Chapter 4

Social Movement Types and Policy Domains

In this chapter, we analyze the relationship between social movements and their political context in a somewhat different perspective. Whereas in the preceding chapters we focused on differences between the NSMs of the four countries in relation to differing national political contexts (POSs), in this chapter *similarities across countries* and *differences within countries* command our attention. Until now, we have dealt with the impact of political opportunities on a whole social movement sector. The general idea to be investigated in this chapter, however, is that the POS does not influence a whole social movement sector in the same way and to the same extent. In what follows, we would like to introduce two sets of concepts related to the idea of POSs specific to the different components of the NSM sector and offering an explanation of the remarkable variations between movements within countries.

First, we take into account the different reactions of challengers to political opportunities, depending on some of the challengers' characteristics. In this regard, the distinction between *instrumental movements, countercultural movements,* and *subcultural movements,* introduced by Koopmans (1992a), emerges as a powerful analytical tool. Due to characteristics *inherent* to the movements—their logic of action and their general orientation—movements of the same type follow comparable interactive dynamics, that is, the same reaction pattern to concrete opportunities. Since authorities and allies, in their turn, have movement-type specific (re)action patterns as well, similarities will occur across countries among movements of the same type and, as a consequence, differences among movements of the same country will appear.

Second, we consider the relation of the POS to different issues raised by social movements, causing different interactive dynamics *within* movement

types as well. We adopt the terms *high-profile* and *low-profile* (Duyvendak 1992) in order to distinguish between issues according to their relation to the POS. Whereas movement types' dynamics are primarily dependent on characteristics of the challengers, an issue's profile is a function of the evaluation by political authorities. What is crucial is the priority of an issue on the political agenda, which is determined by its relevance in the perspective of dominant cleavage structures (see chapter 1) and by the authorities' conceptions of the core tasks and interest of the state. Since issues are generally connected, forming larger issue areas, we would like to introduce the idea that the impact of the POS on social protest differs according to *policy domains.* Some policy domains are seen as more crucial than others by established actors. Hence issues raised by social movements that concern such policy domains are potentially more threatening for the authorities, who in this case would be less responsive/accessible to challengers. In contrast, movements that raise potentially less threatening issues concerning less crucial policy domains would find the political system to be more open.

This perspective is also the one followed by the so-called agenda-building approach (Cobb and Elder 1983), according to which political issues have varying patterns of entrance or access to the agenda of decision makers. Yet this approach has mostly dealt with a bottom-up process, looking for factors that enable political issues to reach the systemic or the institutional agendas, focusing on the definition of issues by those who raised them, and stressing such factors as the issue definition, the symbol utilization, and the expansion to a relevant public. Here we would like to underline the evaluation of issues by established actors, above all by political authorities, and to show how this top-down process influences the mobilization by NSMs.

We will first show how variations between movements within a given political context can in part be explained in terms of the different reaction of movement *types* to the set of concrete opportunities deriving from the structural characteristics of the political context. Then we will elaborate on the idea of *policy domain*-specific POSs in the search of an explanation of variations within movements of the same type.

Types of Movements

In chapter 2, we introduced four motivational factors—facilitation, repression, success chances, and reform/threat—which form the set of concrete opportunities for the mobilization of NSMs. Yet the model was confined to an

instrumental conception of social movements, in which means and ends can be neatly distinguished. Although we agree with the resource mobilization perspective that this assumption is adequate enough to serve as a basis for analyzing the strategic decisions of most movements and participants, we think the new social movement approach makes a valid point in arguing that some movements follow a much more expressive logic in which collective action and the identities it produces become ends in themselves (Hirschman 1982). Because of such differences among movements, several authors have proposed a distinction between strategy-oriented and identity-oriented movements[1] (Cohen 1985; Pizzorno 1978; Raschke 1985; Rolke 1987; Rucht 1988). Koopmans (1992a) has refined this typology by proposing an additional distinction between two types of identity-oriented movements. Subcultural movements, such as the gay movement, the new women's movement, and many ethnic movements, are primarily directed at collective identities that are constituted and reproduced in within-group interaction. In contrast, countercultural movements, such as terrorist organizations or sections of the squatters' movement and, again, many ethnic movements, derive their collective identity from conflicting and confrontational interaction with other groups.

Thus we can classify (new) social movements according to their logic of action (identity/instrumental) and their general orientation (internal/external). Figure 4.1 illustrates the position of each movement type in the conceptual space formed by the combination of these two criteria for the definition of movement types. Subcultural movements are predominantly internally oriented and identity-based. Instrumental movements are in some way their antithesis since they have an external orientation. Finally, countercultural movements are in between, for they combine their identity basis with a strong external orientation. The fourth combination has no logical foundation. If a social movement is instrumental, it cannot have an internal orientation, since instrumentally acting refers by definition to the pursuit of goals in the environment. Here we consider the ecology movement, the peace movement, and the solidarity movement as predominantly instrumental, the homosexual movement and the women's movement as predominantly subcultural, and the autonomous movement as predominantly countercultural. Yet this characterization is a relative one, in two ways. On the one hand, the position of each movement type may differ from one country to the other. For instance, countercultural movements may be more confrontational in one country than in another. As we have seen in the preceding chapters, such differences can easily be explained by the POS approach. On the other hand, within a given

General orientation \ Logic of action	Instrumental	Identity
Internal		Subcultural movements
External	Instrumental movements	Countercultural movements

Fig. 4.1. The three types of movements

political context, the position of each movement type may change over time. For instance, instrumental movements may become more identity-based and subcultural movements more externally oriented. In other words, one and the same movement may shift from one type to the other, at least as a general tendency. As a consequence, the evaluations and reactions by authorities and allies with regard to a given movement change accordingly, generating new interactive patterns.

The importance of this typology for our present purpose lies in the fact that movements of different types react differently to their environment. First of all, this follows from the fact that in identity-oriented movements the distinction between means and ends largely disappears. Since for these movements "the medium is the message," success chances and reform/threat—which are the two factors related to the goals of collective action (the "ends" side)—are of relatively minor importance to them. On the other hand, because in the identity-oriented logic collective action itself occupies a central place, repression and facilitation—which are the two factors influencing the costs and benefits of collective action itself (the "means" side)—become more important as determinants of collective action. A second important implication of the typology is that, due to their strong internal orientation, subcultural movements will, on average, be less affected by external opportunities, whereas the mobilization of both instrumental and countercultural movements strongly depends on external reinforcement (Koopmans 1992a).

But what are the effects of concrete opportunities on these different movement types? In chapter 2, we discussed the relationship between POS and social movement action as mediated by these motivational factors in the case of *instrumental movements.* Here we shall discuss the two identity-oriented types of movements. As far as they are concerned, we can concentrate on the effect of the opportunities that have an impact on collective action itself—that is, facilitation and repression. For *countercultural movements,* we can restrict our attention to *repression,* because these movements are so rad-

ical that hardly any established actors will be ready to facilitate them. Furthermore, even if any were ready to do so, countercultural movements would be unlikely to accept such support, which they generally see as an attempt by "reformists" to tame them and to prevent them from attaining their revolutionary goals. Repression, however, will have a strong impact on the mobilization of these movements. Interestingly, these effects will be exactly opposite to those described earlier for instrumental movements. Repression strengthens the collective identity countercultural participants and activists derive from conflicting interaction. Therefore it stimulates rather than deters mobilization and will provoke a radicalization rather than a moderation of the action repertoire (Koopmans 1992a: 40–44).

With regard to *subcultural movements,* we have indicated that they do not depend to the same extent on external opportunities as the other two types. Nevertheless, to the extent that they interact with their political environment, even subcultural movements are affected by political opportunities. Because subcultural movements have elements in common with both countercultural movements (the identity orientation) and instrumental movements (conflict is not sought for its own sake), we can expect their relations to *repression* and *facilitation* to combine elements of both logics. When facilitation is forthcoming, the externally directed activities of subcultural movements tend to take on an instrumental character. Under conditions of repression, a more countercultural attitude may come to predominate (Koopmans 1992a: 44–45). However, both instrumental and countercultural tendencies will be limited because of the predominant orientation toward within-group interaction. Facilitation may lead to assimilation and a blurring of the boundary between subculture and dominant culture, and may thereby undermine the movement's raison d'être. This will result either in the movement's disappearance or in a reaffirmation of the movement's identity and a relaxation of ties with the dominant culture and politics. Similar limits apply to countercultural tendencies in more repressive circumstances: at higher levels of repression that threaten the movement's subcultural basis, conflict-aversive strategies are likely to gain the upper hand (Koopmans 1992a; see also chapter 7).

To sum up, the discussion of the relationship between concrete opportunities and movement types shows that variations in the patterns of mobilization may be explained, at least in part, by the fact that different movement types react differently to the POS. We may distinguish between two aspects covered by this idea, related to the two criteria for the definition of movement types. On the one hand, political opportunities are of variable *relevance*

for different types of movements. Whereas for instrumental movements all four motivational factors may have an impact on their mobilization, for countercultural movements repression is the dominant factor, and subcultural movements are relatively independent from their political environment. On the other hand, the *consequences* of a given structural set of political opportunities vary from one movement type to the other. Thus, instrumental, countercultural, and subcultural movements do not respond in the same way to the formal openness or closure of the system, to a given strategy of the political authorities, or to a given configuration of power. In order to support these claims, we shall briefly present and discuss some data with regard to the level of mobilization, the action repertoire, reactions and alliances, and the dynamics of these three types of movements.

Level of Mobilization

Why have subcultural and countercultural movements been acting and mobilizing less than instrumental movements in all countries, even in the field of NSMs? If we consider the effect of the POS on the three types of movements, we can explain this. *Subcultural* movements can be expected to mobilize the least frequently, because of their strong internal orientation. This in itself implies a withdrawal from (external) political activity, particularly when the political system is not very open. Their identity-based logic of action, however, produces rather strong ties within the movement. Thus, although mobilization will not be very frequent, it can be massive.

Countercultural movements are also identity-based, but externally oriented. As a consequence, they can be expected to show a higher frequency of mobilization, especially where repression is strong. Yet their level of mobilization can hardly reach that of instrumental movements, because of the kind of protest events they produce. Radical actions are always less facilitated and more easily repressed than moderate ones. Hence, compared to instrumental movements, countercultural movements always face higher mobilization costs. For this reason, instrumental movements are expected to attain the highest level of mobilization. Table 4.1 gives some empirical support to the hypothesis linking the level of mobilization to the type of movement.

As we can see from the table, which reports (*a*) the percentages of unconventional protest events produced by each type of movement and (*b*) the percentages of people mobilized by each type in the four countries, the data confirm our expectations. It is clear that important and interesting differences

Table 4.1. Level of mobilization of the three movement types per country (unconventional events)

	France	Germany	Netherlands	Switzerland
a) Level of activity (percentages)				
Instrumental	89.7	79.8	72.9	66.8
Countercultural	8.1	17.6	21.5	28.9
Subcultural	2.2	2.6	5.6	4.3
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	(737)	(1,770)	(863)	(772)
b) Volume of participation (percentages)				
Instrumental	99.0	96.7	93.7	91.7
Countercultural	0.0	2.3	2.5	6.6
Subcultural	1.0	1.0	3.8	1.7
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	(737)	(1,770)	(863)	(772)

among movement types occur regarding both the number of protest events and the number of participants. In all countries, instrumental movements predominate by far among NSMs with respect to the level of activity as well as the volume of participation: the majority of people mobilized participate in instrumental movements. This may be surprising, given that a number of authors of the so-called new social movements approach (Melucci 1980; Offe 1985; Pizzorno 1978; Raschke 1985; Touraine 1978) argue that a shift has occurred away from the old "instrumental" paradigm toward a new paradigm in which identity-oriented action has become predominant. This new paradigm is considered to be absolutely predominant in NSMs.[2] Our data clearly contradict the claim of such a paradigm shift toward identity-oriented movements. Subcultural movements mobilize much less than instrumental movements. For their participants, the process of identity construction is the collective good and the predominant motivation for their action. The access to these movements is *exclusive* (Zald and Ash 1966): one has to possess or develop specific characteristics in order to participate in the movement. This has important consequences on the mobilization capacity of these movements, in contrast to instrumental movements, which can include more or less everybody. Whereas an individual's tie to instrumental movements is loose and inclusive, and many such ties may exist, the tie to the subcultural movement is exclusive but strong. Although the group involved in subcultural movements will be small, the participation rate can be relatively high. Although countercultural protest events rank second in frequency in all countries, few people participate in these often radical, exclusive actions. This largely confirms our expectation that countercultural movements mobilize less than instrumental movements. We may thus conclude that all identity-oriented movements are by and large relatively small.

Action Repertoire

The general orientation and the logic of action of movement types have probably the most important consequences on the action repertoire of NSMs. In other words, the action repertoire of social movements is not only dependent on the country-specific mix of opportunities, as we have shown in detail in the preceding chapters, but also on the type of movement. According to our general hypothesis, the three types of movements would use different forms of action when acting in the political space. Instrumental movements are influenced by all four motivational factors, and particularly by success chances. These movements aim primarily at changing existing politics without, however, seeking conflict as a goal in itself. Being oriented to obtaining political goals, they try to adapt their action repertoire to the external conditions. This, of course, explains why we find important variations across countries. But it also seems plausible to hypothesize the existence of strong cross-country similarities, if we compare this movement type to the other two.

In the four countries under study, the level of repression is usually low compared to some situations outside Western Europe. It is possible to make political demands through unconventional actions, which is not always the case outside Western Europe. As a consequence of such "democratic" conditions, instrumental movements are expected to adopt quite a moderate action repertoire in all four countries. Subcultural movements are also expected to act rather moderately, due to their relatively strong internal orientation. This characteristic provokes a withdrawal from political action when the outside conditions become too unfavorable. In this situation, participants prefer to avoid confrontations with political authorities. Thus subcultural movements make political demands generally when the conditions are not too bad—that is, when repression is low and some chances of success are present—leading to the use of moderate forms of action. These parameters change fundamentally with countercultural movements, which are expected to adopt a rather radical action repertoire. As we have defined them, countercultural movements reproduce their collective identity through interaction with adversaries, most notably with political authorities. Hence they often seek conflicting interactions with authorities. Such a confrontation can be reached only

Table 4.2. Action repertoire of the three movement types per country (percentages, unconventional events)

	France	Germany	Netherlands	Switzerland
Instrumental				
Demonstrative	64.8	73.8	65.6	88.0
Confrontational	17.7	16.8	24.6	6.6
Violent	17.5	9.4	9.8	5.4
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	(661)	(1,413)	(629)	(516)
Countercultural				
Demonstrative	5.0	30.9	18.3	29.6
Confrontational	11.7	31.2	58.6	30.5
Violent	83.3	37.9	23.1	39.9
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	(60)	(311)	(186)	(223)
Subcultural				
Demonstrative	93.8	84.8	91.7	97.0
Confrontational	6.2	8.7	6.3	3.0
Violent	0.0	6.5	2.0	0.0
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	(16)	(46)	(48)	(33)

through quite radical forms of mobilization; otherwise the movement is left without a response. Table 4.2 shows the action repertoire of the three types of movements in the four countries.

In this table, we have reported the percentages of demonstrative, confrontational, and violent protest events produced by the three movement types in the four countries under study. Everywhere countercultural movements are the most radical ones. Indeed, most of the protest events they produce are confrontational or violent, and in none of the four countries do their demonstrative actions exceed one-third of the total number of actions. The confrontational character of these movements is certainly responsible for the fact that political authorities treat them in a more repressive way than other movements. Of course, participants in countercultural movements react to these often tough responses to their demands with more radical and violent actions. This results in a spiral of violence from which there is no easy way out. On the opposite side, subcultural movements are the most moderate in each country. In all four countries, demonstrative protest events prevail by and large. Instrumental movements also have a rather moderate action repertoire, but in general a less moderate one than that of subcultural movements. As we will see, this is caused by the different political status of many issues instrumental movements deal with as compared to the issues raised by subcultural movements, causing a more repressive reaction toward instrumental movements than toward subcultural ones, which in turn evokes somewhat more radical actions from the instrumental movements.

Reactions and Alliances

In line with our general hypothesis, we expect to find movement-type specific patterns of reactions by authorities and allies. The reactions of political authorities to social movements' actions can be illustrated by the level of repression in general and by the number of arrests per event in particular. We hypothesize that in all four countries the level of repression by the government will be highest for countercultural movements, even if these movements use the same action repertoire as the other types of movements. As we have seen, countercultural movements react strongly to the authorities, and vice versa: both sides seem more interested in conflict than in cooperation. Problems dealt with by countercultural movements represent no "positive" value for the authorities, and therefore we may expect repression to be strong in their case. The opposite holds for subcultural movements. These movements do not represent a "threat" for political authorities and, as we have seen, they do not act in a radical manner, so the level of repression they undergo should be quite low. We expect to find instrumental movements in between, for the same reasons we mentioned with regard to the action repertoire. Table 4.3 shows the level of repression of the three movement types by political authorities in the four countries. The table includes two kinds of data: (*a*) the percentages of demonstrative protest events that were repressed and (*b*) the average number of arrests for demonstrative protest events.

The results show that, according to both indicators, our expectations are largely confirmed. In each country, countercultural movements are more strongly repressed than instrumental and subcultural movements, and instrumental movements are more repressed than subcultural movements, even if these latter differences are less clear-cut in the Netherlands.[3] Thus governmental reactions to protest events show that political authorities value and treat the various types of movements differently. As table 4.3 shows, even if the countercultural movement acts in a demonstrative and peaceful manner, government reactions are more repressive.

Political allies have been said to form a principal component of the POS (see chapter 3 and Tarrow 1989b). We expect different types of movements to receive varying degrees of support from established allies. Both instrumental

Table 4.3. Level of repression of movement types per country (unconventional demonstrative events)

	France	Germany	Netherlands	Switzerland
a) Percentages of repressed demonstrative events				
Instrumental	9.8 (428)	16.7 (1,043)	7.0 (412)	4.2 (454)
Countercultural	–[a]	39.6 (96)	29.4 (34)	16.7 (66)
Subcultural	0.0 (15)	10.3 (39)	6.8 (44)	0.0 (32)
b) Average number of arrests per demonstrative event				
Instrumental	0.2 (428)	4.1 (1,043)	0.1 (412)	0.0 (454)
Countercultural	–	14.6 (96)	1.2 (34)	0.4 (66)
Subcultural	0.0 (15)	0.0 (39)	0.4 (44)	0.0 (32)

Note: Number of cases in parentheses
[a]Fewer than ten cases

and subcultural movements are likely to enjoy the support of established allies, whereas the radical countercultural movements are expected to be more isolated. This is largely due to the fact that established political actors, like parties, cannot support too radical a social movement without running the risk of losing part of their electoral support. Two kinds of external support can be distinguished. First, there is organizational support: established political actors provide material (money, members, etc.) and symbolic (public recognition, organizational skills, etc.) facilitation. Second, support may take the form of common participation in protest events. Table 4.4 shows some results with respect to the second kind of support for each movement type, again for demonstrative events only.

Support may come from political parties or from interest groups. In the table we have merged them into a single category. In all four countries, countercultural movements are much less supported by external established actors than instrumental and subcultural movements, even if they use the same action methods. The radicalism of the goals of the countercultural movements and their negative image in the general public contribute largely to their isolation. We may note that in all countries, but in particular in Germany, subcultural movements obtained a lot of support. This indicates that subcultural movements deal with particular types of issues. On the one hand, their issues are not questions of state interest asking for (repressive) reactions by the side of authorities. On the other hand, the "symbolic" character of the issues makes them attractive for parties to express their solidarity; these movements provide opportunities to allies to profile themselves without many costs involved. Parties that address themselves to groups with strong identities ("communities") may hope for a positive electoral effect.

Table 4.4. External support to movement types per country (percentages of supported unconventional demonstrative events)

	France	Germany	Netherlands	Switzerland
Instrumental	30.8 (428)	34.8 (1,043)	18.7 (412)	16.5 (454)
Countercultural	–	17.7 (96)	2.9 (34)	3.0 (66)
Subcultural	6.7 (15)	35.9 (39)	13.6 (44)	6.3 (32)

Note: Number of cases in parentheses

Hence, when political allies want to support unconventional political action, they have different patterns of behavior depending on the type of movement. This is bound to have important consequences on the development of NSMs.

The Dynamics of Movement Types

Changes in the POS are largely responsible for variations in the level of mobilization and for shifts in the action repertoire of NSMs in a country. In this chapter, we show that within a country, the development of these NSMs may also vary depending on their movement type. Changes in POS — more specifically, in the power configuration — do not affect all NSMs in the same way, regardless of their general orientation and their logic of action. Let us assume that there is a change in the configuration of power. More specifically, we assume changes in the position of the Socialist Party — from the government to the opposition and vice versa. As we saw in chapter 3, when Socialist parties are in the opposition, they tend in most countries to facilitate NSMs, whereas when they are in government, facilitation diminishes. On the basis of our previous discussion, we would expect instrumental movements to be most affected by a change of the Socialist Party from the government to the opposition and vice versa. If the Socialists are in government, these movements experience a situation of "reform" — they will not mobilize as long as the government is working in their direction. Countercultural movements, on the contrary, will not demobilize since for this type of movement nothing changes; Social Democrats never support them, either in opposition or in government, and success chances are by definition of little relevance for them. Subcultural movements, finally, will be less active regarding their explicitly political aims when the Socialists are in government; in general, however, they will be more stable than instrumental movements since identity production always remains one of their tasks. When the Socialists are in opposition, facilitation will support the mobilization of both the instrumental and the subcultural movement types, whereas the mobilization pattern of the

Table 4.5. Changes in the configuration of power—Socialists in government or in opposition—and level of activity of movement types in France, Germany, and the Netherlands (average number of protest events per year per period, unconventional events)

	Instrumental	Countercultural	Subcultural
France			
1975-81 (opposition)	61.5	4.5	1.3
1981-89 (government)	32.4	3.6	0.8
N	(661)	(60)	(16)
Germany			
1975-82 (government)	56.5	26.5	2.1
1982-89 (opposition)	127.0	15.2	3.9
N	(1,413)	(311)	(46)
Netherlands			
1975-77 (government)	14.4	9.5	2.0
1977-81 (opposition)	28.8	15.1	4.5
1981-82 (government)	80.5	18.4	0.0
1982-89 (opposition)	45.3	10.0	3.7
N	(629)	(186)	(48)

countercultural movement will not change that much since facilitation will not occur. Table 4.5 shows the relative level of activity of the three movement types in periods based on changes in the position of the Socialist Party (in the government or in the opposition).[4]

The table reports the average number of protest events per year for each period that Socialists were in government or in opposition. In France, the coming to power of the Socialist Party indeed seems to have had dramatic consequences on instrumental and subcultural movements. As expected, countercultural movements felt the consequences of this change to a lesser extent: countercultural movements do not seem to have been heavily influenced since they were not supported by the Socialists anyway. In Germany as in France, the Social Democratic Party's move into the opposition facilitated instrumental and subcultural movements. Countercultural movements, however, declined during right-wing government, which may be an indication that the mobilization logic of the countercultural type is the inverse of the other two: whereas instrumental and subcultural movements are largely dependent on the support of the Socialists, radical movements consider the Socialists "enemies" when they are in power for allegedly "betraying" their left-wing ideals. The situation in the Netherlands partly confirms the German picture. Subcultural movements, and to a lesser extent instrumental movements, profited from the Socialist Party's exit from government. This does not apply, however, to instrumental movements in the exceptional and

short period of 1981–82, when the peace movement was successfully mobilizing against a split center-left government. The countercultural movements did not follow the exact inverse pattern either, since their mobilization increased somewhat in the period 1977–81 when the Socialists were in opposition, whereas we would have expected an increase during periods of left-wing government (1975–77), as was the case in Germany. The development in 1981–82 is more in line with the idea that countercultural movements mobilize against (center-)left governments: Dutch countercultural movements peaked in these years and declined when the left again went into opposition.

Hence, changes in the configuration of power have different consequences on the level of mobilization of different types of movements. Instrumental movements respond to such changes with an increase (Socialists in opposition) or a decrease (Socialists in government) in activity, whereas countercultural movements are either less affected by these changes or show the inverse pattern: mobilization against the left in government. The fact that countercultural movements are less affected by changes at the national level is also due to the local character of the squatters' movement.

The results with regard to subcultural movements enable us to understand the results of the previous section: these movements only act politically in favorable circumstances. The fact that their level of mobilization modified in important ways when changes in the configuration of power occurred during the period under study seems to contradict to our hypothesis that subcultural movements are less influenced by external conditions than instrumental and countercultural movements. Perhaps we should reformulate this idea, because subcultural movements also depend on political opportunities to the extent that they act in the political arena. In their case, just as for instrumental movements, the Socialist Party becomes a powerful ally when it is in the opposition. We may thus think of positive changes in the configuration of power as a means for subcultural movements to develop their movement side, whereas in unfavorable circumstances the subcultural side becomes predominant. This "double face" guarantees subcultural movements more continuity than the other movement types: the impact of changes in the power configuration upon subcultural movements seems to be mitigated by their subcultural underground.

Social Movement Issues in Policy Domains

So far we have discussed the role of movement types for explaining differences between movements within countries and similarities across countries. Yet variations are also observable within movement types, most notably within

instrumental movements. Neither the general POS argument put forward in the preceding chapters nor its elaboration based upon the distinction of movement types outlined in this chapter can explain such variations in a satisfactory manner. Here we would like to indicate a possible way of going beyond such limitations. The general idea is that varying political opportunities exist that act specifically upon different components of NSMs: to a certain extent, different parts of the social movement sector have a specific POS. This derives from the fact that not all issues movements deal with have the same relevance within the political arena. Across countries, however, many similarities in the "position" of issues come to the fore. For instance, nuclear energy is considered a crucial issue by members of all political systems sharing a faith in technological progress as a fundamental source of welfare. Similarly, there is rather general agreement in considering national defense and security as crucial tasks of the state.

High-Profile and Low-Profile Policy Domains

Since issues are linked to each other according to various criteria, we can adopt the concept of *policy domain* in order to delimit sets of issues.[5] A policy domain may be defined as "a basic policy-making subsystem within a larger polity" (Pappi and Knoke 1991: 184). Policy domains include "all arenas into which governmental authority has intruded" (Laumann and Knoke 1987: 10). Hence many of them are crucial concerns of social movements and, more specifically, of NSMs. The various issues reaching the political agenda concern different policy domains. Usually a social movement raises issues concerning more than one policy domain. The ecology movement is the most typical example in this regard.

Social movements are confronted with various reactions of political authorities and allies in different policy domains. As far as these reactions are concerned, we can make a distinction between *high-profile* and *low-profile* policy domains (Duyvendak 1992: 248–50). Whether a policy domain is considered to be high-profile or low-profile depends on how authorities and allies define it on the basis of their conception of the core tasks and the core interests of the state. According to the way they are defined by members of the system, some issues and the corresponding challengers find the political system to be less accessible than others. The relevance of an issue in the dominant cleavage structure, as well as its perception by authorities and allies, are both factors that determine its priority on the political agenda. Some issues do not even penetrate into the political arena at all. According to the political agenda-building approach, the openness and closure of the political arena is determined by the views of the members of a polity: "In the interest of their own political survival, leaders and organizations must make sure that issues which threaten their existence, their own allocations of political space, are not admitted to the political arena. Toward some species of conflict they must remain impenetrable" (Crenson 1971: 23). As we saw in chapter 1, organizations representing old cleavages either organized new issues out of the political arena or admitted "new" issues on the condition that they were formulated in old terms. Here we make the point that among NSMs there also exist differences as to the degree to which they are "acceptable" for both political authorities and allies, depending on the policy domain's profile, that is, the type of issues the movement deals with and the potential threat they represent for the authorities.

The notion of the status of a policy domain in the system—high-profile or low-profile—implies a hierarchy of political issues. We may select a number of criteria that enable us to distinguish high-profile from low-profile policy domains. First, the amount of material resources involved in the policy domain strongly influences its profile. The more resources are involved, the more threatening a social movement may be for political authorities. As a consequence, the high-profile character of the policy domain increases. The amount of resources is not limited to past expenses, but concerns future investments as well. Second, the power at stake is one of the crucial factors contributing to a policy domain's profile. Thus a high-profile policy domain is one in which, if challenged by a social movement, the power held by established actors is the most endangered or in which the power they may potentially acquire is fundamentally contested. Third, a policy domain's profile is also determined by its electoral relevance. This factor refers to the possibility that a challenge could threaten the survival of the government. A fourth factor influencing a policy domain's profile is the extent to which the policy domain concerns the "national interest." The more the national interest is concerned, the more a challenge is seen as a threat.

Depending on whether the issue at stake concerns a high-profile or a low-profile policy domain, established political actors—authorities and allies—behave differently and, consequently, political opportunities vary accordingly. With regard to high-profile policy domains, challengers face a rather closed political system. Political authorities tend to follow a more exclusive strategy and to concentrate their efforts on defeating challengers. In doing so, they are often supported by the lobbying activity of economic interests. Because of the large amount of resources involved in high-profile policy domains,

pressure by lobbies and interest groups against the challengers' goals becomes more important. Indeed, in such policy domains we find the most powerful interest groups, which are able to prevent challengers from gaining access to the system. Moreover, the public administration is willing to invest a large amount of resources in the struggle against challenging groups. As a consequence, high-profile policy domains offer a relatively unfavorable mix of concrete opportunities to challengers deriving from the closure of the system in such policy domains. Facilitation is rather limited; repression may be present when challengers use radical action forms and success chances are rather low. Even when direct-democratic procedures are at the challengers' disposal, success chances deriving from the use of this institutional possibility are expected to be quite low. On the other hand, low-profile policy domains tend to be more open to challengers. The opposite arguments may be put forward to show how in this case concrete opportunities represent a more favorable setting to a social movement's mobilization. The administrative arena tends to be more open and more responsive. Therefore facilitation is larger, repression practically absent, success chances higher, and so on. Moreover, when direct-democratic procedures are present, the chances of a positive result are higher than in high-profile policy domains.

As a consequence of the relative closure of high-profile policy domains and the relative openness of low-profile policy domains, we expect the level of mobilization with regard to the former to be low and radical, and, with regard to the latter, to be high and moderate. But, as we have already pointed out, the question of the status of new issues concerns not only political authorities but potential *allies* as well. At first glance, the allies of the NSMs—parties of the left—should support SMOs and actions within high-profile policy domains more strongly and more frequently, for the latter can be more "lucrative" in electoral terms than low-profile policy domains.[6]

In what follows, we shall try to identify policy domains within the NSM sector. We shall mainly discuss the instrumental movements, because differences in profile within the two other types are, generally speaking, small: countercultural movements deal with high-profile issues, subcultural movements with rather low-profile ones.

Policy Domains within Instrumental NSMs

We earlier distinguished between three instrumental movements within the NSM sector: the peace movement, the ecology movement, and the solidarity movement. Each of these movements can be further subdivided into policy domains. Here we would like to propose a distinction between seven policy domains that treat issues raised by NSMs. With regard to the concerns of the peace movement, we may distinguish between nuclear weapons policy and national defense policy. With regard to the concerns of the ecology movement, we have identified three policy domains: energy policy, transport policy, and environmental protection policy. As to the concerns of the solidarity movement, we make a distinction between the immigration policy field and the domain of international solidarity. Let us take a closer look at these seven policy domains.[7]

Nuclear weapons. This is a single-issue policy domain that is related to the international security system and that is part of the foreign policy of a given country. Since the emergence of the NSMs in the 1970s, their mobilization within this policy domain has mainly concerned the stationing of cruise missiles in some West European members of NATO, among them Germany and the Netherlands. Even if the protest did not seem to seriously threaten the institutions and the established political actors, the trustworthiness of these countries as members of NATO was at stake, as well as the credibility of NATO policy in general. In the other countries, which include France and Switzerland, the question of the stationing of cruise missiles was almost a nonissue. The fact that mobilization around nuclear weapons was almost absent in France—one of the two European nuclear powers—does not imply, however, that in France the maintenance of the *force de frappe* is considered a state task of minor importance. On Swiss territory, nuclear weapons were not installed, nor were any plans developed to do so. This suggests that we consider the nuclear weapons issue as a high-profile policy domain in Germany, the Netherlands, and France, and as a low-profile policy domain in Switzerland.

National defense. With respect to issues other than nuclear weapons, the peace movement is the best example of a social movement that raises issues of national interest. These are typically considered by political powerholders as their own affair. Movements mobilizing on the basis of such issues will, at the outset, often be depicted as antinational forces supporting the interests of other countries and ideologies. Peace issues normally only manage to enter the political agenda temporarily, under exceptional circumstances, when conflict among members of the political system can no longer be "hidden." Formal integration of movement organizations in advisory boards, cooptation of movement members within bodies of public administration, subsidies of national or local governments—these measures are rarely taken with respect to the peace movement. This formal closure is, however, not

necessarily linked to exclusive or repressive informal strategies. As long as movements do not pursue radical goals with radical means, and to the extent that they mobilize massively but peacefully, governments will not react violently. In contrast to other issues, however, the chance that governments will respond positively to the demands raised by the movement is very small. Thus national defense policy is a typical high-profile policy domain.

Energy. The national interest is at stake in other policy domains as well. The antinuclear energy movement is often confronted with the argument that the energy supply is not a matter for the street, but that it only concerns scientists and politicians. In all countries, movements that challenge the state's nuclear power policy run the risk—as long as they are small—of encountering quite repressive government strategies, absence of facilitation, and limited chances of success. But they are "assured" of some form of reaction; these movements cannot be "ignored" as easily as movements dealing with (nonnuclear) ecological or solidarity issues. Since it is a rather new movement, the antinuclear movement has fewer historical bonds with the main left-wing parties than do, for instance, the peace movement or the solidarity movement. The result is that state repression is not tempered by facilitation on the part of allies. Because of the threatening character of the issues related to nuclear energy, energy policy clearly is a high-profile policy domain.

Transports. Whereas neither the peace movement nor the antinuclear movement have actually received state subsidies, the moderate parts of the ecology and the solidarity movements are often (partially) co-opted by authorities. This happens, for instance, within the transport policy domain, which treats all problems related to the construction and management of road, rail, and water networks in a given country. The nonthreatening character of most of the movement's goals within transport policy suggests that we are dealing with a rather low-profile policy domain. The construction of airports is, however, an exception to the rule that transport is a rather low-profile area. In all countries, airport construction and management is a top priority, resulting in harsh confrontations between challengers of these projects and authorities. Therefore, the overall conclusion should be that transport is an issue somewhere in between high- and low-profile.

Environment. What we have said with respect to most of the transport issues holds even more for another part of the ecology movement: the one acting within the policy domain of environmental protection. In this case, the ecology movement is not so threatening for political authorities. This fact leads us to consider this policy domain to be low-profile.

Immigration. The solidarity movement is a broad movement in which there are many non- or less conflicting issues, clustered in subunits such as human rights, Third World activism, and support to specific political regimes. Generally speaking, the solidarity movement as a whole seems to be rather nonthreatening for political authorities, and therefore rather low-profile, for its protest is generally addressed to foreign political authorities or supranational institutions. Nevertheless, one of its components may be thought to have more of a high-profile character, since it deals with an issue of national interest, one that has important consequences on the whole political system. We are referring to the immigration policy, which concerns all problems having to do with foreigners living or aspiring to live in a given country. More precisely, this policy domain includes problems having to do with political refugees, with immigrants in general, and with racism. Although this policy domain is less high-profile than, for instance, the national defense policy or the energy policy, it seems to deal more with questions of national interest ("Who is a citizen?") than the rest of the solidarity movement.

International solidarity. Another component of the solidarity movement is concerned with issues pertaining to the international aid policy. This is clearly a low-profile policy domain, because the issues raised by the movement are not very threatening for national political authorities. Such a relative lack of threat stems from the fact that these national authorities have less of a say in matters of this policy domain, although we should not forget that any mobilization related to this policy domain is very heterogeneous and includes many different issues.

Before turning toward an empirical illustration of our argument, we would like to add two important qualifications. First, the suggested classification of policy domains within NSMs is rather vague. A policy domain's borders are not as clear-cut as our description presupposes. On the contrary, we have to take into account the interdependence between political issues. Therefore, an issue is not easily placed into one policy domain or the other. Second, the relevance of an issue or of a policy domain varies from one country to another. This is a result of the fact that political authorities do not have the same priorities or interests in the different countries, as the example of nuclear weapons illustrates. Moreover, such priorities may change over time.

Policy Domains and Mobilization by Instrumental Movements

Next we shall present some data in order to provide an empirical illustration of our argument. It is important to stress that what follows has to be consid-

ered only as a tentative test of our main argument. Moreover, the fact that the definition of policy domains as high-profile or low-profile may change across countries as well as over time prevents us from obtaining a clear-cut empirical picture.

Since our ideas about high- and low-profile policy domains presuppose divergent reactions of authorities toward challengers on the various fields, we should first look at data regarding the level of repression of instrumental movements within the seven policy domains in the four countries. As table 4.6 shows, our idea that important differences exist in the reaction of authorities regarding specific topics makes sense.

The table gives (*a*) the percentages of protest events repressed by political authorities within each policy domain and (*b*) the average number of arrests that occurred during those events. Some interesting results indicate a rather clear relationship between a policy domain's profile and the level of repression. Overall, challengers acting within high-profile policy domains seem, indeed, to be more repressed than challengers acting within low-profile policy domains. In all countries, the percentages of repressed events and the average number of arrests are higher for high-profile topics than low-profile ones. It appears that, on average, challengers acting within policy domains like national defense or energy have faced a more hostile context than, for instance, challengers acting within the policy domains of transports or environmental protection. This tendency is particularly evident when we look at the average number of arrests. These data make clear that it makes sense to distinguish between nuclear energy and environmental issues in an analysis of the ecology movement: across all countries, nuclear energy is more "defended" by authorities. The results pertaining to the peace movement show that in Germany, the Netherlands, and France, the profile of nuclear weapons is indeed much "higher" than in Switzerland. The issues of the solidarity movement are more difficult to classify. Nonetheless, the hypothesis that "immigration" is a high-profile issue whereas "international solidarity" is low-profile seems to find some support in the data. Mobilizations around immigration issues were quite strongly repressed in all four countries, especially in Germany—though not in terms of arrests—compared to other issues. Hence concrete opportunities really seem to be more favorable within low-profile policy domains, where the political system is more open.

Since the concrete opportunities, such as repression, vary across policy domains, the action forms used by NSMs are also expected to vary according to the policy domains. High-profile policy domains are expected to lead to

Table 4.6. Level of repression of instrumental movements regarding their unconventional actions in seven policy domains per country

	France	Germany	Netherlands	Switzerland
a) Percentages of repressed events				
National defense	15.5 (58)	19.2 (120)	55.0 (40)	6.1 (33)
Energy	18.1 (282)	27.7 (310)	34.3 (67)	11.0 (91)
Immigration	9.4 (127)	37.0 (235)	14.3 (77)	12.5 (48)
Nuclear weapons	11.1 (9)	24.9 (273)	16.1 (155)	–
Average high-profile	13.5 (476)	27.2 (938)	29.9 (339)	9.9 (172)
Transports	8.3 (36)	27.2 (136)	14.3 (28)	1.4 (74)
Environment	11.4 (44)	4.0 (125)	12.0 (75)	2.1 (47)
International solidarity	16.7 (36)	24.0 (125)	10.9 (147)	6.6 (136)
Nuclear weapons	–	–	–	0.0 (12)
Average low-profile	12.1 (116)	18.4 (386)	12.4 (250)	2.5 (269)
b) Average number of arrests				
National defense	0.5 (58)	4.8 (120)	1.9 (40)	0.2 (33)
Energy	0.2 (282)	12.0 (310)	1.5 (67)	0.8 (91)
Immigration	0.2 (127)	5.1 (235)	1.2 (77)	0.0 (48)
Nuclear weapons	0.0 (9)	10.6 (273)	0.7 (155)	–
Average high-profile	0.2 (476)	8.1 (938)	1.4 (339)	0.3 (172)
Transports	0.0 (36)	2.9 (136)	0.1 (28)	0.0 (74)
Environment	0.2 (44)	0.3 (125)	0.1 (75)	0.0 (47)
International solidarity	0.1 (36)	7.8 (125)	0.2 (147)	0.0 (136)
Nuclear weapons	–	–	–	0.0 (12)
Average low-profile	0.1 (116)	3.6 (386)	0.1 (250)	0.0 (269)

Note: Number of cases in parentheses

a more radical mobilization than low-profile policy domains. Table 4.7 presents some data showing the action repertoire of NSMs within each of the seven policy domains in the four countries in order to test this hypothesis.

The table gives the percentages of (*a*) confrontational and violent protest events and (*b*) conventional protest events. If we compare the action repertoires across countries and across policy domains, we find some empirical support for the hypothesis mentioned above. In all countries, proponents of high-profile issues use more confrontational and violent action methods, whereas low-profile issues are predominant among the conventional events (with the exception of Switzerland, where 40 to 50 percent of both high- and low-profile events are conventional). In particular, mobilization within the national defense and the energy policy domains, which we have defined as high-profile, is more radical than mobilization relative to the other categories (except for Germany, where "national defense" is less confrontational and violent than,

Table 4.7. Action repertoire of instrumental movements in seven policy domains per country

	France	Germany	Netherlands	Switzerland
a) Percentages of confrontational and violent events				
National defense	51.6 (64)	12.1 (182)	58.4 (48)	10.5 (86)
Energy	34.7 (311)	22.3 (422)	35.8 (81)	6.7 (223)
Immigration	16.7 (168)	15.6 (303)	17.7 (118)	8.0 (100)
Nuclear weapons	36.4 (11)	20.5 (346)	17.2 (197)	–
Average high-profile	34.8 (554)	17.6 (1,252)	25.2 (444)	8.4 (407)
Transports	25.6 (43)	22.7 (215)	15.8 (38)	0.0 (325)
Environment	17.3 (81)	7.7 (297)	31.5 (130)	1.6 (182)
International solidarity	36.7 (49)	17.8 (191)	21.5 (195)	5.5 (200)
Nuclear weapons	–	–	–	0.0 (12)
Average low-profile	26.5 (173)	16.1 (703)	22.9 (363)	1.8 (719)
b) Percentages of conventional events				
National defense	9.4 (64)	34.1 (182)	16.7 (48)	50.0 (86)
Energy	8.4 (311)	26.5 (422)	17.3 (81)	44.8 (223)
Immigration	24.4 (168)	22.4 (303)	34.7 (188)	51.0 (100)
Nuclear weapons	18.2 (11)	21.1 (346)	21.3 (197)	–
Average high-profile	15.1 (554)	26.0 (1,252)	22.5 (444)	48.6 (407)
Transports	16.3 (43)	36.3 (215)	26.3 (38)	35.1 (325)
Environment	45.7 (81)	57.9 (297)	42.3 (130)	59.9 (182)
International solidarity	26.5 (49)	34.6 (191)	24.6 (195)	31.0 (200)
Nuclear weapons	–	–	–	33.3 (12)
Average low-profile	29.5 (173)	42.9 (703)	31.1 (363)	39.8 (719)

Note: Number of cases in parentheses

for instance, "transports" and "international solidarity"). We may conclude that the less facilitative situation of these issues really seems to have some influence on the action repertoire of NSMs. Yet there are important exceptions to this rule. They result in part from the difficulty of giving a clear-cut definition of the policy domains concerned by demands of NSMs. But they are above all due to the varying character and meaning of certain issues across countries, which is the main obstacle to an empirical analysis like the one we are trying to make. Nevertheless, at least in the case of the peace and the ecology movements, the hypothesis of a link between a policy domain's profile and the degree of radicalism of the mobilization occurring within it seems to find some support.

The level of repression of instrumental movements in seven policy domains and the action forms used by movements have, of course, effects upon the mobilization level of movements. Table 4.8 shows the level of mobilization within each of the seven policy domains in the four countries.

Table 4.8. Level of mobilization of instrumental movements in seven policy domains per country (conventional events, direct-democratic events, and petitions excluded)

	France	Germany	Netherlands	Switzerland
a) Level of activity (percentages)				
National defense	9.9	8.7	6.9	8.2
Energy	47.4	23.6	11.8	22.7
Immigration	21.5	18.2	12.7	11.3
Nuclear weapons	1.5	21.0	25.9	–
Total high-profile	80.3	71.5	57.3	42.2
Transports	5.8	10.0	4.8	14.5
Environment	7.5	9.1	12.7	10.3
International solidarity	6.3	9.5	25.4	31.1
Nuclear weapons	–	–	–	1.8
Total low-profile	19.6	28.6	42.9	57.7
High-low-profile ratio	4.1	2.5	1.3	0.7
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	(586)	(1,279)	(568)	(379)
b) Volume of participation (percentages)				
National defense	4.3	6.1	1.8	7.1
Energy	23.7	17.2	11.2	32.1
Immigration	67.5	4.9	5.3	8.4
Nuclear weapons	0.8	61.6	68.0	–
Total high-profile	96.3	89.8	86.3	47.6
Transports	0.8	4.4	2.5	7.9
Environment	1.6	2.1	1.5	12.8
International solidarity	1.1	3.7	9.5	18.7
Nuclear weapons	–	–	–	13.0
Total low-profile	3.5	10.2	13.5	52.4
High-low-profile ratio	9.7	2.5	5.4	0.2
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	(727)	(1,956)	(807)	(1,128)

The table shows (*a*) the percentage of protest events and (*b*) the percentage of participants mobilized. In this table, we observe once again important differences within the same country and, parallel to them, important similarities across countries. The level of mobilization varies greatly from one policy domain to the other, especially when it is measured by the volume of participation. But such differences are also striking with respect to the level of activity. Whereas (nuclear) energy is very mobilizing in all four countries, environment and transports attract fewer participants; whereas nuclear weapons is a highly mobilizing issue in Germany and the Netherlands, it

attracts fewer people in a country like Switzerland where it is a low-profile issue.

However, table 4.8 also shows that the high-low-profile ratio varies greatly from country to country. The differences among countries are striking. Switzerland in particular seems to deviate from the general trend that mobilization around high-profile issues is more frequent and massive than around low-profile issues. How to understand that in Switzerland, at least in terms of mobilization, the distinction between high- and low-profile issues seems to lose its relevance? In countries where either the formal institutional structure, the prevailing strategies of political authorities, or both are closed—the Netherlands, Germany, and France, respectively—NSMs have mobilized more with respect to high-profile policy domains than in low-profile ones. By contrast, in Switzerland, where the political system is open according to both dimensions of the POS, they have mobilized most with respect to low-profile policy domains. Moreover, it does not seem accidental that the two most different cases in our POS typology (France and Switzerland) are located at the extremes, whereas the two intermediary cases (Germany and the Netherlands) stand in between. These results suggest that the more closed the political system, the more the protest tends to concentrate on a few specific, highly politicized and central issues (central in the view of the members of the system). By contrast, the more open the system, the more the protest addresses rather "apolitical" and secondary issues. This is a very interesting result, which calls for an explanation. In closed political systems, political authorities concentrate their (hard) reaction on the most threatening issues. Mobilization addressing low-profile policy domains is often left without a response, since the state can afford to ignore it. This different treatment, combined with the low degree of access to the system, stimulates mobilization directed at high-profile policy domains and discourages mobilization addressing low-profile policy domains, for, in the former case, challengers are called to action through the increasing threat to which they are subject, whereas in the latter case they would abandon the action because of the low chances of success. This is what happens in France, for instance. By contrast, in open political systems like Switzerland, mobilization directed at low-profile policy domains is high, because authorities cannot ignore issues (since challengers have the capacity to put issues on the political agenda), and consequently, allies facilitate low-profile issues as well. This may explain why, with regard to the mobilization data, the cleavage between high- and low-profile issues is less clear-cut in Switzerland.

High-Profile and Low-Profile Movements

Policy domains, as our results generally attest, are a good way to show how political authorities behave differently according to whether the challengers are addressing more threatening, or less threatening, issues. In fact, challengers that address issues concerning policy domains considered crucial by the authorities and other members of the political system are confronted with a more closed POS than other, less threatening ones. Yet at this point it is important to go back to single movements within the NSM sector. Political issues concerning specific policy domains are carried by social movements or parts of them, like SMOs. Parallels in movement development from country to country can be explained if we take into account the fact that the importance of different movements for politics varies in a more or less comparable way within each country; that is, political agendas concerning policy domains addressed by NSMs resemble each other across countries (apart from the nuclear weapons issue in case of Switzerland). On the basis of the more or less threatening character of the different issues raised by NSMs, as it results from our discussion about policy domains, it appears that of the *instrumental* movements the peace movement and the antinuclear movement have to be considered as high-profile. As we have already said, the peace movement is the best example of a movement that addresses issues of national interest, and such issues are often considered by political authorities as their affair. As we have also pointed out, national interest is also at stake in the case of the antinuclear movement. The *countercultural* squatters' movement also attacks one of the state's fundamental responsibilities: the protection of private property. Conversely, the other parts of the ecology movement, the solidarity movement, and the *subcultural* gay, lesbian, and women's movements can be considered as low-profile, which do not threaten in such a dramatic way the core interests and tasks of the state.

The fact that high-profile movements face a more closed POS than low-profile movements does not necessarily imply a lack of political allies. Thus, as we have seen, although the peace movement does not have much access to the system, it is frequently supported by allies. Indeed, the peace movement is a typical example of a movement that is supported by allies, on the one hand, while, on the other hand, the state remains closed, even when its political friends are in power. The ecology movement, in contrast, has a high degree of access to the system, but does not have at its disposal a compara-

ble support by allies. The concrete opportunities of the ecology movement—with the exception of the antinuclear movement—are the exact opposite of those of the peace movement: the former is normally confronted with an open state and little support by the traditional left-wing parties, whereas the latter is not facilitated by the state but by allies. This results in a different relationship between the level of mobilization and the organizational infrastructure of these two movements. The peace movement is expected to have a weaker organizational infrastructure than the ecology movement, because it lacks formal access to the system; the ecology movement is expected to have a more restricted mobilization capacity than the well-facilitated peace movement. Table 4.9 shows two indicators of the organizational infrastructure (the number of members and the level of resources) of some important SMOs and the mobilization capacity of five NSMs.

The difference between high-profile movements and low-profile movements with regard to the number of members, the mobilization capacity, and the level of resources is quite striking. The latter have many more members and far greater financial resources than the former, but fewer participants in action. In particular, the contrast between the ecology and peace movements—the two most important movements of the eighties—shows that similar instrumental movements may be very different with respect to their organizational infrastructure and the number of people mobilized during the last decade.

Conclusion

This chapter represents an attempt to apply the political process model to a level of analysis other than the one usually adopted. In general, researchers trying to show how the political context influences social movements and their mobilization check for differences between single movements or clusters of movements—as, for instance, the NSM sector—in different national contexts. Thus they can stress some structural factors that have an impact on the level of mobilization, the action repertoire, the movement's organization, and so on. Such an endeavor is also the main purpose of this book. Yet, in this chapter we have tried to add a new element to the theory of POS, with the intention of improving our knowledge of the mechanisms that regulate collective action. More precisely, we took into account not only regularities across countries but also across sets of movements and across parts of movements. In doing so, we have put forward two main arguments. First, we have

Table 4.9. Constituency, level of resources, and level of mobilization of five new social movements in four countries

	Ecology	Peace	Solidarity	Autonomous	Gay
a) Average level of membership of SMOs in four countries in 1989 per movement					
Per SMO	91,800	5,300	15,500	880	5,000
Per million inhabitants	5,450	270	1,020	110	170
N	(27)	(15)	(32)	(6)	(16)
b) Average level of financial resources of SMOs in four countries in 1989 per movement (thousands of dollars)					
Per SMO	4,390	330	1,850	170	720
Per million inhabitants	235	8	144	24	14
N	(31)	(12)	(31)	(6)	(9)

c) Total level of mobilization of five social movements in four countries 1975–89[a]

	Absolute level
Peace movement	9,099,079
Ecology movement	3,383,546
Solidarity movement	2,024,453
Autonomous movement	515,368
Gay movement	118,497

Note: Parts (*a*) and (*b*) are taken from Kriesi 1995.
[a]Petitions and festivals excluded

tried to show that the way in which movements perceive and react upon concrete opportunities is determined by their typical logic of action and by their general orientation. As has been shown, political authorities, in turn, have a specific reaction pattern to each movement type as well: authorities are well aware of the different degree to which the types of movements pose a direct challenge. Countercultural movements are always considered a threat, resulting in repressive reactions, whereas subcultural movements are either ignored or appeased. Second, focusing on instrumental movements, we have related differences within this type to the more or less challenging character of political issues raised by these movements. The concrete opportunities of each instrumental movement vary according to the political evaluation of its issues. Here we have proposed to cluster the issues raised by NSMs according to the policy domain they deal with. Challengers acting within high-profile policy domains—that is, raising threatening issues—are confronted with a rather closed system, whereas challengers acting within low-profile policy domains face a rather open system; with regard to the former, the strategies of political authorities will be exclusive; with regard to the latter they will be inclusive. Moreover, not only do the authorities' strategies vary from policy domain to policy domain, but allies' strategies vary across

domains as well, which adds a further element of variation within a given political context.

All this results in rather different settings for social movements, dealing with several policy domains. These differences in the political context can help to explain contrasts in movement development within countries and similarities across countries.

Chapter 5

The Dynamics of Protest Waves

In the preceding chapters, we have discussed differences and similarities in the mobilization of new social movements across countries and across movements. We now focus on a third dimension: the dynamics of NSMs over time. This dimension was touched upon in chapter 3, where we analyzed the impact of discrete changes in political opportunity structures on the level of mobilization of NSMs. However, this analysis remained confined to a static comparison of mobilization levels before and after changes in POS, and leaves us with a number of questions as to the subsequent development of NSMs. We have, for instance, shown that there are important differences among countries in the action repertoires of NSMs. But are these repertoires constant within each country, or do they also fluctuate over time in systematic ways? Another question concerns the sudden character of the expansion of NSMs at the beginning of the 1980s in Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. After all, the POS changes that triggered this expansion were relatively gradual. And, perhaps most important, why did the level of mobilization in these countries decline again after a certain period of time? Again, POS provides an insufficient explanation. The conservative backlash within the Dutch Social Democratic Party may explain why decline was relatively pronounced in the Netherlands. However, this leaves unexplained why protest also declined in West Germany after 1986, even though, with the opening up of the Social Democrats and the increasing success of the Green party, the NSMs' opportunity structure seemed more favorable than ever before.

The dynamic analysis of mobilization that these questions call for is not an easy task. Tarrow has called this "the largest current problem in collec-