New Social Movements in Western Europe
Social Movements, Protest, and Contention

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New Social Movements in Western Europe
A Comparative Analysis

Hanspeter Kriesi, Ruud Koopmans, Jan Willem Duyvendak, and Marco G. Giugni
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This study is the product of a collaborative effort that has lasted for more than seven years. The project on the comparative analysis of new social movements in Western Europe was launched by Hanspeter Kriesi when he was still at the Department for Collective Political Behavior of the University of Amsterdam in 1987. Jan Willem Duyvendak was the first assistant to be hired by the department for this project the same year. Ruud Koopmans joined the project a year later thanks to the Amsterdam School for Social Research, which provided him with an assistantship. After Hanspeter Kriesi moved to the University of Geneva, he obtained two research grants from the Swiss national science foundation, which allowed Marco Giugni to join the project in 1989. In the course of the following years, the project has also been supported by the Department of General Political Science and the faculty of political and social-cultural sciences at the University of Amsterdam, by the Dutch national science foundation (NWO), and by the Department of Political Science of the University of Geneva. Without the generous support we have received from these various institutions, we could never have gone as far as we have.

In the course of the project, four country-specific volumes have been completed—one for each of the four countries we have chosen to compare: first, Jan Willem Duyvendak, Hein-Anton van der Heijden, Ruud Koopmans, and Luuk Wijmans (1992) edited a book on the Netherlands, to which several additional authors have contributed. Then, three Ph.D. theses have been completed: Jan Willem Duyvendak (1992, 1994b) wrote about France, Marco Giugni (1992) about Switzerland, and Ruud Koopmans (1992a) about Germany. All these individual studies share the same general conceptual framework which we have developed and discussed in many joint workshops in
Amsterdam and Geneva during the years of our collaboration. The present study is an attempt to integrate the country-specific findings of the previous publications into a systematically comparative whole. All the chapters of the present volume share the same general perspectives, and have been intensively discussed among ourselves on several occasions. However, they have been written by variable combinations of us four, and the final responsibility rests with the particular authors of each chapter. More specifically, Jan Willem Duyvendak wrote chapter 7 on the gay movement and contributed to chapters 1, 4, and 6, as well as to the Conclusion. Marco Giugni wrote the final two chapters on diffusion and outcomes chapters 8 and 9, and coauthored chapter 4 and the Introduction. Ruud Koopmans is the author of chapter 5 on the dynamics of protest waves and of the technical appendix, and he contributed to chapters 2 and 6 as well as to the Conclusion. Hanspeter Kriesi wrote chapter 3 on alliance structures and coauthored the Introduction and chapters 1 and 2.

In addition to institutional support, we have also received support from a number of colleagues and friends. We would like to express our gratitude to the coders who helped us with the coding of the events in France, Germany, and the Netherlands. We are indebted to the three reviewers of the University of Minnesota Press—Bert Klandermans, Chris Rootes, and Sidney Tarrow—whose comments have been very helpful in improving our manuscript. In developing our ideas, we have also profited from stimulating discussions with a large number of colleagues at several workshops that have been held on social movements over the past few years. Finally, we would also like to thank our colleagues Hein-Anton van der Heijden and Leuk Wijmans from the University of Amsterdam, and Florence Passy of the University of Geneva, who, at various stages of our common project, discussed concepts and results with us and otherwise contributed to our well-being. Meeting with one or the other of them in Geneva or in Amsterdam, we not only worked hard, but we also enjoyed some beautiful hikes and pleasant meals together.

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May 1994
October 22, 1983, will be remembered in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany as Le Monde observed. As early as four o'clock in the morning, the first special trains arrived in Bonn, bringing participants to what was to become the greatest peace demonstration the capital had seen since the beginning of the mobilization two years earlier against the stationing of cruise and Pershing II missiles in Germany. In the morning, the demonstrators formed chains linking the Theater Square in nearby Bad Godesberg with the embassies of the nuclear powers—China, France, Great Britain, India, South Africa, the Soviet Union, and the United States. At noon, under a magnificent sky, a huge train flowed back from Bad Godesberg to Bonn, where, at two in the afternoon, an enormous crowd was gathering in the Hofgarten. An estimated 250,000 to 500,000 people took part in this impressive demonstration of force by the German peace movement. The event was not clouded by the slightest incident, apart maybe from the fact that Willy Brandt, who was supposed to be the star speaker of the day, got a rather lukewarm reception from the crowd. After extended negotiations, the organizers had allowed the president of the Social Democratic Party to address the meeting, but many of those attending had not forgotten that it was a Social Democratic chancellor who had agreed to the NATO decision to station the Pershing II and cruise missiles on German territory.

The meeting in Bonn was not the only great event of the day. All over Germany, the peace movement demonstrated against nuclear weapons. Thus, in southern Germany, the movement organized a human chain of 220,000 demonstrators linking the headquarters of the U.S. forces in Germany at Stuttgart-Vaihingen to the Wiley barracks near Ulm, more than 100 kilometers away. Given the number of participants (which exceeded all expectations),
the chain could have gone as far as Munich, to the seat of the Christian Social Union (CSU), the party that most assiduously defended the double-track decision of NATO. Moreover, the events of the weekend had been preceded by an action week that mobilized very large numbers of people. Innumerable professional groups had launched appeals to the general public—among them “artists for peace,” “architects for peace,” “judges and public prosecutors for peace.” There was hardly a professional group that did not publish a statement. All over Germany, schools too had been participating in this peace week. Many special events had been held, such as a hunger strike in Frankfurt organized to manifest the people’s hunger for peace.” All in all, between two and three million people took part in the events of this peace week. The news magazine *Spiegel* spoke about the greatest challenge the Federal Republic had ever had to face: never before had a protest movement put the establishment under such pressure! The impact of the movement was particularly far-reaching for the Social Democratic Party (SPD), which, *Spiegel* maintained, had become entirely “lafontainized.” In other words, the SPD was now following the lead of one of its figureheads, Oskar Lafontaine, who had already sided with the peace movement and who was to become the party’s candidate for the chancellorship in the 1990 national elections.

If the German challenge was the most important one, Germany was not the only country to be rocked by the peace movement during that weekend in October 1983: 500,000 people protested against nuclear weapons in Rome (the Communist *Unità* claimed that they numbered one million); 150,000 marched from the River Thames to Hyde Park in the center of London, an unprecedented success of the British Campaign against Nuclear Disarmament (CND); between 120,000 (the police estimate) and 400,000 (according to the organizers) gathered in Brussels, which had not seen such a massive demonstration in two years; more than 100,000 Spaniards (according to the most credible estimates, as was stressed by *Le Monde*) demonstrated their solidarity with the international campaign in Madrid. One week later, the Dutch movement staged its largest demonstration ever in The Hague; with its 500,000 participants, this event was even bigger than the one the movement had organized two years earlier in Amsterdam. Even in Switzerland, the protest against the stationing of cruise missiles in Western Europe was impressive, although this neutral country was not directly affected by NATO’s decision, in one of the largest demonstrations that had ever taken place in Switzerland, between 30,000 and 40,000 people supported by more than fifty organizations demonstrated their solidarity with the international campaign in the capital of Bern on December 5.
France turns out to be a deviant case. On its first page, *Le Monde* spoke about a "weak mobilization" in France. In Paris, two separate demonstrations were held during the weekend in question: one on Saturday, organized by the Communist-dominated Mouvement de la Paix, the Communist Party (PCF), and the largest trade union (the Communist CGT); and one on Sunday, organized by the Committee for Disarmament (CODEN), the second-largest trade union (CFDT), and the major party of the new left, the Unified Socialist Party (PSU). Both events only attracted comparatively small numbers of people: between 15,000 and 20,000 marched on Saturday; 7,000 to 8,000 formed a human chain between the United States embassy on the Avenue Gabriel and the Soviet embassy on the Boulevard Lannes on Sunday morning; and about 5,000 met at the Bastille on Sunday afternoon. The main speaker at this last gathering challenged the Socialist Party and the Socialist government, both hostile to any pacifist manifestation. In the rest of France, the mobilization was even weaker: about 2,000 were mobilized in Marseilles, Lyons, Grenoble, and Lille, about 1,000 in Nancy and Bourges, and 200 in Toulouse—the hometown of the French aircraft industry.

From the comparative perspective we take in this study, the surprise is not so much the enormous success of the movement's mobilization all over Europe, but its relative absence in France. Why did more people not turn out to demonstrate in France in October 1983? The reader might be tempted to invoke the historical or cultural specificity of the French to explain their exceptionalism. At its most general level, however, such an argument is not very persuasive: each of the countries mentioned earlier has its own historical and cultural peculiarities, but in spite of these many peculiarities, all of them, except for France, participated massively in the movement's protest. At a more specific level, the reference to historical or cultural roots could be more promising. Thus, one might refer to the tradition of the *grande nation* that has maintained a rather distanced relationship with NATO and had, therefore, not been directly concerned by NATO's double decision. But, as we noted, the lack of NATO membership did not prevent the Swiss from joining the international campaign against the cruise missiles. Alternatively, one might think of the fact that France, as a nuclear power, has chosen to maintain its own *force de frappe* and that the French, therefore, are generally little inclined to protest against nuclear weapons. But again there is a counterexample that casts doubt on this reasoning: Great Britain is also a major nuclear power, but that has not prevented the British from demonstrating massively against cruise and Pershing II missiles. One might still...
argue that maybe it was the combination of the two elements—France's being a nuclear power that had chosen to stay independent of NATO—that explains the exceptional behavior of its citizens. Elaborating this combined argument, a major difference between Britain and France in the 1980s was that Britain had, in all intents and purposes, abandoned its independent nuclear weapons capacity in favor of the cheaper option of buying American nuclear weapons. Moreover, it was U.S.-controlled cruise missiles that were to be sited on British soil (e.g., at Greenham Common). The French nuclear deterrent has thus been—and has seemed to be—more truly independent than the British one. According to this more subtle argument, the British could have been moved to oppose the stationing of U.S. missiles on their soil for nationalist reasons, whereas the French had no such incentive to mobilize.

Although we do not want to discard this type of argument, we believe that one should be skeptical about explanations of movement politics that do not take into account the more specific aspects of the national political context in which the mobilization of social movements takes place. There are reasons enough to mobilize—in the absence of nationalist reasons, the French could, for example, have mobilized to manifest their international solidarity, just as the traditionally neutral Swiss have done. But mobilization is not always forthcoming and, if it is forthcoming, it takes different forms at different times and places. Our contention is that the mobilization of social movements is closely linked to conventional politics in the parliamentary and extraparliamentary arenas of a given country. We shall try to show that by paying attention to this crucial link, we will be better equipped to deal with the striking cross-national variations we find with respect to the mobilization patterns of social movements in Western Europe.

Given this perspective, we suspect, among other things, that it is no accident that there were two rival peace demonstrations in France in late October 1983, and we believe that the weak mobilizing capacity of the French peace movement at that time may well have had a lot to do with the split between its Communist and its new-left branches. We would also suggest that the lack of support of the movement by the Socialists in France—which contrasts sharply with the close alliance between the Socialists and the peace movement in countries like Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland—decisively contributed to its comparative weakness. Moreover, according to the perspective we have adopted for this study, we should also try to explain changes in the patterns of mobilization over time with changes in the national political contexts. Without recourse to such changes in the respective
national political contexts. It would, for example, be quite difficult to explain why, by the early 1990s, the mobilization of the French peace movement no longer was exceptionally weak, but why it was now the turn of the Dutch peace movement to manifest a comparative lack of mobilizing capacity. In fact, in January 1991, the French peace movement mobilized comparatively strongly against the Persian Gulf war, as did the German movement. In contrast, the Dutch hardly mobilized at all, although their country was as much involved in the war as were Germany or France (Duyvendak and Koopmans 1991a).

Our emphasis on the political context for the explanation of the mobilization of social movements is in line with an important branch of recent theorizing in the area of movement research. Among the most recent developments in this field of study, the idea that processes of social change impinge indirectly, through a restructuring of existing power relations, on social protest has gained some weight. This idea, put forward by the political process approach to social movements (McAdam 1982), goes against the classical theories of collective behavior—such as the theories of "mass society" or "relative deprivation"—which stress a direct relationship between social change and protest. Recently, several authors have developed analytical tools for the analysis of the political context that mediates the effect of structural conflicts on overt mobilization. More particularly, the concept of political opportunity structure (POS) has become central to such studies. This concept was first introduced by Eisinger (1973), according to whom it was meant to represent the degree of openness of a political system to challenges addressed by social movements. Kitschelt (1986), Tarrow (1983, 1989b, 1994, 1995), Della Porta and Rucht (1991), Rucht (1993), among others, have contributed to elaboration of the concept, which has proved to be very useful for the study of collective action. In Tarrow’s (1995) apt phrase, the POS refers to all the "signals to social and political actors which either encourage or discourage them to use their internal resources to form social movements."

A Model for the Political Context of Mobilization

According to the conceptualization of the POS that we shall use in the present study, the POS is made up of four components: national cleavage structures, institutional structures, prevailing strategies, and alliance structures. First, we start from the idea that the mobilization capacity of social move-
ments is to a large extent determined by the country-specific political cleavage structures, which, in turn, are rooted in the social and cultural changes of a given society. As Brand (1986: 322) has suggested, the existing configuration of political cleavages, or, if you will, of established political conflicts, imposes important constraints on the mobilization of newcomers to the scene of movement politics. Second, our concept of the POS includes the formal institutional structure of political systems. This aspect of the POS has been at the heart of Krasnoy's (1986) use of the term, which distinguished between formal "input" and "output" structures of the political system. In our approach, the distinction between these two sides of the formal structure is quite secondary, but we think that it is important to include the aspects of what Tarrow (1994) has called the "states" approach in our concept of the POS. Third, unlike previous conceptualizations of the POS, we would like to stress the distinction between the formal institutional setting for the mobilization of social movements and the prevailing informal strategies followed by political authorities when dealing with them. Broadly defined, political institutions not only include the formal rules governing politics in a given country, but also the informal procedures and operating practices (Hall 1986: 13). We adopt such a broad conception of political institutions and shall make use of the fact that formal rules and informal practices may vary quite independently between countries. Finally, our conception of the POS also includes the less stable elements of the political context of mobilizing movements—certain aspects of the configuration of power of a political system, which we summarize under the term alliance structures. These are the elements underscored by the conceptualization of the POS by Tarrow (1982a, 1982b, 1984, 1985). He emphasizes the importance of the political conditions of the moment, of short-term changes in political opportunities that may unleash political protest and that may contribute to its decline. The elements of the political context that may change in the short run include the opening up of access to participation, shifts in ruling alignments, the availability of influential allies, and changes within and among elites. We shall concentrate on two aspects of the changing political context that are of particular relevance for the type of movements that constitute the major object of this study: the configuration of power on the left and the presence or absence of the left in government.

These four components of the POS are more or less systematically linked to each other. Thus, we maintain that the alliance structures are, in part at least, determined by the three more stable components of the POS. So far
as the latter are concerned, we presuppose that cleavage structures consti­
tute the most general and most stable aspect of the political contest. They
have contributed to the development of the prevailing strategies, which, in
turn, have been to some extent formally institutionalized. The left-hand side
of figure 1 summarizes these considerations.

Authors using the POS approach have not always been very explicit about
how the structural characteristics of the political context affect the mobi­
lization of collective actors. In order to understand the impact of the POS on
the mobilization of social movements, we need to specify the mechanisms
that link the macrostructural level of the POS to the collective action of move­
ment actors. Under the general heading of "interaction context," we pro­
pose a number of concepts designed to bridge the gap between the political
context and the mobilization processes. According to our conception, the ele­
ments of the POS jointly determine the strategies of the members of the po­
litical system in general, and of political authorities in particular, with regard
to the mobilization of social movements. These strategies imply a country­
specific mix of facilitation/repression of the movements’ mobilization, their
chances of success, and the degree of restraints/threat they have to reckon
with. This specific mix defines the concrete opportunities of a given social
movement. By specifying the costs and benefits of a movement’s mobiliza­
tion, these concrete opportunities in turn determine to an important extent
the movement’s own strategies, its level of mobilization, and the outcomes
of the mobilization process.

However, we cannot expect to explain the whole process of mobilization
on the basis of this "funnel of causality." At least three considerations limit
the reach of the impact of the POS: First, the consequences of the concrete
opportunities for the mobilizing strategies of a challenging movement de­
pend on the extent to which the movement in question is acting instru­
mentally. As we shall argue in this study, there are different types of move­
ments—instrumental, subcultural, and countercultural—which differ in the
way they react to the concrete opportunities defined by the POS. Second,
one the mobilizing process has been set in motion, the strategies adopted by
the social movements will have a feedback effect on the strategies adapted
by the authorities. An interactive system will be established with a dynamic
of its own. Finally, as is especially emphasized by Tarrow (1994, 1998), de­
pending on the magnitude of the mobilizing processes and the importance
of the social movements involved, it is conceivable that the interactive dynam­
ics will create their own opportunities, modify the POS—as the level of the

Fig. 1. Model of the political context and its impact on the mobilization of social movements
alliance structures, or even more profoundly, on the level of institutional structures, prevailing strategies, and cleavage structures. These considerations are summarized by the right-hand side of figure 1: the type of movement is introduced as an exogenous factor at the far right of this figure, while feedback processes are indicated by arrows pointing back to the POS and to the strategies of the authorities. This completes the presentation of our model of the political context and its impact on the mobilization of social movements.

We do not maintain that this model is applicable at all times and in all places. The present model presupposes a political system with a relatively stable structure and a certain degree of autonomy with respect to its environment. Both preconditions apply more or less well to the period and region of the world we propose to study in this book—Western Europe from 1975 to 1989. During this period, the national cleavage structures, the prevailing strategies, and the institutional framework of Western European countries have been relatively stable, certainly if compared to what has happened in Eastern Europe since the late eighties. It is true that the period in question was one of increasing integration of Western Europe into the transnational European community, or the European Union, as it is called since the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993. Moreover, as our previous example of the massive demonstrations of the peace movement illustrates, the mobilization of social movements has come under the influence of the globalizing tendencies that have been manifest during this period, not only in Western Europe, but all over the world. But if, in an age of globalization, national political contexts are bound to become less and less important for the interpretation and explanation of the mobilization of social movements (Tarrow 1995), we maintain that the national contexts were still decisive for the understanding of the mobilization of social movements during the period under consideration. The cross-national variation in the example of the mobilization by the peace movement that we introduced at the outset provides us with a hint that national political contexts, indeed, still are quite important.

New Social Movements

While taking into account the protest events of all the movements that mobilized in the late seventies and eighties, our study focuses on a particular segment of the social movement sector in the Western European countries:
the so-called new social movements. These movements are of particular in­
terest for a study of collective action since they have been responsible for
the bulk of the mobilization that has taken place in Western Europe during
the period in question. They constitute a specific "movement industry," ac­
cording to the conceptualization by McCarthy and Zald (1977), or a specific
"movement family," as Della Porta and Rucht (1991) prefer to call such clus­
ters of movements. Most authors would probably agree that this family in­
cludes the ecology movement (with its antinuclear energy branch), the peace
movement, the solidarity movement (solidarity with the Third World), the
women's movement, the squatters' movement, as well as various other move­
ments mobilizing for the rights of discriminated-against minorities (such as
the gay movement). There have been numerous attempts to specify the com­
mon denominator of all the movements that constitute this movement fam­
ily. Although we do not want to enter into the details of these theoretical dis­
cussions, we consider it indispensable to clarify our point of view before
launching into the presentation of the different aspects of our study.

We agree with Raschke (1985: 413) that the basic characteristic of a social
movement is constituted by the position of its main constituency in the social
structure. Moreover, we agree with him that a theoretical understanding of
a social movement requires that we go beyond a mere description of its social-
structural characteristics and inquire into the transformation of the conflict
structure within a given society that has given rise to its mobilization. We
believe, indeed, that the rise of the new social movements was intimately
linked to the slow, but profound, transformation of the society's conflict struc­
ture in the course of the macrohistorical process of modernization. This
transformation implies, first of all, a weakening of traditional cleavages in
which people are freed from traditional ties of class, religion, and the family.
The result has been an unprecedented degree of individualization, but not
the dissolution of structural and cultural bonds altogether.

The weakening of traditional structures is not equivalent to a lack of any
structure. Nor does it necessarily have the disturbing consequences that
were conjured up by theorists of the classical approaches to collective be­
havior, such as the theorists of "mass society," for whom the alienated citi­
zens in modern society easily fall prey to mobilizing demagogues. The great
structural transformation has brought with it new forms of control. Individ­
uals now find they are dependent on new kinds of structurally determined
circumstances, giving rise to conflicts between large groups in society. Some
theorists have proposed to analyze these new conflicts in terms of processes
of large-scale societal differentiation (Neidhardt and Rucht 1993). One of the present authors has preferred to interpret them in terms of class analysis (Kriesi 1987, 1989, 1993a). Thus, we have argued in some detail that there is an emergent "new class" cleavage traversing the new middle class, opposing the professionals whose work is mainly cued to organizational control (the "managers" and "technocrats") to those professionals whose work is mainly skills-oriented and cued to service to clients (the "social and cultural specialists").

According to this argument, the structural conflict between the two strata within the new middle class is a conflict about the control of work. In this conflict, the professionals whose control is based on expertise and skills are defending themselves against the encroachments on their work autonomy by colleagues who are primarily involved in the administration of the large private and public employers for whom the former work. Tending to lose out in this conflict, the skills- and service-oriented professionals constitute a crucial structural potential for the new social movements, all of which attack in one way or another the unrestricted reign of technocracy. A detailed analysis of the Dutch situation has, indeed, confirmed that social and cultural specialists are most heavily overrepresented in the avant-garde of the various movements that have been considered to belong to the family of the new social movements. Moreover, the activists of any given one of these movements also tend to be active in any given other one among them (Kriesi and van Praag Jr. 1987; Kriesi 1993a).

We would, of course, concede that the structurally determined conflicts of modern society cannot be reduced to this new class conflict about the control of work. This conflict is part of a larger struggle about the blueprint of modern society. As many analysts of new social movements have pointed out (Beck 1983, 1986; Brand 1987; Duyvendak 1992; Kriesi 1988; Offe 1985; Raschke 1985; Schmidt-Beck 1982; Touraine 1980b), these movements have been mobilized by new types of threats to individual autonomy exerted by corporate actors—the colonization of the life world by systemic imperatives" of Habermas, or the "iron cage" of Weber—as well as by new, invisible risks affecting people in more or less the same way irrespective of their social position (radioactivity or AIDS, for example). These new threats have replaced the dependence on traditional bonds and the deprivation stemming from the inequality of resource distribution. The social and cultural service professionals are generally most sensitive to these kinds of threats, but their fears and motives are shared by large numbers of people who have, in part
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at least, been sensitized by the past mobilization processes of the very same
new social movements for which they presently form a potential.

Like the social and cultural professionals, these people subscribe to the
values and beliefs articulated most clearly by these professionals. These values
and beliefs have often been described as “postmaterialist” (Inglehart 1977,
1990b). Postmaterialist values include an emphasis on personal and political
freedom, political and economic democracy, environmental protection, open­
ness to new ideas, and a caring society. Flanagan (1987) has identified two
major themes in this new set of values—a postmaterialist and a libertarian one.

One of the present authors has argued (Kriesi 1993a) that this new set of
values is closely associated with the values traditionally defended by the left in
Western Europe and includes at least three components: a social-democratic
one referring to the set of goals of the Socialist reformers, a libertarian one
directed against traditional authoritarian structures, and an emancipatory one
oriented toward the implementation of an egalitarian society protecting both
nature and individuals from the imperatives of large-scale organizations. In
the same vein, Della Porta and Rucht (1991) propose to call the new social
movements “left-libertarian movements.” They adopt the term from Kitschelt
(1990: 180), who uses it for the small parties of the new left and argues that
“they are left because they share with traditional socialists a mistrust of
the marketplace, of private investment, and of the achievement ethic, and a
commitment to egalitarian redistribution. They are ‘libertarian’ because
they reject the authority of the private or public bureaucracies to regulate
individual and collective conduct. Instead they favor participatory democ­
racy and the autonomy of groups and individuals to define their economic,
political, and cultural institutions unencumbered by market or bureaucratic
dictates.”

That the appeal of the new social movements has gone far beyond the
narrow circle of the social and cultural professionals is evident from the
level of mobilization they have attained throughout the last two decades.
Moreover, these movements can count on the continued existence of enor­
mous potentials for future political campaigns (Fuchs and Rucht 1992; Kriesi
1993b; Watts 1987). It is quite likely that not only the goals of these move­
ments, but also their mode of doing politics—a participatory, issue­specific
mode, oriented toward public opinion—have struck a responsive chord within
the populations of the Western European countries. We would maintain, how­
ever, that these more procedural aspects of their mobilization pattern are no
longer characteristic of the family of the new social movements. As is argued
by Koopmans (1992a: 18), little is left of the initial differences in the action repertoires and the type of organization between the new social movements and other contemporary movements: on the one hand, certain innovations introduced by the new social movements, such as their internal organizational networks, have spread to the other types of movements; on the other hand, in the course of the eighties the new social movements have undergone a process of conventionalization that has contributed to the convergence of their formal aspects with those of the other types of contemporaneous movements. By the end of the eighties, most of the new social movements in Western Europe appeared to be pragmatic reformist movements (Kiichler and Dalton 1990, Schmidt-Beck 1992), closely connected to established politics in various dimensions. As Nohlen (1984) suggested some time ago, they are best interpreted as a differentiation of the system of political interest intermediation or, as Roth (1989, 1991, 1992) would say, as a new type of political institution. We hasten to add that if institutionalization has been the trajectory followed by the largest new social movements, others have developed along other lines to which we shall return.

In spite of the fact that the new social movements are no longer all that new, we shall use this label to characterize them throughout this study. Although the label is no longer all that appropriate, it has become so widespread and generally accepted to designate this type of movement family that we continue to use it in order to avoid possible misunderstandings. Focusing our attention on new social movements, however, does not make us typical representatives of what in the 1980s came to be called the "new social movements approach." Following the theme of Klandermans and Tarrow (1988) and Klandermans (1991), we are in fact trying to integrate the European and American approaches to social movement research. If the "new social movement approach" was mainly concerned with the structural origins of these movements, with the question of why they made their appearance in the first place, our approach also tries to address the question of why there are such enormous differences between Western European countries with respect to the timing, the capacity, and the forms of mobilization of the various movements belonging to this important movement family. We accept the idea of the European approaches that the new social movements are ultimately rooted in structural and cultural transformations that characterize all Western European countries to more or less the same extent. But we think that it is time to move beyond the generalizations of the European approaches and to introduce the more specific questions about the how and
when of the mobilization of these movements in the various countries (Tarrow 1994, chapter 5). In trying to explain the cross-national differences by various aspects of the national political contexts of the countries compared, our analysis is also firmly grounded in the political process approach, which has its origins in the United States.

Research Strategy

As has already become apparent, we take a resolutely comparative perspective in this study. Cross-national comparisons are at its core. More specifically, we shall compare the family of the new social movements across four West European countries: France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. Looking for differences between the mobilization patterns of Western European countries, we have adopted a “most similar systems design” (Przeworski and Teune 1970), which tries to control as large a number of explanatory variables as possible. The four countries selected are quite similar with respect to the level of their economic and social development, but they constitute quite different political contexts for the mobilization of the new social movements. In other words, they lend themselves to a systematic test of our political process model. The four countries, of course, differ not only with regard to their political context, and in this sense the differences in the mobilization patterns of the movements of interest to us shall be indeterminable, or, if you will, overdetermined. However, guided by the hypotheses we shall develop in each one of the following chapters, we shall be able to focus on the impact of specific aspects of the political context and render the relevance of these aspects more plausible.

Following the lead of other students of political protest (Kriesi et al. 1981; McAdam 1982; McCarthy, McPhail, and Smith 1992; Rucht and Ohlemacher 1992; Tarrow 1989b; Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly 1975), the present study is based on a quantitative analysis of protest events collected from newspaper sources. Our notion of protest event is quite broad and includes an extensive list of various forms of unconventional political action. In addition, for five specific new social movements—the peace, ecology, solidarity, urban autonomous, and gay movements—we have also collected information on conventional political events, to the extent that the event was initiated by a social movement organization (SMO) or by a group of activists of one of these movements. For each event we coded a limited amount of information.
Compared to other quantitative sources such as official statistics, yearbooks, or archives, the most important advantages of daily newspapers for the study of the mobilization of social movements are perhaps that they provide a continuous, easily accessible source that includes the whole range of protest events produced in a given country. We have systematically analyzed one major newspaper in each of the four countries under study. The papers we selected are quite comparable with respect to their quality, their national scope, their political orientation, and the selectivity of their reporting on protest events. We chose Le Monde in France, the Frankfurter Rundschau in Germany, NRC/Handelsblad (NRC) in the Netherlands, and the Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ) in Switzerland. For reasons of resource constraints, we have not coded all the issues of these papers for the entire period under study, but decided to concentrate on the Monday issues only. Monday issues were chosen because they cover two days of the week, and because a large number of unconventional events, on which our analysis is focused, are concentrated on weekends. The important category of strikes, which typically take place during the week, has been treated separately. More details about our analysis of the newspaper data as well as a discussion of the advantages and pitfalls of this type of analysis are given in the Appendix.

Our general position with respect to this type of data is well formulated by Rucht and Ohlemacher (1992:101), who observe that "in a field which is marked more by speculation than by substantial knowledge," newspaper data provide a useful tool to arrive at more empirically grounded generalizations. The field of research concerned with new social movements abounds, indeed, with interpretations that, when confronted with the kind of empirical data we are providing here, can easily be shown to be highly misleading or just plain wrong. More specifically, although the use of newspaper data for the analysis of political mobilization has become quite common, this procedure has up to now hardly been used in a comparative perspective. The only study adopting a comparative approach and making use of this kind of data that we are aware of is the pathbreaking work of Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly (1973). Building on our comparative set of data, we attempt to present a creative blend of theory and data analysis. In every chapter of this book, we develop a set of theoretical ideas which we then try to test on the basis of the comparative data from our newspaper sources. Our goal is to elaborate an empirically grounded theory about the impact of national political context structures on the mobilization patterns of social movements in general, and new social movements in particular.
Our study is divided into two main parts. Part I is devoted to the elaboration of our general concepts and to a presentation of the basic results of our research. The first three chapters of this part deal with the various aspects of the political opportunity structure. Chapter 1 presents an analysis of the impact of traditional cleavage structures on the mobilization of new social movements. Our data support the hypothesis that there is a zero-sum relationship between the mobilization capacity of traditional cleavages and the corresponding capacity of the new social movements to articulate a new cleavage. The pacification of the traditional cleavages allows for more "space" for new social movements to mobilize. By contrast, in countries where "old" conflicts are still not pacified, "new" conflicts turn out to be less likely to burst onto the political scene.

Chapter 2 introduces two further aspects of the political opportunity structure—the institutional structures and the prevailing strategies—which add to our understanding of why the level of mobilization and the action repertoire of new social movements vary substantially across the four countries. The country-specific mix of concrete opportunities derived in part from the combination of these two dimensions of the POS is shown to have an impact on the level of mobilization and the action repertoire of new social movements.

Chapter 3 deals with the more variable elements of the POS— the alliance structures. Two elements of these alliance structures are analyzed in detail—the configuration of power on the left and the presence or absence of the left in government. Facilitation of the mobilization of new social movements by established political actors, especially by organizations of the left, is an omnipresent phenomenon. But, as we shall see, depending on the character of the configuration of the old and the new left and on whether the left is in or out of government, the magnitude of the facilitation by the left varies considerably. Variable support from the left, in turn, goes a long way toward explaining variations over time in the country-specific capacity of new social movements to mobilize.

In chapter 4, the political opportunity argument is elaborated for different types of new social movements— instrumental, subcultural, or countercultural ones. Political opportunities are not the same for various movements within one and the same country; different movements face different constraints and opportunities. Thus, the reaction of the authorities to the challenges of social movements varies widely from one movement to the other, depending on the characteristics of the movements, and as a function of the
types of issues they raise. The status of an issue raised by a challenging movement in turn depends on how it is evaluated by the political authorities.

Finally, chapter 5 introduces interactive dynamics. According to the wave-like model presented in this chapter, shifts in the political opportunity structure are not sufficient to explain the development of protest waves once they have been set in motion. The interaction between different currents within social movements, the shifting balance of strategic resources, and the interaction between movements, adversaries, authorities, and allies give rise to an autodynamic of protest that is relatively independent of the more stable aspects of the political opportunity structure.

Part II is devoted to elaborations of the general themes introduced in the first part. Chapters 6 and 7 deal with the mobilization of two specific movements. The first of these chapters uses the example of the antinuclear movement to introduce framing processes into our analysis of the mobilization by new social movements. The main argument is that problems and grievances are not given, but depend on the political opportunities to "construct problems" in a way that "resonates" with concepts and discussions prevalent in established politics. Using the conspicuous example of Chernobyl—a suddenly imposed grievance of international scope—to illustrate and test our argument, this chapter tries to bridge the gap between structural and constructivist theorizing about processes of mobilization. Chapter 7 deals with the twin trajectories followed by our example of a subcultural social movement—the gay movement. This movement has not institutionalized as suggested by the well-known Weber-Michels hypothesis, which applies well for instrumental movements. Nor has it radicalized as would be typical for a countercultural movement. Instead, the gay movement has followed the twin paths of commercialization and revolution: movements commercialize as their SMOs increasingly become involved in commercial activities (like publishing, catering, or advertising); or they take the route of revolution, if their SMOs and informal networks increasingly engage in self-help and social activities (Kriesi 1995).

The last two chapters address the questions of the diffusion of collective actions and their outcomes. Chapter 8 deals with the diffusion processes occurring among new social movements. The main argument is that collective action spreads across countries to the extent that national political opportunities are present in the country which are taking up the stimulus from abroad. Examples drawn from the antinuclear, peace, and urban autonomous movements provide some evidence that the political context also matters with
respect to the cross-national diffusion of protest. Finally, chapter 9 addresses the difficult question of the outcomes of the mobilization by social movements. On the basis of examples drawn from the antinuclear, gay, and urban autonomous movements, this chapter argues that the outcomes of the new social movements in particular are largely influenced by the interplay of political opportunities and movement types.
Part I

General Concepts and Basic Results
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Chapter 1
National Cleavage Structures

In this chapter we will analyze the way that traditional political cleavage structures facilitate or constrain the action space of new social movements. As already suggested in the Introduction, the new social movements tend to articulate a political conflict that is based on a new cultural and social cleavage in society. Not only in this case, but quite generally, political conflicts are ultimately rooted in structural and cultural cleavages. In other words, they have their origin in broad societal transformations that oppose social groups for structural and cultural reasons. However, "structures" and "cultures" do not impinge directly on politics. Social and cultural dividing lines—societal cleavages—only result in political cleavages if they are politicized. As Bartolini and Mair (1990: 216) observe, political cleavages cannot be reduced simply to the outgrowths of social stratification; rather, social distinctions become political cleavages when they are organized as such. If the social-structural basis of a political conflict emerges from social change, the conflict itself results from the coupling of these processes of social change with those of democratization, politicization, and mobilization. Thus, Bartolini and Mair continue, it is only through the historical processes of mobilization, politicization, and democratization that any specific political cleavage acquires its distinctive normative profile and organizational network (ibid.: 217). In short, political cleavages develop initially on the basis of a social stratification that sets the structural conditions for group identity, and only later do they become fully political, particularly with the development of mass democracies. Or, in other words, social change determines structural and cultural potentials for political mobilization that remain latent as long as they are not politicized. In order for such potentials to become politicized, they have to develop, on the one hand, a collective identity, a sense of solidarity, and political consciousness.
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and, on the other hand, an organizational infrastructure (Kriesi 1983: 30ff.; Klandermans 1988). The organizational infrastructure includes not only formal organizations, but also informal personal networks that allow for the micro-mobilization processes to take place that have been found to be so important in the mobilization for collective action.

Traditional societal cleavages constitute the basis of the political cleavage structure even today. Although Western European societies have undergone far-reaching social and cultural transformations, the impact of traditional societal cleavages on the political cleavage structure has proven to be very resistant to social change. Thus, according to the well-known “freezing hypothesis” of Lipset and Rokkan (1967), the political configuration in the party systems of the Western European countries of the late sixties still reflected the cleavage structures that had existed at the end of the First World War. If, in the meantime, the impact of the traditional cleavage structure on the voting behavior of Western European electorates seems to have considerably diminished in most countries (Franklin et al. 1992), the sediments of past political mobilization are still with us.

Given that the political mobilization by new social movements articulates a new societal cleavage, it seems obvious that the continuing strength of old cleavages, which is reflected in the national political conflict structure, has an impact on the possibility for the new cleavage to emerge. While the structural underpinnings of the new cleavage are present in all Western European countries, the relative strength of the old cleavages may be expected to restrict the possibilities of the mobilization on the basis of the new cleavage. The construction of new identities is only possible when old identities fade and lose their capacity to help people to interpret the world. Distinct existing identities provide, in other words, a shield against the framing attempts of rising collective actors. Moreover, the articulation of a new cleavage presupposes the mobilization of resources that may not be available if political mobilization on the basis of traditional cleavages is absorbing a great deal of the time, energy, and money of the relatively small part of the population that engages in political action. Organizations engaged in traditional political conflicts may even actively prevent potential supporters of new social movements from contributing to their mobilization. According to this line of reasoning, there exists a zero-sum relationship between the strength of traditional political cleavages and the possibility of new social movements to articulate a new societal cleavage. Karl-Werner Brand (1985: 32ff.) has already suggested that the mobilization of “new social movements” depends on the mobilization potential of tra-
ditional political conflicts. He maintained that there exists an inverse relationship between the mobilization potential of the traditional class conflict and the mobilization opportunities of new social movements. According to his hypothesis, the pacification of traditional class conflict by way of the expansion of the welfare state and by the institutionalization of the conflict over the distribution of the national product created “space” for the articulation of new conflicts. He did not propose the same substitutive relationship between the continued mobilization potential of other traditional conflicts and the mobilization of new social movements. He seemed to assume that, under certain conditions, these other traditional cleavages might serve as a catalyst for the mobilization of the new social movements rather than as a constraining factor.

The Mobilization Potential of a Political Cleavage

In order to get a closer idea of the possible relationships between the traditional political cleavages and the new ones articulated by the new social movements, let us briefly discuss the concept of the “mobilization potential” of a political cleavage. The term “mobilization potential” was first introduced by Klandermans and Oegema (1987), who referred to the “potential of people in a society who could theoretically be mobilized by a social movement.” Applied to a political cleavage, the term can be defined in an analogous way as the potential of people in the social groups involved in a political cleavage that could theoretically be mobilized by a social movement. In order to characterize the mobilization potentials of various cleavages in a more precise way, we propose to distinguish between two dimensions that we conceptualize by applying some ideas of Bartolini and Mair (1990). First, the mobilization potentials of political cleavages vary according to the degree to which the cleavages constitute social groups that are, at the same time, clearly segmented from each other and internally highly integrated. This dimension corresponds to what Bartolini and Mair call the degree of closure of the social relationship represented by the cleavage. Accordingly, a cleavage is structured by processes that restrict mobility in a number of ways (ibid.: 224): “through marriage, educational institutions, the urban and spatial setting of the population, social customs, religious practices and so on. And, as mass politics develops, these original forms of closure are extended to new kinds of behaviours, such as organizational membership and voting, which may then reinforce the original basis of the cleavage through an active defense of the community.” Social homogeneity and cultural distinctiveness, on the
One hand, and internal organizational integration and political encapsulation, on the other, are the parameters determining the degree of closure of social groups divided by a cleavage. The more socially and culturally distinct, and the more internally integrated and politically encapsulated a group, the greater is its degree of closure. Tilly’s (1978) concept of “CATNET” (category + network) captures the same idea of closure of a social group.

This notion of closure is crucial, because, as Oberschall (1973) has argued convincingly, an internally highly integrated group in a segmented context—no matter whether it is integrated on the basis of traditional communal or more modern associational ties—constitutes a formidable basis for political mobilization. The members of a group that is closed in terms of a traditional cleavage will be readily mobilizable on the basis of their distinctiveness—that is, their collective identity and common interests, their loyalty to the group, and their shared consciousness of belonging to a distinct group—and on the basis of their integration into informal networks and formal organizations. However, the essential point in the present context is that they will only be mobilizable in terms of the traditional cleavage that defines their distinctive identity and their specific interests; that is, they will not be available for mobilization by new social movements.

The second aspect of the mobilization potential of a traditional cleavage is its salience, that is, the degree to which it dominates the conflicts in the political arenas. Bartolini and Mair introduce this term to assess the relative importance of a given cleavage with respect to other cleavages in the context of electoral competition. We propose instead to apply it to the significance of a given cleavage in the context of political competition in the extraparliamentary arena of movement politics. From this perspective, a cleavage is salient to the extent that it has not been institutionalized and, therefore, pacified. The institutionalization of a political cleavage implies that it becomes regulated by established procedures, that the groups involved are integrated into the political networks in the administrative and the parliamentary arenas, and that they abandon the challenging of authorities by unconventional means.

The institutionalization of a cleavage does not imply that it no longer gives rise to political competition. It only implies that the competition is no longer taking place in unconventional terms. By definition, a pacified cleavage no longer gives rise to political mobilization on a large scale outside of the parliamentary or administrative arenas. In contrast, it is rather likely that precisely this will happen in the case of a nonpacified cleavage. Moreover, it is
essential for the present context not only that a nonpacified traditional cleavage is likely to give rise to political mobilization by unconventional means, but that it also tends to provide master frames for the interpretation of movement politics, that it tends to absorb the general public's attention and to occupy the political agenda of both conventional and movement politics to an extent that goes far beyond the more or less narrow confines of the social groups directly involved in the cleavage in question. Accordingly, a nonpacified traditional cleavage sets important constraints on the political opportunities for the mobilization of new social movements.

Note that this second aspect of the mobilization potential of a cleavage is quite distinct from the previous one. At first sight, a cleavage characterized by highly distinct and internally coherent groups is not likely to be institutionalized. But, if pacification of a closed cleavage is difficult to obtain, it is not impossible. It is conceivable that the strongly segmented groups maintain routinized, peaceful, and stable relationships with each other on the level of their representatives. Even if the ordinary members of the groups hardly have any contact with each other at all, their elites may be integrated into the political process and maintain good relations with each other. The Dutch system of "pillarization" provides the most prominent example of this configuration of a more or less pacified coexistence of segmented groups. Both the religious and the class cleavage constituted internally highly integrated groups in the Netherlands, which, nevertheless, maintained rather peaceful relationships with each other. The highly integrated character of the separate groups may actually be instrumental in the stabilization of the relationships on the elite level, since it allows the elites to control their grassroots base quite successfully. One may go even one step further, as do some authors in the debate on neocorporatism (e.g., Schmitter 1981), and suggest that the integrated internal structure of the groups involved in a given cleavage is a precondition for the institutionalization of intergroup relationships.

Combining the two aspects of the mobilization potential of a political cleavage, we arrive at four types of traditional cleavages with quite different mobilization capacities. Table 1.1 provides an overview of these types. First, take the case of a closed traditional cleavage that has been pacified. This is the case illustrated by the Dutch system of pillarization just mentioned. In this case, the traditional cleavage no longer gives rise to political mobilization outside of the conventional channels. Given its closure, however, the potential capacity for mobilization of the traditional cleavage is still important. The situation is one of "latency." Although the members of the social
groups involved are not actively mobilized on the basis of the traditional cleavage, they will not be available for the mobilization by new social movements, given the closure of the traditional groups.

To the extent that the traditional elites lose their hold over their respective client groups—that is, to the extent that the closure of these groups weakens and they are opening up—their members may become available for the mobilization by new social movements. The acceleration of the process of "depillarization" of traditional Dutch society since the mid-sixties has, for example, increased the availability of Dutch religious groups for the mobilization by new social movements. If the traditional cleavage is open and pacified—our second type—the members of the groups involved become potentially available for the mobilization by new social movements. In such a situation, the extraordinary mobilization in terms of the traditional cleavage has ceased to be of any significance and the members of the groups involved become free for the mobilization in terms of new cleavages.

Third, if the traditional cleavage is closed and not yet pacified, the social groups involved tend to be highly politicized and mobilized in terms of the traditional conflict. The closure of the social groups involved in such a non-pacified traditionally conflict proves to be particularly instrumental for their mobilization. Given a high degree of closure, the traditional political organizations, which typically mobilize "from above," can count on a prevailing consensus among their members and on elaborate recruitment networks among their respective social groups. In such a situation, the mobilization potential of the cleavage is highly visible, manifest, and activated, but—and this is the important point in our context—it is activated exclusively in terms of the traditional conflict. In other words, the social groups involved are not available for the mobilization by new social movements articulating new types of cleavages. Given the high degree of politicization in traditional terms, it is rather unlikely that the groups involved will open up to newcomers on the political scene.

Finally, if the traditional cleavage lacks closure, but is still highly conflictual and still gives rise to intense political mobilization, the situation is mor
complicated. The high degree of conflictuality implies a high degree of political consciousness among the members of the social groups involved, as well as a high degree of visibility of the symbols and ideologies linked to the traditional conflict. In this case, the lack of closure is above all an organizational one. It implies, first, a greater amount of competition between the political organizations that mobilize their traditional client groups. Under these circumstances, some of the organizations associated with the traditional cleavage may try to outflank their competitors in the organizational field representing traditional social groups by trying to be different, that is, by appealing to new issues and new types of clients not catered to by their competitors (Duyvendak 1992:115). If this is the case, the issues raised by new social movements may be interpreted in terms of the old identities and conflicts. The lack of organizational closure also implies the possibility of "mobilization from below" in the form of revolts against the organizational leadership or of direct challenges of the adversaries that bypass the organizational top. Such "mobilization from below" may be influenced by the interpretations of competitors from outside the traditional organizational field. In other words, lack of closure under conditions of high conflictuality gives rise to a great amount of competition not only within the traditional organizational field but also between traditional organizations and newcomers on the political scene. In this competitive space, the political organizations associated with the traditional cleavage are likely to make every attempt to mobilize their traditional potential in terms of the traditional conflict and to impose the terms of this conflict on all the newly emerging conflicts in movement politics; that is, they will try to absorb new issues and new collective actors into the traditional conflict. This is why we propose to speak in this case of an "inclusively" mobilized traditional potential.

The extent to which traditional cleavages are "inclusively" mobilized also depends on the proximity of the traditional conflict in question to the concerns articulated by new social movements. The greater the proximity of the two conflicts, the greater the likelihood of competition between the collective actors that articulate the traditional conflict and new social movements. Prominent causes give rise to competition for scarce resources and conflicts of interpretation and strategy. However, proximity has ambivalent implications. It not only leads to competition, but it also implies the possibility of mutual support, facilitation— in short, alliances. We shall discuss alliances in chapter 3. For the time being, we wish to underline the first aspect of proximity, which suggests that, paradoxically, a traditional cleavage that is closely related to the cleavages articulated by new social movements may reduce the
available mobilization potential for new social movements to a greater ex-
tent than a traditional cleavage that has nothing to do with the issues and
concerns articulated by new social movements. The paradoxical character
of proximity has already been pointed out by Simmel (1968: 205), who re-
minded us of the fact that the close relationship among kin tends to give
rise to more profound antagonisms than we find among strangers.

The Mobilization Potential of Traditional Cleavages
in the Four Countries

We can now turn to more specific questions concerning the mobilization po-
tential of the traditional cleavages in each one of the four countries under
study and the implications for the mobilization of new social movements.

Following the lead of Rokkan (1970), we may distinguish between four tra-
ditional cleavages, which have been generally very important in the past:
the center-periphery, religious, and urban-rural cleavages as well as the cleav-
age between the working class and the bourgeoisie. It will, of course, not be
possible to study the strength of these cleavages in detail, but we shall never-
theless try to indicate the general makeup of each one of them in the four
countries. Let us start with the conflict between the center and the periphery.

This cleavage has traditionally given rise to regionalist or nationalist move-
ments that have mobilized against the builders of the centralized auton-
omy states. The defense of the periphery is typically linked to a specific territorial
identity. In this respect, two elements play an especially important role—
language and religion. Very often, language constitutes the crucial resource
(Rokkan and Urwin 1983: 131). Religious and linguistic minorities in the pe-
riphery are particularly likely to mobilize if their territory is at the same
time economically discriminated against. If a distinct regional identity is in
any case conducive to mobilization, it is clearly reinforced by an unfavorable
economic situation (Rennwald 1992: 171). We assume that the persistence
of this conflict is closely linked to the state structure and that it is much
more salient in centralized states than in federalist ones. A federalist state
may contribute to a certain degree of closure on the part of peripheral groups.

Of our four countries, France is the one where we would expect the most
salient center-periphery cleavage. It is not only the most centralized, but it
also has several ethnic and linguistic peripheries—in the Alsace, the Basque
country. Brittany, Corsica, and Occitania—which are directly confronted with the discriminatory practices of the central state. On the other hand, we have the two federalist countries—Switzerland and Germany. Their federalism is, however, not of the same kind. Swiss federalism is what Lijphart (1984: 179) calls the “incongruent” type, whereas German federalism is “congruent”3: “Congruent federations are composed of territorial units with a social and cultural character that is similar in each of the units and in the federation as a whole. In a perfectly congruent federal system, the component units are ‘miniature reflections of the important aspects of the whole federal system’. Conversely, incongruent federal systems have units with social and cultural compositions that are different from each other and from the country as a whole." Whereas congruent systems such as the German one are unlikely to produce strong territorial identities, and are, therefore, typically associated with open center-periphery cleavages, incongruent systems may preserve strong collective identities of a territorial kind, which implies the continued existence of rather closed groups defined in terms of the center-periphery cleavage, even if the federalism is likely to pacify the segmented groups.4 In this case, the cleavage is not giving rise to large-scale mobilization, but it is still present in the sense that it shapes individual and collective consciousness, influences the way political issues are conceived, and is liable to shut out from public attention issues that are entirely unrelated to it. In Switzerland, there is one more element to be considered: if its federalism allows center-periphery conflicts to be reduced, it may still be possible for a center-periphery conflict to develop within one of the member states of the confederation. This is especially likely if there are ethnic, linguistic, or religious minorities that are politically discriminated against by the majority within a member state. There is one Swiss region where these conditions have prevailed: the region of the Jura in the canton of Bern constituted both a linguistic (French-speaking) and a religious (Catholic) minority in a canton dominated by Swiss-German-speaking Protestants. The center-periphery cleavage has become particularly salient within this region throughout the postwar period, but especially since the late sixties (Rennwald 1994). The Netherlands, finally, is difficult to situate with respect to this cleavage. It is true that the Netherlands has a unitary state that is almost as centralized as the French, and there are also cultural minorities concentrated in specific regions of the country: the Frisians in the north and the Catholics in the south. However, the Frisians have never been a discriminated-against minority, and the Catholic south has been integrated into the pillarized system, which has served to considerably reduce the salience of the center-periphery
cleavage at the same time as it weakened the religious one. In other words, we would not expect much mobilization along those lines in the Netherlands.

The religious cleavage takes different forms in predominantly Catholic countries, in Protestant countries, and in countries that are religiously mixed. Among our four countries, France is the only one that is predominantly Catholic, while the other three are all religiously mixed. In France, the religious cleavage refers to the conflict between the church and the secularized state, between practicing Catholics and those who are not affiliated with the church at all. This cleavage marks one of the constants of French politics, where the church has been associated with the political right since the ancien régime. The conflict has not definitively been pacified, but lingers as and erupts typically with respect to educational questions, which have been at its core since the nineteenth century. It has not given rise to stable patterns of political integration. There is, for example, no equivalent to a major Christian Democratic party in France that could integrate the practicing Catholics under one organizational roof. Similarly, the secularized part of French society is not organized in one clearly identifiable party. Although not pacified at the level of political representation, the mobilization potential of this cleavage is weakened by the fact that it crosscuts the predominant class cleavage.

In contrast, in the religiously mixed countries, the religious cleavage has traditionally opposed Catholics and Protestants. In all three of them, the Catholics have organized in defense against the dominant Protestants, who were the decisive builders of the nation-state. In all three, however, the religious cleavage was largely pacified by the mid-seventies. In Switzerland, federalism has allowed the Catholics to preserve their political power in the regions where they dominate. In the other regions, the creation of an organizational infrastructure reminiscent of the Dutch pillarized structures (Altermatt 1991; Righart 1986) has served to defend their interests. In several steps, the Catholics have then been integrated into national politics and the federal administration, which have carefully observed religious proportional representation for decades. The Dutch situation has traditionally been somewhat more complicated in that the Netherlands has known two types of religious cleavages—one between Protestants and Catholics, and a second one within the Protestant church, where orthodox dissenters broke off from the mainstream in the nineteenth century. Just as in Switzerland, however, the cleavage was pacified in several steps at the beginning of our century. Moreover, a process of massive “depillarization” took place in the late sixties, which implied that the various groups lost much of their distinctiveness, even if the organizational
The continued existence of pillarized organizations maintains some degree of closure of the system, but the pacification of the cleavage assures that the potential for mobilization in extra-institutional channels remains largely latent.

In Germany, the traditional defensiveness of the Catholic minority, which still lived with the memory of Bismarck's Kulturkampf against the Catholic "state in the state," gave way to a much more open attitude after the Second World War. First of all, after the partitioning of the country, the Catholics no longer constituted a minority but approached 50 percent of the population. Second, their party was no longer a minority party but became the major party of the center-right, which was based on a double compromise (Smith 1986): even if the Catholics were the decisive element in the party, it represented an alliance of Catholics and Protestants. Moreover, it also became a party that cut across social classes and mobilized from all quarters of society. In other words, by its "catchall" character it not only weakened the mobilizing capacity of the old religious cleavage, but also that of the class cleavage to which we shall return shortly.

If the urban-rural cleavage, as Rokkan maintains, dominated the politics of the nineteenth century, it has generally lost much of its virulence in the course of the twentieth century. The main reason for the weakening of the mobilizing capacity of the urban-rural cleavage is that, by the end of this century, farmers have become a rather small, politically highly integrated minority in Western European countries. Although they have become a minority in the population even of France, farmers have maintained an important political position in all the countries under study. This is certainly related to the excellent political organization of the farming community and to the crucial electoral role played by the farmers in all these countries. Their firm integration into national politics has everywhere contributed to the pacification of the urban-rural cleavage. But, given their organizational infrastructure and their distinct identities, the farmers have everywhere retained a high mobilizing capacity. Due to the institutionalization of the cleavage, this capacity has remained latent for most of the period covered by our study. More recently, however, the political clout of the farmers has been declining in the context of the process of European economic integration. As a result, the farming population has been remobilizing, following an "exclusive" pattern. This remobilization has been especially strong in France.
The class cleavage—that is, the cleavage between the working class and the bourgeoisie—is the last and, from the point of view of the mobilization of new social movements, the most important of the traditional cleavages. The class cleavage is most closely related to the new cleavage articulated by the new social movements. In part at least, the organizations of the traditional and the new left, and those of the new social movements, address themselves to the same constituencies. Previous research has amply documented the close affinity between the constituencies of the parties of the left, on the one hand, and those of the new social movements, on the other (see, for example, Kriesi 1993a; Muller-Rommel 1984, 1985, 1990; Watts 1987). The details of the relationship between the left and the new social movements will occupy us in several of the following chapters. In the present context, the question concerning us more specifically refers to the extent of the comparative strength of the mobilizing capacity of the class cleavage in the four countries under study.

The mobilizing capacity of this cleavage depends, first of all, on the transformation of the class structure. As a result of the growing role of the service sector in the economy of Western European countries, the traditional working class is generally losing ground in the active labor force of these countries. This means that the traditional base of the labor movement is increasingly narrowing, which, in turn, implies that the mobilizing capacity of this cleavage, at least in its traditional form, is weakened. In addition, the increasing standard of living and the establishment of the welfare state equally weaken the cleavage in its traditional form in that they reduce the distinctiveness of working-class culture and working-class identities. As a consequence of the opening up of the class cleavage, its impact on the voting behavior of the Western European electorates has declined over the last twenty-five years. If the timing and the speed of this process is country-specific, Franklin et al. (1992) argue that it is taking place in a generalized way all over Western Europe.

The way the organizations of the labor movement have dealt with this process differs significantly between our four countries. In France, in particular, the opening up of the class cleavage has not implied its pacification. In fact, this cleavage has continued to be highly conflictual and salient in French politics. In other words, the case of the class cleavage in France provides us with a particularly eloquent illustration of the pattern of "inclusive mobilization." A crucial factor explaining the continued salience of this cleavage is, as we shall argue in more detail, the split of the French left into a Communist and a Socialist or social-democratic branch. As a result of the repressive tradition...
of the French authorities with regard to the labor movement (Galle 1983), and as a consequence of their record in the Resistance during World War II, the French Communists emerged as the major party on the left in the post-war period. Given the dominant position of the Communists on the French left, the political discourse in France continued to be cast in terms of class, and images of class struggle were continually reinforced until at least the early eighties. The French Socialists had no other choice but to compete with the Communists for the leading position on the left, and they had to do so on the latter's terms. The high mobilization potential of the class cleavage is also a result of the polarization between the left and the right, which in turn has been reinforced by the electoral system of the Fifth Republic (Depauw 1982).

The competition between the Communists and the Socialists in France extended to the union system, which again contributed to the mobilization potential of the class cleavage. A divided left prevents the unions from getting integrated into stable policy networks and from abandoning traditional notions of class conflict (Golden 1986). Moreover, as has been pointed out by Hibbs (1979, 198), the particular economic interventionism of the French state, which is oriented to the strengthening of market forces, prevents the pacification of industrial relations and contributes to the politicization of the strike. In the French situation, where the state is an important actor in the system of industrial relations, the strike is frequently used as a form of political action to exert pressure on the government. However, the French unions are organizationally weak. In fact, in terms of organizational density and structuration, the French union system is the weakest in Western Europe (Visser 1987; Rosanvallon 1988). The weakness of their organizational base implies that the mobilization tends to come from below and is likely to escape the control of the unions.

The French situation with respect to the class cleavage contrasts quite sharply with what obtains in the other three countries. In all three, the class cleavage has been largely pacified and depoliticized. By adopting the Bad Godesberg Program in 1959, the German SPD not only shed the remaining Marxist elements but also accepted the integration of West Germany into NATO. Following the lead of its successful competitor, it became a "catchall" party, or at least a "people's party" (Smith 1989). This shift in orientation was remarkably successful: by 1972, the SPD had become the largest party with 46 percent of the vote. Similarly, industrial relations were largely pacified in the Federal Republic. The German union system was completely restructured by the Allies after the war. It now follows the principle of industrial
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unionism. The new, comprehensive organizational structures as well as a number of restrictions in the realm of strike legislation, which the unions had to accept, facilitated the integration of the unions into the German policy networks. Although higher than in France, the organizational density of the German unions does not come close to the density rates of Scandinavian or even British unions. However, their comprehensive organizational structure reinforces their position. A highly encompassing, corporatist union system such as the German one is still a class organization "in the sense that it promotes and protects interests of workers that may be tempted by the advantages of pursuing particularistic interests" (Przeworski and Sprague 1986: 75). Moreover, such a union system tends to exert pressure on the Social Democrats to give priority to the traditional labor class concerns. But such a union system is also conducive to the institutionalization of industrial relations. Thus the German unions are highly integrated into institutionalized patterns of codetermination and political concertation (Schmidt 1987). Given its pacified character and the widespread lack of class identities reflected by relatively low union densities, the mobilization potential of the German class cleavage is rather limited. The overall conclusion is that the German situation with respect to the class cleavage is quite ideal for the mobilization of new social movements.

In contrast to France, the class cleavage has become rather inconspicuous in Germany, it is even weaker in Switzerland and the Netherlands. In these two consociational countries, the Social Democrats have been part of coalition governments throughout large parts of the postwar period. Moreover, their union systems have been integrated into corporatist policy networks. The union systems in both countries have been fragmented along religious lines, which has served to dilute images of class from the start of their development. The Socialist unions have never been able to represent the whole working class. Finally, the organizational density of the unions in both countries has been rather low throughout the postwar period, and the Dutch unions in particular have suffered important losses since the early eighties. Pacified, organizationally fragmented, and without distinct collective class identities, the union systems in both countries do not in any sense contribute to the mobilization potential of the class cleavage.

In order to corroborate these sketches of the mobilization capacities of the traditional cleavage structures in the four countries under study, we would like to present some data on the electoral volatility provided by Bartolini and Mair (1990) in their study on the closure and competition in Western European party systems.

Electoral volatility does not directly address our notion of...
Table 1.2. Electoral volatility in the four countries: 1945-89

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total volatility (TV) 1945-65</th>
<th>Class-specific volatility (CV) 1945-65</th>
<th>% class-specific volatility (CV/TV) 1945-65</th>
<th>Total volatility (TV) 1967-89</th>
<th>Class-specific volatility (CV) 1967-89</th>
<th>% class-specific volatility (CV/TV) 1967-89</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>41.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>44.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bartolini and Mair 1990

Table 1.2 presents the relevant figures for the postwar period, which we have divided into two intervals of about equal length—1945-65 and 1967-89. These intervals roughly correspond to the periods before and after the new social movements burst onto the political scene of the countries under study.

First, consider the total volatility, which is an indicator of the overall closure of the cleavage structure. During the first period, total volatility was much lower in the two smaller countries that have traditionally been known for their highly segmented—that is, closed—societies and their integrative politics. The high degree of volatility in the larger countries during this period is, however, not only a result of their more open cleavage structures but also a consequence of the restructuring of their party systems due to institutional changes. Thus, the German party system was entirely reconstructed under Allied supervision after the defeat in World War II. In France, which had the highest total volatility in this period, the party system changed profoundly as a result of the transition from the Fourth to the Fifth Republic in the late fifties. During the second period, we note a certain convergence with respect to the total volatilities in the four countries, as a result of the opening up of the traditional cleavages in the smaller countries—the famous "de-polarization" of the Netherlands, the weakening of the all-party coalition in Switzerland—and of the increasing institutionalization of the traditional cleavages and of the party systems in the larger countries.

Next, consider the class-specific volatility. The most conspicuous aspect of this second comparison is the increase of the class-specific volatility in France from one period to the other. While, overall, the French system became less competitive, its class cleavage became more open for competition. In other words, the class cleavage became more salient in France. This is reflected in the last two columns of the table, which give the respective...
shares of the total volatility that can be attributed to the class cleavage in each country. If we add to this result the comparatively strong competition within the two blocks of the left and the right, which is included in the still rather high total volatility, we get a confirmation of the continued political salience of the various traditional cleavages in France.

The smaller countries provide a stark contrast to the French case. In Switzerland and the Netherlands, the redoubling in total volatility is not accompanied by a corresponding increase in class-specific volatility. As a result, the share of class-specific volatility decreases. In other words, the salience of the class cleavage in the context of electoral competition is reduced. It is quite likely that, in these two countries, the increase in the overall volatility is primarily linked to an opening up of the traditional cleavages, as well as to the electoral repercussions of the mobilization of the new social movements.

Finally, with respect to Germany, we would like to underline that its class-specific volatility is no longer higher than that in the two smaller countries, which reflects, in our view, the considerable pacification of the German class cleavage in the postwar period.

Although this test is far from rigorous, the data provided by Bartolini and Mair confirm the general sense of our previous discussion of the mobilization potential of the traditional cleavages in the four countries, independently of the actual mobilization capacity of the various cleavages in the arena of movement politics. Table 1.3 briefly summarizes this discussion. It points out quite clearly the saliency of the French case, in comparison with the other three countries. Given the largely nonpacified character of the French traditional cleavages, we expect that the "space" for the mobilization of the new social movements was particularly restricted in France, and that, therefore, the mobilization of the French new social movements has been weaker than that of the new social movements in the other three countries. Moreover, given our assessment that the French class-specific potentials in particular have been "exclusively" mobilized up to and including most of the period under study, we expect that the new social movements in France had to meet with particularly stiff competition from the organizations from the left. The only instance of another relatively salient traditional cleavage concerns the center-periphery cleavage in Switzerland. This implies that among the other three countries, the Swiss new social movements were experiencing somewhat greater competition for mobilizing space than the German and the Dutch ones. In other words, if anything, the Swiss new social movements should turn out to be somewhat weaker, in comparative terms, than the German and the Dutch ones.
Table 1.3. The mobilization potential of the traditional cleavages in the four countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cleavages</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Switzerland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Center-periphery</td>
<td>Exclusive</td>
<td>Available</td>
<td>Available</td>
<td>(Exclusive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>Inclusive</td>
<td>Available</td>
<td>Latent</td>
<td>Available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural-urban</td>
<td>Latent</td>
<td>Latent</td>
<td>Latent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class</td>
<td>Inclusive</td>
<td>Available</td>
<td>Available</td>
<td>Available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: If a given pattern is present, but less pronounced, it is put in parentheses.

Some Tentative Empirical Results

Our newspaper data allow us to test this hypothesis in a first, rather tentative way. More detailed discussions of the relationship between traditional cleavages and the mobilization of new social movements will follow in subsequent chapters. For the time being, we have two rough indicators at our disposal for the analysis of this relationship. First, we shall consider the overall distribution of unconventional events over the different movements. As is discussed in more detail in the Appendix, "unconventional" events cover all actions of a demonstrative, confrontational, or violent type. Not included under this heading are conventional actions of a political (various kinds of lawsuits), political (lobbying, letter writing to politicians, participation in consultation procedures, etc.), or media-directed (leafletting, press conferences, public tribunals, etc.) nature, as well as direct-democratic events. The distribution of unconventional events is shown in table 1.4.

This table gives a rather detailed description of the distribution in question, but let us concentrate for the moment on the total share of events accounted for by the different new social movements, on the one hand, and the corresponding share accounted for by other mobilization processes, on the other. As a comparison of these shares across countries shows, our expectations about the impact of the strength of traditional cleavages on the mobilization of the new cleavage are largely confirmed. In France, where the traditional conflicts continue to be rather strong, the new social movements’ share of the total number of events is much more limited (36.1 percent) than in the other three countries. The four traditional cleavages we discussed earlier account for almost 40 percent of the unconventional events in France, whereas their share varies between only 10.1 percent in Germany and 17.7 percent in Switzerland. The mobilization on these four cleavages is indicated by lines 14 to 18 in table 1.4, which refer to regionalist movements (center-periphery), education (religious), farmers (urban-rural), and to the labor movement and other left mobilizations (class cleavage). The remaining events...
### Table 1.4. Distribution of unconventional events by movement (1975-89)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Movement</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Switzerland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear weapons</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other peace movement</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear energy</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecological movement</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homelessness</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squatters' movements</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other environmental movements</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antiracism</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other solidarity movements</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squatter movements</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countercultural movements</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homosexual movements</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's movement</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total NSMs</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>61.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student movement</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil rights movement</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreigners</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regionalist movements</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial movements</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other left</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internationalization</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious movements</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other right mobilization</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other mobilization</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total not-NSMs</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All mobilization</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The squatters' movement includes actions for autonomous youth centers, mainly to be found in Switzerland. The category "other countercultural" includes actions by groups like the Autonomen or terrorist organizations that are not directed at the goals of any of the other NSMs. "Countermobilization" refers to all actions directed against the new social movements listed in the table. Examples are demonstrations against abortion or the nuclear power industry. "Civil rights" refers to actions directed against the regime, but not those that are part of the movements of that country. "Foreigners" refers to actions by residents of foreign origin, against both the regime in their country of origin and their treatment in the country of residence. The figures for the labor movement do not include strikes (see Appendix, the section titled "Why Monday Issues?"). But they do include any other action that may take place around strikes (for instance, factory occupations or demonstrations).

According to this indicator, new social movements take the largest share of the overall mobilization in Germany. In Switzerland, the relative share of unconventional events attributable to new social movements is limited, as were produced by mobilization processes that are not readily attributable to either the new social movements or movements associated with the four traditional cleavages.

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expected, by the moderate strength of the center-periphery cleavage. More detailed analyses show that, in this case, it is indeed the conflict in the Jura region that was responsible for the rather conspicuous presence of regionalist mobilizations (10.8 percent of the events as compared to 16.6 percent in France). The Jura conflict in the canton of Bern was of considerable importance throughout the postwar period. After many years of intermittent mobilization, it started to escalate in the late sixties and peaked in the course of the seventies. In 1979, the conflict was partially solved with the creation of a new canton, the canton of Jura (Rennwald 1994). The solution was only partial, however, because the new canton did not cover the whole territory claimed by the regionalist movement, which continued to mobilize throughout the eighties. In the Netherlands, the number of events produced by the labor movement is somewhat higher than we would have expected on the basis of the previous discussion (9.2 percent of events as compared to 10.1 percent in France). A more detailed analysis will have to show what accounts for this comparatively strong unconventional mobilization of the Dutch labor movement.

Our first indicator only takes into account one aspect of the magnitude of collective action—its frequency. Other aspects include its duration, its size (number of participants per event), and the intensity of the involvement required (Tilly 1978: 96). We propose a second indicator that takes into account the size of the events. We shall exclude from the calculations based on this indicator all demonstrative events that require only a minimal level of involvement; in other words, we exclude petitions and political festivals. Table 1.5 presents the volume of participation in the various movements of the four countries. If we concentrate again, for the time being, on the relative weight of the mobilization of the new social movements, our expectations are once more confirmed. In France, the mobilizing capacity of the new social movements again turns out to be much weaker than that of the traditional movements, whereas exactly the contrary obtains in the other three countries. In fact, the weakness of the French new social movements turns out to be even more serious, if we evaluate them on the basis of this second indicator. These movements account for only 24.5 percent of the participation in unconventional events, compared to 64.7 percent in Switzerland, 72.0 percent in the Netherlands, and almost 80 percent in Germany. However, not all new social movements are equally constrained by the mobilization potential of the traditional cleavages in France. Thus, the mobilization for peace issues that do not concern nuclear weapons and the mobilization against racism reach a
## Table 1.5. Volume of participation in unconventional events by movement (1975-89), in 1,000s per million inhabitants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Movement</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Switzerland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Nuclear weapons</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Other peace movement</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Human rights</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Enviromental movement</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Other solidarity movement</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Nuclear energy</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Ecology movement</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Antiracism</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Other solidarity movement</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Women's movement</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total NSMs</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Student movement</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Civil rights movement</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Foreigners</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Educational movement</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Education</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Labor movement</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Other left</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Other right</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>19. Right-wing extremists</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>20. Other right</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Other mobilizations</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total not-NSMs</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### All mobilization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Movement</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Switzerland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Note:

- Sum of the number of participants in all unconventional actions per million residents (Germany 61.6 million; France 53.3 million; Netherlands 14.1 million; Switzerland 6.4 million). Figures for France are for 1979, and for the rest, 1980. Missing values have been replaced by the national median of the number of participants for a given type of event (e.g., a demonstration). Figures have been rounded to thousands, figures below 500 are given as 0. Petitions and festivals are excluded (see text). Strikes were not included in the newspaper sample (see Appendix). They are based on International Labor Organization (ILO) figures.

volume comparable to that of the other countries. As we shall argue in chapter 3, these mobilizations benefited from the support of allies on the left.

With respect to the traditional cleavages, our second indicator shows that if the center-periphery cleavage gave rise to a particularly large number of events in France, it did not mobilize very many people. Instead, the religious cleavage (i.e., educational issues) and the class cleavage (i.e., the labor movement)...
were particularly mobilizing in France during the period under consideration.

If we add all strikes that took place in this period to the set of unconventional events we collected in our newspaper analyses (not line 23 in table 1.5), the relative mobilization potential of the French new social movements is further reduced. They now account for no more than roughly one-tenth (10.7 percent) of the total mobilization, compared to roughly two-thirds of the total mobilization in each of the other three countries. Adding strikes reveals the enormous strength of the class cleavage in France, which, on the basis of this indicator, accounts for no less than two-thirds of the people mobilized by unconventional events. Some readers may consider it inappropriate to classify strikes among unconventional events. We believe, however, that it is justified to regard them as unconventional for the period and the countries we are dealing with here. On the one hand, one should not forget that for pacified union movements such as the Dutch, German, and Swiss movements, strikes are quite unconventional ways of pursuing their workers' interests. In Switzerland, for example, collective agreements between employers' associations and unions typically do not allow the workers to strike. On the other hand, as we have just seen, strikes are, indeed, quite frequent in France. But, as Schain (1980: 201) has pointed out, the style of the strike in France is often rather close to what we understand as a political demonstration: it takes the form of mass meetings, marches, and frequent attempts to mobilize the support of the broader public. Indeed, the style of the strike is to politicize, rather than to isolate, industrial conflict. We believe, therefore, that strikes are best categorized among demonstrative actions in all of our countries. But even if strikes are treated as less unconventional than we claim them to be, this result confirms the crucial importance the pacification of the traditional class cleavage has for the mobilization potential of the new social movements.

Finally, if we also take into account the petitions and political festivals, which we have excluded from the calculations presented in table 1.5, the overall results do not change very much: the mobilization potential of the French new social movements remains quite marginal, whereas these movements are still shown to be predominant in all the other three countries. If we add these two action forms, which require very little involvement, the new social movements turn out to be somewhat less prominent in Switzerland, because political festivals belong above all to the action repertoire of the regionalist movement and its countermovement in the Jura, which have mobilized large numbers of people for the festivals of the "people of the Jura."
Table 1.6. Summary of relative strength of the new social movements in the four countries (percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Switzerland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Relative number of unconventional events (table 1.4)</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>75.2</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>61.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Relative size of mobilization capacity (table 1.5)</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>79.6</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>64.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Relative size of mobilization capacity (as 2, but including strikes)</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>63.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Relative size of mobilization capacity (as 3, but including petitions/festivals)</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>58.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.6 presents a summary of the different measures of the relative strength of the new social movements in the four countries. The figures in table 1.6 also allow us to compare the absolute size of the mobilization capacity of new social movements and traditional mobilizations between the four countries. These figures are directly comparable, since they measure the number of people that have been mobilized per one million inhabitants. Excluding festivals, petitions, and strikes, we note that the new social movements in Switzerland have a mobilizing capacity roughly two and one-half times as important as that of their French counterparts. But the corresponding Dutch capacity is roughly three times and the German capacity roughly four times as large. On the other hand, strikes alone have had a greater mobilizing capacity in France than all the new social movements taken together in each one of the other three countries. If we exclude strikes from consideration, the four traditional cleavages have proved to be as mobilizing in France as the new social movements in Switzerland, but not quite as mobilizing as these movements have been in the Netherlands and in Germany.

The figures in table 1.6 also allow us to compare the overall level of mobilization in the four countries. This overall level is strongly dependent on the forms of action that we include in the analysis, as the differences between the totals including and those excluding strikes indicate. While it is true that the country-specific characteristics of the action repertoire are not wholly independent of a country's cleavage structure—the prominent place of political festivals in the Swiss regionalist movement is a case in point—action repertoires do not so much depend on the cleavage structure of a country as on its political opportunity structure. This is the subject of the next chapter, which shall also consider variations in the overall levels of mobilization between the four countries.
Conclusion

In this chapter, we have presented some concepts for the discussion of the relationship between the mobilization potential of traditional cleavages and the corresponding capacity of the new social movements to articulate new issues. We have found support for the idea that there exists a zero-sum relationship between the two. The French case has been particularly revealing in this respect. Our hypothesis that salient traditional cleavages can be quite constraining for the mobilization of new social movements has been confirmed by the French case. By contrast, where traditional cleavages are no longer closed and have been pacified, the new social movements seem, indeed, to find more "space" to mobilize. The availability of the social groups belonging to the constituency of the old and the new left—which are defined by the class cleavage—has turned out to be crucial in this respect, because these groups are most likely to form a constituency of the new social movements, too. The availability of some other groups, which are defined in terms of the three remaining traditional cleavages—farmers, orthodox Protestants or Catholics, ethnic minorities, or regional groups—is likely to be less significant for the mobilization potential of the new social movements, since these groups typically do not share their concerns in the first place. However, to the extent that these other three traditional cleavages are not pacified, they still dominate the political agenda in movement politics, absorb public attention, and provide master frames for the interpretation of political mobilization in general. Accordingly, we have found that, contrary to what Brand (1985) had expected, all un pacified traditional cleavages impose important constraints on the mobilization potential of new social movements, even if they do not directly involve social groups that belong to their main constituencies.
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