of failed integration policies in this period. David Pinto’s June 1988 op-ed in the national daily de Volkskrant called for a ‘completely new approach to the problem’.27 The government’s approach to minority integration failed because it over-accommodated and over-assisted minority communities. By helping, government made them dependent on state paternalism. ‘The patronizing has gone on for too long. The ethnic minorities have slowly been hugged to death. My suggestion is to just abolish the organizations that have been set up as categorical institutions and have been maintained for too long’.28 Like Bleich and Vuijsje, Pinto highlights the adverse effects of treating minorities like pitiful people, and not being able to speak uninhibitedly about the complexities of integration: ‘Why is it that even the slightest disapproval of a foreigner is seen as racism? Because people think that foreigners are pitiful and can’t take care of themselves!’29

Instead of the all-too-well-intentioned approach of the Dutch government, Pinto argues that immigrants should stand up for themselves and build their own futures:

This pitying of foreigners conceals the danger of a self-fulfilling prophecy. This attitude has existed for too long now. In the 90s we should no longer speak about minorities, but about immigrants. Immigrants who can build their future themselves, who have to, want to and can stand up for themselves.30

All in all, the motif of inhibition and the need to get beyond the pre-occupation with race and racism runs through all three interventions. The idea that much of what the government is doing is in fact only making things worse is central. The recent past is imagined as a period in which an all-too-general approach has failed to attend to complex and banal realities on the ground, and has served to reinforce inhibited relations between natives and newcomers. Vuijsje and Pinto not only advocate a more provocative and defiant attitude, but in fact put that attitude into practice in their interventions. They not only present inhibition as the problem, but actively try to break through it with their performances.

Post-pillarization and the ideal of a debate on the res publica

Increasing criticism of the Dutch government’s approach towards minorities, set out in 1983, prompted the Scientific Council for Governmental Policy

28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
(WRR) yet again to publish a report on the integration of newcomers into Dutch society: *Allochtonenbeleid*. This report advocated another paradigmatic shift in dealing with *allochthones*, a term which it elevated to the status of policy category. While it responded to the kinds of criticisms presented above, the report also introduced new ideas about why integration policies had failed. With these ideas came new ideals and horizons.

The authors of *Allochtonenbeleid*—most notably Arie van Zwan and Han Entzinger—developed a distinct notion of cultural recognition, which is central to their diagnosis of previous policies. Instead of actively accommodating the cultural identities and practices of newcomers, integration policies should sideline the specific backgrounds and communal memberships of ‘allochthones’. The term ‘allochthon’ itself was supposed to enable the move away from ethnic group categories and towards the integration of individuals who happen to have non-indigenous backgrounds. What is most important, according to the WRR, is individual success in terms of socio-economic and political participation. Cultural practice and ethnic membership is something that allochthones, and indeed all citizens, should sort out on their own.

Allochthones, who wish to, need to be able to maintain and develop their cultural identity: integration certainly doesn’t necessitate cultural assimilation. Even more than in realizing institutional integration, this is the responsibility of the groups in question. The initiative to obtain certain facilities should come from these groups themselves. Government doesn’t have any other duties apart from breaching barriers that allochthonous groups encounter due to being allochthonous, thus enabling them to share in the cultural plurality in equal measure to the autochthones.

The government’s active encouragement to form ethnically coherent communities is thus presented as the major flaw of the previous period.

There is a striking shift in concepts here. The WRR rejected the idea that newcomers should be supported to maintain their identities—the infamous *behoud van eigen identiteit*—in their own previous report on integration policy, a rejection that was carried over by government in 1983. It did so precisely because it was not up to government to dictate the contents and boundaries of ethnic identity. Government should not reify what was—in fact—fluid, plural and changing as this would only hamper integration. The 1979 report bears the legacy of a more anthropological notion of group identity. In the new report of 1989, the accommodation of supra-individual

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32 Ibid., 24.
33 WRR, *Etnische minderheden*.
34 Vink, ‘Dutch “multiculturalism” beyond the pillarization myth’.
35 Scholten, ‘Constructing immigrant policies’; Uitermark, ‘Dynamics of power in Dutch integration politics’.
identities is also rejected, this time because allochthones should be free to experience and change their identities on their own prerogative. The reasoning is not anthropological, but rather juridico-republican.

The WRR thereby introduces a new logic for dealing with cultural identity and practice. As long as culture and ethnicity are treated as private matters where the government only needs to protect the negative liberty of citizens, there can be no misunderstanding about what is expected of allochthones and their equal position vis-à-vis autochthones. ‘There is no reason to place the “new” allochthones, groups or members thereof, in a special position when dealing with their cultural and denominational identities and the creation and maintenance of the necessary, material conditions’. 36 If only government would treat everyone as citizens and leave their other identities alone, the right balance between responsibilities and rights will be maintained. What was already true for autochthones should also be true for allochthones: as far as government is concerned, only their civic, individual identities are relevant.

This principled split between public and civic on the one hand and private and ethnic on the other is also the main focus of the interventions made by Frits Bolkestein in 1991. From 1991, Bolkestein, the leader of the conservative-liberal VVD party, emerged as the most prominent and indeed provocative critic of Dutch integration policy. 37 Concurring with the WRR, Bolkestein’s interventions were predicated on the split between public and private domains. He also added several elements that extended the significance of juridico-republican logic. First of all, Bolkestein presented his liberal ideals not only as political positions, but as belonging to the cultural heritage of Western civilization. Indeed, one of his first critiques of Dutch integration policy was part of a lecture on the future of a post-communist Europe. 38

Here we must go back to our roots. Liberalism has produced some fundamental political principles, such as the separation of church and state, the freedom of expression, tolerance and non-discrimination. We maintain that these principles hold good not only in Europe and North America but all over the world. 39

In Bolkestein’s performance, liberal values are at once political and cultural. Liberalism moves ambiguously between being a party specific, political vision and being constitutive of democratic, public culture as such, rendering it non-negotiable. ‘Liberalism claims universal value and worth for these

36 WRR, Allochtonenbeleid, 49.
37 Uitermark, ‘Dynamics of power in Dutch integration politics’.
39 Ibid.
principles. That is its political vision. Here there can be no compromise and no truck’.40

Second, Bolkestein is skeptical of the Dutch legacy of denominational ‘pillars’ for civic inclusion.

‘Emancipation through pillarization’ has a good reputation in the Netherlands. A century of pillarization, so it is claimed, has lead to the emancipation of Catholics and orthodox Calvinists. On these grounds, one would also prefer emancipation through pillarization in the case of Islamic minorities. But maybe Catholics and orthodox Calvinists would have emancipated themselves without pillarization. Yes, maybe they would have emancipated more quickly in the face of repression than within the rich life of their own pillars.41

In Bolkestein’s account, the pillars were always already minority structures sheltering individuals from the repression of the majority. If so, pillarization can only be a mechanism for inclusion into that majority, not a politico-cultural ideal in itself. Not sheltering oneself from the pressures of the majority is presented as a more promising mechanism to prompt individuals to engage with, rather than retreat from, public life and to promote a more active, republican attitude.

Finally and crucially, Bolkestein calls for a ‘great debate’ on the issue of integration. Of course, this is consistent with the republican logic: if we differ, the only way to manage these differences is to speak out publically as citizens. And like Vuijsje and Pinto before him, Bolkestein’s interventions already perform what a ‘great debate’ should be. There is no place for permissiveness or taboo; it should showcase the public culture of Dutch society and involve all political parties.

The integration of minorities is such a complex problem that it can only be solved with guts and creativity. There is no space for permissiveness or taboos. We need a great debate, in which all political parties take part, about what is allowed and what is appropriate, what is necessary and what looms if we don’t.42

What began as the need to breach inhibitions in daily life is, in a sense, upgraded by Bolkestein into the need for a nationwide and very public debate about who we are as Europeans and, indeed, as Dutch citizens—namely, a people who are historically disposed to speak out on public concerns and thereby enact their republican liberalism.

Much more than just a policy discussion, the ‘great debate’ is presented as a necessary mechanism for integration itself, an alternative to pillarization.

40 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
where such debate would be evaded and allochthonous individuals would be sheltered from majoritarian attacks.

**Post-pluralism and the ideal of a public restoration of national identity**

Although the ‘great debate’ called for by Bolkestein in 1991 took shape over the course of the 1990s—the integration of newcomers and the regulation of borders became prominent electoral issues—the debate took on a new form with the unfolding of the ‘purple coalition’ government and, especially, the interventions of the public intellectual and professor of urban problems Paul Scheffer. The public impact of Scheffer’s critiques was such that he is sometimes credited with starting the debate on integration as such. From the reconstruction thus far, we can conclude that Scheffer did not invent or spark the debate on integration. Along with the idea of failing policies, it had been around for some time. By contrasting Scheffer’s performance with the two previous episodes, we can reconstruct more precisely what is new about how he envisioned and performed policy failure.

In his landmark piece in the national daily *NRC Handelsblad*, ‘Het multiculurele drama’ (*The multicultural drama*, January 2000) and his subsequent reaction to criticisms ‘Het multiculurele drama, een repliek’ (*The multicultural drama, a reply*, March 2000) Paul Scheffer attacks Dutch detachment and negligence regarding the segregation and inequality unfolding in Dutch cities. In contrast to the 1980s, when uninhibited and easy-going relations were idealized, Scheffer is highly critical of down-playing the very real problem of integration. What is needed is not relaxation, but public urgency.

In 1994 the government still expressed urgency regarding ethnic minorities: ‘The government concludes that the prospects are very worrisome. Reasons for concern are stagnating economic development, ongoing immigration—of asylum seekers in particular—and the considerable impact of these developments on societal support for policy’ (White paper on integration policy of ethnic minorities). It seems that this urgency has evaporated in the bliss of the *poldermodel* [corporatist welfare reforms].

The lack of urgency is tied to the legacy of consensus-seeking in Dutch history:

> What is the value of the age-old method of peaceful coexistence in entirely new circumstances? Will it function in the same way? Is it a mark of self-confidence

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not to emphasize the distinctive identity \( \text{[het eigene]} \) of our society? The cultural commonality, within which difference could be lived, is now far less at hand; there aren’t many sources of solidarity. The comparison with pillarization doesn’t match up. Segregation of schools into black and white schools is, of course, of a completely different nature than the distinction between public and denominational schools.\(^45\)

Scheffer reiterates the importance of public liberalism so central to the critiques of the 1990s. A clear distinction should be maintained between what is public and what is private: ‘There ought not to be space in public life for movements that want to discontinue the separation of church and state or the equal rights of men and women. Religious symbols like headscarves belong to the private sphere and not to a public office such as the police’.\(^46\)

But Scheffer’s subsequent and explicit emphasis on national identity is distinctive. Public liberalism is not only rooted in the cultural history of the Netherlands, as Bolkestein already contended, but should be imagined as such through a collective, \textit{national} identity. Not only are the lines between public and private blurred by all-too-accommodative responses to culturally different newcomers; the imagination of a national identity which would encompass these differences has been neglected.

The culture of toleration, which now bumps up to its limits, goes hand in glove with an unrealistic self-image. We need to get away from the cosmopolitan illusion in which many wallow. The denunciative way in which we have dealt with national consciousness in the Netherlands isn’t welcoming. We pride ourselves in having no national pride. This boundless attitude of the Dutch doesn’t contribute to integration, because more often than not, it conceals a detached and heedless society. Today, the postmodern historical vision dominates in which every ‘we’ is immediately suspect.\(^47\)

A happy-go-lucky \( \text{[gemakzuchtig]} \) multiculturalism is spreading because we are not able to explicate what keeps society together. We say too little about our borders, don’t cherish a relation to our own past and treat our language nonchalantly.\(^48\)

The ‘great debate’ called for by Bolkestein should not only constitute confrontation between citizens, but should also provide a national narrative, an encompassing identity that ties together those citizens through which they can, once again, form a community based on solidarity. Contrary to the Dutch tendency to shy away from any form of national imagination, the debate about integration should also make it clear who ‘we’ are. What ‘we’

\(^{45}\) Ibid.  
\(^{46}\) Ibid.  
\(^{47}\) Ibid.  
\(^{48}\) Ibid.
have in common should exceed mere principles of confrontation and be embedded in a national self-image. The astute and intellectual defense of republican liberalism offered by Bolkestein is in itself not enough, because the ideal of *res publica* would still enable a culture of evasion and negligence. According to Scheffer, the notion of ‘maintaining one’s identity’ cannot provide the basis for this new national image. In reaction to his critics, Scheffer writes: ‘In the Netherlands a self-image is cherished in which tolerance and indifference have become strangely intertwined’. 49

Clearly, many take the critique of the slogan ‘integration while maintaining one’s identity’ as a sign of poor appreciation of other cultures. There is no reason to speak disrespectfully about other cultures, but this slogan is susceptible to critique because it misrecognizes the experience of migration. It is an appeasing statement, while nobody should underestimate how rough a farewell from hearth and home can be.50

In the end, though, uninhibited relations return. Scheffer’s call for urgency is meant to realize a more uninhibited future. According to Scheffer, it is precisely the debate that was sparked by his intervention that has shown such a future to be possible. Again, the possibility of uninhibited relations is related to national self-consciousness:

The historian Johan Huizinga wrote in his beautiful essay *Nederlands Geestesmerk* [Dutch Mental Character] (1935): ‘As a nation and state we are in a certain sense enduringly *satisfait* [content] and it is our national duty to remain so’. He formulates a paradoxical task: all effort should be focused in order to remain at ease. This is also what is at stake today: how can we deal with new forms of inequality and segregation in such a way that the country remains uninhibited in its relations with immigrants?51

Being at ease and undisturbed is presented as being unmistakably Dutch, a crucial part of Dutch self-awareness. The troubling developments in the multicultural present must be urgently addressed to retain a relaxed society in the future. Only by going beyond the evasion and negligence of the past can a better future become reality.

**Post-tolerance and the ideal of constitutional patriotism**

The years following Scheffer’s essays have been anything but relaxed. The rise of a new political party organized around Pim Fortuyn—sociologist,

50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
provocateur, public intellectual, dandy\textsuperscript{52}—his assassination just before the national elections, the unprecedented electoral success of his party and the subsequent in-fighting that led to its demise set the stage for a highly contentious period in Dutch politics. Right at the middle of the contention was, and is, the issue of integration and failing government policies. Although Fortuyn’s profile included much more than integration, it was one of his central topics of contention. The Labour Party (PvdA) bore the brunt of Fortuyn’s attacks. In the following years, the PvdA was challenged from all sides of the political spectrum on the issue of integration. Especially after Ayaan Hirsh Ali’s switch from the PvdA to the conservative-liberal VVD (2002) and the murder of Theo van Gogh (2004), PvdA social democrats struggled to reposition themselves. Fiercely divided internally on how to position the party within the new emerging discourses, the PvdA became almost synonymous with failed policies of integration.\textsuperscript{53} It is therefore all the more interesting to analyse how, after having regained its position in a governing coalition, the PvdA repositioned itself on the issue. We look here at two crucial moments: the resignation speech of Ella Vogelaar as PvdA minister for housing, neighborhoods and integration, and the PvdA white paper on integration issued almost a year later.

Ella Vogelaar became minister for housing, neighborhoods and integration in the newly formed Labor/Christian coalition government in 2006. She quickly drew media attention for being more appeasing on integration than her predecessor, Rita Verdonk, and was often associated with being ‘soft’ or ‘pragmatic’. When it was revealed that she had hired a spin-doctor to improve the image of her policies and an interview about this with the provocative blog Geenstijl.nl went badly,\textsuperscript{54} Vogelaar’s inability to present herself and her policies to the public became a major news story. Her media performance became a topic in and of itself. Matters became even worse for her after a statement in an interview with the broadsheet Trouw. She was quoted saying that: ‘Centuries ago Jews came to the Netherlands and today we say: the Netherlands have been shaped by Jewish-Christian traditions. I can imagine that we will see a similar process with regards to Islam’.\textsuperscript{55}

A host of other controversies surrounding her actions and decisions followed, focusing in particular on the effectiveness of her approach to

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\textsuperscript{54} The interview was posted on the blog ‘Geenstijl.nl’ on 17 April 2008. See for video and blog: http://www.geenstijl.tv/2008/04/rutger_en_de_mediastilte_van_e.html (viewed 18 June 2011).

integration. Eventually her own party, the PvdA, withdrew its confidence in her as minister. At the moment of her resignation—13 November 2008—Vogelaar gave an impromptu speech in which she related her own demise to the failure of her party to deal with the issue of integrating immigrants:

With regard to integration I have to conclude that after the period of Fortuyn the PvdA has not been able to give a clear direction that is supported by the entire party. As a reaction to what the PvdA didn’t see in the years before, namely the negative effects of the settlement of large numbers of migrants, some of whom have caused nuisance, degradation and crime, the focus is, to my mind, too much on the tough approach only. I’m personally very much convinced that the approach should be two-sided. Setting boundaries and offering perspectives. These two need to go hand in hand. Indeed, they belong to the roots and the core values of social democracy. Enforcement when necessary, but also demonstrating that it is possible to build a future here in the Netherlands. 56

In this speech, the position of the PvdA is performed through a number of motifs that will turn out to be crucial in the PvdA white paper. Pim Fortuyn saw what the PvdA did not: some newcomers disturb public order. The PvdA was split between hard-disciplining and soft-emancipatory approaches. Vogelaar’s speech was intended to convince the television audience that her resignation is a testament to the inability of the PvdA to marry these approaches in a coherent and convincing way.

The PvdA leadership set out to reposition the party on integration policy in a white paper outlining the party’s thinking on the matter. First, a draft version was released. After considerable haggling, a final resolution was accepted at a party conference on 14 March 2009. 57 In it, the party explicitly accepts blame for not having recognized serious problems concerning immigration:

And, fair is fair, those feelings were not recognized sufficiently by government and politicians. The difficult issues and problems of multicultural society were too often unarticulated in fear of discriminating. Only when Paul Scheffer, Pim Fortuyn and others—each in their own way—gave voice to the grievances did the conflicts that many people had to deal with on a daily basis reach the top of the political agenda. 58

56 A brief reportage about Vogelaar’s demise and the entire speech can be viewed at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c9lXX1243HQ (viewed 18 June 2011).
57 For an example of the kinds of discussions that took off in response to the draft resolution within the PvdA see: Socialisme & Democratie, Verdeeld verleden, gedeelde koers? Bijdragen aan het debat over integratie (Amsterdam: Boom 2009). The final, accepted resolution—Verdeeld verleden, gedeelde toekomst—can be accessed on the website of the PvdA: http://www.pvda.nl/publicatie/bibliotheek/publicaties/2009/03/Verdeeld+geleden,+gedeelde+toekomst+definitief.html (viewed 18 July 2011).
Culturally deviant migrants and their children are also ostensibly present in the draft paper. Evasion of the problems they create should end:

The period of evasion is over for good. This will entail conflicts. There is diminishing patience for Moroccan-Dutch and Antillean-Dutch rascals who can’t behave themselves. And there is also less and less tolerance for hate-mongering imams who, claiming freedom of religion, preach intolerance for people with other persuasions.\(^59\)

The double approach—hard and soft—is ultimately based on the defense of the rule of law and the constitution:

These are the two pillars of the vision that the PvdA is drawing. Both are equally important. But we will only get support for our beckoning vision if we uphold and consistently protect the rule of law and the constitution. Only when everyone’s freedom is in good hands. This also means that we have to enter into confrontation when we think that this freedom is threatened—or when emancipation is impeded. This is a task for politics—for the PvdA. Politicians have to confront citizens, to condemn abuses and also bring people together again. We are credible in our defense of a new Netherlands with a greater diversity of cultures, religions and identities only if we are credible in our narrative about the rule of law, the constitution and the freedom that these bring.\(^60\)

The PvdA white paper is thus built around the notion that, in the past, the negative consequences of immigration were hidden by politicians. The rule of law and the constitution are now presented as the common ground on which confrontations about cultural differences and undesirable behavior can, and indeed should, take place. The past is one of evasive tolerance; in the present, the PvdA has found stable footing in the constitutional protection of individual freedoms. Only through such protection can people attain fully-fledged citizenship:

Emancipation is much more than offering equal opportunities. Emancipation also involves freedom. The freedom of all people to decide for themselves how to live their lives. The freedom of all people who want to make choices which go against the pressures of the group, culture or religion. In our Netherlands, the Netherlands as we wish it to be, this right is unconditionally number one. In our Netherlands this is one of the accomplishments of the democratic, constitutional state. The PvdA always chooses the side of the individual and his or her emancipation. The PvdA takes [its] position by staunchly defending opportunities, emancipation and upward mobility and the unconditional duties of active citizenship which emanate from our constitution.\(^61\)

\(^{59}\) Ibid.

\(^{60}\) Ibid.

\(^{61}\) Ibid.
Individual freedoms not only provide the ground rules for public order, but also constitute the national self-image, a source of national identification:

This is what we want.
A country where everyone feels at home, irrespective of where his or her crib once stood.
A country where everyone’s talents are realized, where there are no glass ceilings on the basis of last names, sex, religion or ethnic background.
A country without fear in whose cities Jews can wear yarmulkes, Muslim women can wear a head scarf out of their own free will and gays and lesbian can openly hold hands on the street. A country where everyone can voice their opinion within the bounds of the law, where both religion as well as critique of religion is tolerated, where accomplished freedoms are uncompromisingly protected, where artists and cabaretiers [highly regarded comedic, public commentators] can make their jokes without fear, where politicians can explore the boundaries of civil discourse and go through life without security protection.
A country where loyalty isn’t measured by the number of passports someone has, but by the extent to which someone is willing to participate in building a shared future; a country where we ask all citizens to make an affirmative choice for the Netherlands, without this having to mean that people deny their own personal past.
A country where autochthones and allochthones do not live, play and work separately out of separate pasts, but work together through knowledge and understanding of each other’s backgrounds towards undivided neighborhoods and a shared future.
But above all, a country where we no longer speak of allochthones and autochthones, but only of citizens. Citizens who are proud of their country.
A country where everyone in equal circumstances is treated equally. A country where everyone may believe what he or she wants within the bounds of the law, may say what he or she wants, may be what he or she wants, with or without God. A country where we respect each other, where we look out for each other and feel connected to each other and our shared future.
A country of which all its citizens say: ‘This is our country. And together we are this country’. 62

In their search for a clear position in the highly contested field of integration and immigration, the PvdA seems to find stable footing on the rule of law and the constitution. In the end, all citizens can and must be bound to the constitution, which also provides a source of identification. Moreover, the rule of law and the constitution provide a clear basis from which legitimate confrontations over cultural differences and undesirable behaviour can be launched. This will ensure that the evasive tolerance of the

62 Ibid.
past will be transcended. The social democrats concur with Scheffer that society must have a common ground and a common self-image. The PvdA will replace evasive tolerance and its failed self-image with constitutional patriotism: a nation which understands and identifies itself through the rule of law, the constitution and citizenship.

From civic exceptionalism to liberal protectionism

To explain how the scapegoat of an accommodative, pluralistic policy model—i.e. multiculturalism—persisted through some thirty years of public and political debate, we need to highlight the persistent refrain within the shifting diagnoses of failure. What motifs are repeated across the changing ways in which integration policies are problematized and new horizons advocated? On the basis of the above analysis, we argue that the central cause of failure is seen to be, time and again, the lack of confrontation. This involves (1) inhibited relations with newcomers; (2) vagueness about what is expected of them; and not least, (3) a hesitation to speak publically about the issue. The central cause turns out to be framed over and over again as a matter of style, as the way the Dutch deal with diversity.

The lack of confrontation takes on different guises over time. This can most clearly be seen by examining the changing ways in which the notion of ‘integration while maintaining one’s own identity’ is criticized. It was first attacked for being artificial, paternalistic and assuming all-too-general ethnic types, projecting an image of dependency and backwardness onto immigrants. The 1989 WRR report and Bolkestein emphasized that expression and experience of ethnic identity, in fact any identity, is the prerogative of the individual citizen. It should be made unmistakably clear that this is, in fact, the social contract under which the Dutch live together, a cherished centerpiece of Dutch public culture. At the turn of the century, Scheffer chastised the notion for enabling negligence and evasive tolerance. It might seem respectful, but prevents the government from facing the issue. The PvdA followed Scheffer’s diagnosis in 2009—that the Dutch have been tolerant to the point of neglect—adding the idea that the individual freedoms enshrined in the constitution should be the basis from which confrontation can take place. So even though ‘maintaining one’s own identity’ means something different at each step—and even though policymakers rejected the idea from 1983 onwards—it shows the persistence of a recurring motif: government policies fail because they do not address the lack of confrontation.

We argued at the outset that a coherent, multiculturalist policy model cannot explain the persistence of its critique in the Netherlands. Not only is the very concept of an ‘integration model’ doubtful; its application to the history of Dutch immigration and integration policies is highly problematic.
So how can the persistent critique of all-too-accommodative policies and the permanent idea of ‘failure’ be explained? When we shift our attention from the debate about policy models to the ways in which the Dutch and Dutchness figure in the various diagnoses of failure, it becomes clear that the Dutch and their Dutchness hardly change across the succeeding interventions. That is, characterizations of the Dutch as being exceptionally modern, freedom-loving, uninhibited, forthright, democratic, civic-minded and egalitarian remain robustly at the forefront of how the cultural differences between the native population and the newcomers are conceived. Again, certain aspects are more pronounced at different moments, but the core image of Dutchness persists: a people who stand out in their common embrace of individual liberty and resistance to imposed morality. We are not the first to reconstruct this genre of Dutchness.63

Although this image of Dutchness is robust and hardly contested, it creates tensions when it comes to the integration of newcomers. These tensions have only grown over time. Cultural differences were first embedded in everyday life, banal and parochial. The typically Dutch tendency to repress differences by containing them within all-too-general stereotypes was the root of the problem. The Dutch wanted to be post-racial, which is to their credit, but it led them to ignore the very real differences that exist in daily life. They had to conquer their inhibitions.

The 1989 WRR report and Bolkestein then elevated this problematic to the level of political philosophy: the Dutch social contract is a liberal republican one in which, to the credit of the Dutch, everyone may express and experience their differences, on the condition that government only recognizes the individual citizen. To get beyond the ills of ‘pillarization’, a great debate on these matters, speaking openly and frankly, had to enable newcomers to adapt. The Dutch should be more vocal about the foundations of their public culture. At this point, cultural differences gain philosophical and, indeed, civilizational dimensions.

At the turn of the century, Scheffer turned all of these self-images—liberty, tolerance, egalitarianism, anti-nationalism—into the root of the problem itself. Scheffer’s move was highly reflexive: it is precisely because the Dutch have been holding on to these self-images that they have not recognized the extent of the drama taking place. To regain the typically Dutch attitude towards difference—one of relaxed tolerance—we must reinvigorate national identity in a more effective mode. Once again, an outspoken debate

on our national identity will enable the Dutch to reimagine clearly and openly who they are. Cultural differences are not only deep and dramatic, but will only be encompassed through a new idea of Dutchness. The PvdA addressed the question of national identity in their white paper by placing the constitutional protection of individual liberty at the heart of national identification. The party explicitly agreed with Scheffer in arguing that because politicians have hesitated to speak about these issues openly and frankly, the basis of solidarity has been undermined. Cultural cleavages might be deep and dramatic, but as long as the Dutch hold on to their basic principles and no longer evade confrontation, they can be drawn together. What starts out as the exposition of an exceptionally civic spirit gradually turns into a call to protect liberal values.

The consecutive diagnoses of failure increasingly centre on the question of national identity—its vague and unarticulated character—keeping the lack of confrontation in Dutch responses to newcomers at the forefront of debate. Though lack of confrontation is a motif in debates on diversity in many other polities as well—witness American anxieties over political correctness and affirmative action, for instance—it has a particularly crucial role to play in Dutch debates as the lack of confrontation relates directly to the core question at hand: what does it mean to be Dutch?

Running from our shadows

The idea that a more successful policy approach will need to be more uninhibited, more explicit and advocated more vocally—an idea already in place in the early 1980s—brings with it the problem of explicating what Dutchness in fact is. The debate over the style in which integration politics should be conducted brings with it questions of and concerns about the symbolic resources at the disposal of the Dutch: what images symbolize true Dutchness? As we argued, this problematic becomes more and more apparent as the debate develops. Settling the matter, however, turns out to be difficult. This is first of all because Dutchness itself is never contested within the debate. Its core motif remains firmly in place: individual liberty from repressive morality. With the rise of debate on immigrant

64 Zimmer, ‘Boundary mechanisms and symbolic resources: towards a process-oriented approach to national identity’.
integration, Dutchness does not begin to change, but is increasingly reiterated. In fact, one of the most prominent figures in the debate, Scheffer, makes the public imagination of national identity a centrepiece of his argument. Second, there is significant tension between the ideal of individual liberty from repressive morality and the will to impose that ideal on newcomers in order to protect it. Critics of integration policy cope with this tension by arguing that individual liberty from repressive morality is a typically Dutch achievement—one that can be so extreme that it becomes the root of the problem.

Denunciations of multiculturalism end up demarcating two ways of being different in the Netherlands: there are those who are different—e.g. gays and lesbians—because they are Dutch, part of an open, dynamic, liberal culture which doesn’t enforce one encompassing morality, and those who are different because they aren’t Dutch. Even though policy frameworks, discourses and practices have changed continuously over the last 30 years, multiculturalism, or the notion of providing space for new forms of diversity in Dutch society, has remained the central object of contention. We have argued here that it plays this role primarily because the Dutch have been imagined in these debates, consistently and robustly, as a people who refrain from imposing a unified identity on their fellow citizens. This image resonates with the notion of multiculturalism itself. This notion of Dutchness is not subject to critique or change but has been more and more explicitly presented as a native, Dutch achievement. Therefore the critique of multiculturalism returns time and again: the Dutch never seem to get rid of their inhibitions to confront the newcomers. Or, to put it in other words, the critics of multiculturalism seem to be running from their own shadows.

Were the critics of multiculturalism to be less occupied with running from a specter of their own creation—the artificial distinction between national identity and cultural diversity—they might overcome their preoccupation with inevitable failure. This would aid immensely in shifting our attention to the failures and successes of the varied and multiscalar policy practices across Europe today. In the meantime, there have been attempts in Dutch debates to perform, with varying kinds of impact, rhetorics of progressive optimism about migrant integration.66

66 Dick Pels, Een zwak voor Nederland (Amsterdam: Anthos 2005); Jan Willem Duyvendak, Ewald Engelen and Ido de Haan, Het bange Nederland: pleidooi voor een open samenleving (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker); James Kennedy, Beziende verbanden: gedachten over religie, politiek en maatschappij in het moderne Nederland (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker 2009); Frans Verhagen, Hoezo mislukt? De nuchtere feiten over de integratie in Nederland (Amsterdam: Nieuw Amsterdam 2010); Leo Lucassen and Jan Lucassen, Winnaars en verliezers: een nuchtere balans van vijfhonderd jaar immigratie (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker 2011).
**Rogier van Reekum** is a doctoral candidate at the Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research (AISSR), and holds masters degrees in sociology and philosophy from the University of Amsterdam. He is conducting a study (funded by NWO/Oxfam-Novib/Forum) of public and political debates on Dutchness and citizenship in the Netherlands (1989–2010), and is an editor of *Krisis, Journal for Contemporary Philosophy*. E-mail: R.vanReekum@uva.nl

**Jan Willem Duyvendak** has been full professor in Sociology at the University of Amsterdam since 2003 and was previously director of the Verwey-Jonker Research Institute for Social Issues (1999–2003) and Professor of Community Development at the Erasmus University Rotterdam. His main fields of research currently are belonging, urban sociology, ‘feeling at home’ and nativism. His most recent books include *The Politics of Home: Nostalgia and Belonging in Western Europe and the United States* (Palgrave 2011) and (with Menno Hurenkamp and Evelien Tonkens) *Crafting Citizenship: Understanding Tensions in a Multi-Ethnic Society* (forthcoming from Palgrave). E-mail: w.g.j.duyvendak@uva.nl